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 This dissertation examines the impacts of interfirm variables on both invention and 
commercialization activities, following Greve’s (2003) suggestion that innovation research will 
be enriched if more studies integrate invention and commercialization activities to understand 
the entire innovation development process.  Utilizing two established theoretical perspectives—
organizational learning and institutional theory—six sets of hypotheses are developed 
containing the following interfirm variables: 1) direct and indirect ties, 2) strength of direct ties, 
3) structural holes, 4) prominence of direct partners, 5) exploration and exploitation partners, 
and 6) horizontal and vertical networks.  The dissertation also predicts that these interfirm 
variables would contribute to either invention or commercialization activities.  
Examining 262 publicly traded biopharmaceutical firms from 1986 to 2003, the study 
demonstrates that the interfirm variables significantly influence the invention and 
commercialization outcomes.  While some interfirm variables positively influence the number 
of patents of a focal firm, they could have a negative impact upon the number of marketed drug 
applications and revenue.  A managerial implication from the findings is that a focal firm may 
want to clarify its objectives before engaging in any interfirm collaboration by examining the 
multiple dimensions of its interfirm network and to identify its posture toward alliances.  Due 
to the complexity and length of invention and commercialization activities, future research is 
warranted to investigate further the impacts of these interfirm predictors on important, but 
relatively ignored, product innovation outcomes (i.e., the number of new projects and licensing, 





CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Scholars have attempted to understand innovation-related factors since Schumpeter 
(1934) wrote a seminal paper about innovation activities.  At present, scholars have identified 
several factors that are located both inside and outside any managerial control of influence.  
Among several innovation-related factors, three uncontrollable factors include organizational 
inertia, technological breakthrough, and institutional and market dynamics.  Regarding 
controllable factors, several scholars suggested that management could influence the 
outcomes of innovation through their strategies, organizational structure, and behaviors of 
management.  Despite notions that management may influence the outcomes of innovation, 
nobody comprehends how innovation occurs and to what extent management may achieve 
successful innovation activities.  Regardless of innovation-related factors, scrutinized 
carefully and continuously for several decades, Damanpour (1996) suggested that the 
development of innovation knowledge had not been adequate.      
 An analysis of prior research in innovation areas reveals that the terms and concepts of 
innovation studies are still messy and unorganized.  For instance, scholars applied the term 
“innovation” in diverse contexts and definitions.  Despite Schumpeter’s early suggestion that 
innovation consists of three sequential types of activities—invention, innovation, and 
imitation—later researchers apparently ignored these terms and used the term “innovation” at 
their own discretion.  For example, Rogers (1995) used the terms “innovation” and 
“technology” interchangeably.  He also used the term of “diffusion of innovation” to replace 
Schumpeter’s term of “innovation” and/or “imitation.”  Additionally, most management 
studies used the term “innovation” to elaborate the concepts of “invention.”  For example, 
several important studies used numbers of granted patents, R&D intensity, and patent citation 
to represent the term “innovation outcomes” (Ahuja, 2000a; Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & 
Moesel, 1996; Shan, Walker, & Kogut, 1994; Stuart, 2000).  Comparing the variables used by 
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these studies with Schumpeter’s innovation definitions, I suggest that the scholars label their 
dependent variables as “invention outcomes” rather than “innovation outcomes.”     
 Replacing the term “invention” with “innovation” in their studies, scholars in prior 
studies limited the scope of study to focus solely on Schumpeter’s term of invention activities 
or, at most, the early stage of commercialization activities.  By using innovation activities 
alone, scholars completely left out commercialization and adoption activities.  It is even more 
surprising that there appears to be only a few empirical studies aimed at understanding the 
impact of interorganizational networks on commercialization activities.  Whereas several 
studies in interorganizational relationships discussed related variables for “adoption” (Davis, 
1991; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991), there were only two qualitative case 
studies in management that explained factors associated with successful commercialization 
activities (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997).  One may argue that 
perhaps the knowledge of commercialization belongs to the marketing field; however, 
commercialization is one of the most crucial innovation activities that generate needed 
resources for firms to survive and thrive.  In fact, successful commercialization activities feed 
a focal firm its invention activities and receive like response in return. 
 In recognition of the limitations of innovation definitions in the field of management, this 
study addresses the terminological issues of innovation thoroughly.  Establishing and 
clarifying the constructs of innovation importantly allow the theoretical development in this 
particular area to proceed (Pfeffer, 1993).  Therefore, this study proposes to use the term 
“invention” to represent the act of creating or developing a new product or process; 
“commercialization” to represent the process of creating a commercial product from an 
invention; and “adoption” as the process of imitation of innovation by similar firms.  
Accordingly, in this present study, the term “innovation” covers three sequential and 
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interdependent activities, beginning with invention activities, commercialization activities, 
and adoption activities.   
 Further, this study follows Wejnert’s (2002) concept of “public consequence” to narrow 
the scope of the study to cover only invention and commercialization activities.  Wejnert 
(2002) explained that unlike private consequences that affect the well-being of either 
individuals or small collective entities such as organizations, peer groups, and rural 
communities, public consequences deal with the inventions leading to historical 
breakthroughs that impact total societies (i.e., laws protecting civil rights, welfare policy, 
patent laws, or international regulation protecting the natural environment).  Following the 
concepts of public and private consequences, this study elaborates the differences between 
“process” and “product” innovations to clarify the stages of innovation in the section of 
innovation studies.  Product innovation generates public consequence because it primarily 
deals with commercialization activities, unlike process innovation which is more likely to 
produce private consequence from adoption activities.    
 Focusing on the concept of product innovation (Greve, 2003), the premise is that 
innovation research will be enriched if more studies integrate invention and 
commercialization activities.  This will culminate in an understanding of the innovation 
development process as a whole.  Please note that the study examines sequential and 
interdependent innovation activities, aiming to advance knowledge of an integrated 
innovation performance (i.e. product innovation).  The main thesis of this paper suggests that 
the linkages between activities must hold simultaneously to provide support for relationships 
between invention and commercialization performance.  Therefore, success or failure in 
product innovation is derived by the performance of both invention and commercialization 
activities.   
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 Although a stream of product innovation studies in the field of interorganizational 
network often becomes increasingly popular, prior studies rarely have incorporated invention 
and commercialization activities in tandem to advance knowledge of the product innovation 
process.  One exception is a study published in Strategic Management Journal, offering a 
comprehensive framework to elaborate interorganizational networks of biotechnology firms 
and product innovation processes (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004).  Moreover, two studies used 
dependent variables reflecting the concepts of invention and commercialization (i.e., 
innovation speed and patent renewals) (Kessler, Bierly, & Gopalakrishnan, 2000; Spencer, 
2003).  In addition to these particular studies, this study will review other important studies in 
this area in Chapter 3.    
   To foreshadow the structure of this study, Chapter 2 provides an empirical context of 
this study, explaining the scope of the biopharmaceutical industry.  The biopharmaceutical 
industry represents a testing ground because the unique characteristics of the industry lend 
nearly perfect conditions for outcomes in terms of interorganizational networks and product 
innovation activities.  Past studies focused on how biotechnology firms interacted with 
research oriented institutions and chemical-based pharmaceutical companies to achieve 
patentable inventions (Shan et al., 1994; Wuyts, Dutta, & Stremersch, 2004).  Rothaermel 
(2001) indicated that the biopharmaceutical industry is composed of traditional 
pharmaceutical companies, fully dedicated biotechnology firms, and nonprofit research 
institutions and universities that engage in biotechnology research.   
 The primary research question is to examine multiple dimensions of interorganizational 
network that promote sustainable performance in terms of the product innovation.  
Consequently, this study focuses on a center of the networking system—a biopharmaceutical 
firm.  With the understanding that the biopharmaceutical firm represents a driving force of 
interorganizational innovation networks, thereby undertaking invention and 
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commercialization activities, all important factors of the firm’s interorganizational networks 
will be examined.  Several other sections in chapter 2 include the important characteristics of 
the biopharmaceutical industry, roles of the patent protection, collaborative environments 
among biopharmaceutical organizations, and potential sources of data in the industry.    
 Chapter 3 is the literature review of innovation studies.  Starting with general knowledge 
of innovation, I discuss several academic perspectives of innovation (i.e. evolutionary, 
behavioral, economics, and sociological perspectives).  Then, I review several important 
innovation studies both in organizational and interorganizational levels.  Following the 
perspective of product innovation, I separate prior studies into two main sections—invention 
and commercialization.  I also discuss several studies that incorporate invention and 
commercialization in their analyses.  Then, several studies of product innovation in the field 
of interorganizational network are reviewed in detail.  Last, I categorize several important 
innovation studies, identify dependent and independent variables and empirical findings, and 
list data sources. 
 Chapter 4 importantly deals with hypothesis development in the study.  To indicate 
motivation for the hypotheses, I briefly summarize both theoretical concepts of organizational 
learning and institutional theories.  Since a number of scholars believe that innovation is a 
phenomenon, it is important to incorporate the two theoretical concepts to provide framework 
for the study, which allows recognition of multiple dimensions of interorganizational 
variables as predictors of invention and commercialization outcomes in product innovation.  
Basically, firms engage in interorganizational networks to generate invention and 
commercialization outcomes a) by learning from internal and external environments, b) by 
gaining acceptance and institutional supports from the market, and c) through interfirm peers.  
Based on two theoretical perspectives, the study proposes six sets of hypotheses and one 
concluding hypothesis.  Specifically, the study extends Ahuja’s (2000a) concepts of direct 
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and indirect ties in order to understand focal firm performance in terms of invention and 
commercialization activities.  In the subsequent sections, the study proposes several 
hypotheses to understand concepts of tie-strength (Granovetter, 1973, 1983) and structural 
holes (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988).  This study avers that the first three dimensions of an 
interfirm network should be used to predict a focal firm’s product innovation performance. 
 Next, the prominence of a focal firm’s partners (Stuart, 2000) is hypothesized to predict 
the focal firm’s invention and commercialization outcomes.  Afterward, the concepts of 
network orientations (i.e., exploration and exploitation partners) are examined (March, 1991; 
Rothaermel et al., 2004), regardless of the position of focal firms.  Last, the concepts of focal 
firms’ horizontal and vertical alliances from Kotabe and Swan (1995) and Silverman and 
Baum (2002) are used to understand invention and commercialization.   
 From hypotheses 1 to 6, it is interesting to note that whereas multiple dimensions of 
interorganizational networks from the perspectives of organizational learning and 
institutional approach are predicted to foster invention activities, these dimensions are 
simultaneously predicted to harm commercialization activities, and vice versa.  Thus, the last 
hypothesis predicts that, taking into account the stability of biopharmaceutical interfirm 
networks (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996), negative relationships between invention 
and commercialization performances should be found for focal firms.   
 Chapter 5 deals with the methodologies of this study, elaborating on the primary data 
sources, BioScan Directory, COMPUSTAT, Drug@FDA, and LexisNexis.  These four data 
sources offer comprehensive information regarding the publicly traded biopharmaceutical 
firms from 1977 to present, which permits the study to employ cross-sectional time series 
analyses.  The next section of this chapter elaborates three dependent variables, six main 
predictors, and several control variables.  In brief, the number of patents of a focal firm is 
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used to capture its invention performance each year.  Additionally, the number of marketed 
drug applications and revenues are the two commercialization outcomes of the focal firm.   
 The first set of the interfirm predictors includes the number of direct and indirect ties of 
the focal firms.  The social network software called “UCINET” facilitates the collecting 
process for this set of variables.  UCINET generates the density measure and the brokerage 
measure of each focal firm’s network.  These two measures are used to capture the second 
predictor—levels of structural holes.  Next, the strength of ties is the third interfirm predictor.  
I calculate the average tenures of a focal firm’s relationships with direct partners to determine 
the strength of ties in a particular year.  Next, the fourth predictor is the prominence of the 
direct partners.  This predictor is measured by the frequencies of the direct partners’ news 
articles appearing in LexisNexis.  The frequencies are measured in the period of ten years 
prior to the study.   
 The fifth set of predictors includes the focal firm’s exploration and exploitation partners.  
The alliances’ propensities to invention and commercialization are determined in the period 
of ten years prior to the study.  If a focal firm collaborates with a set of alliances that generate 
a high number of patents, the focal firm deals with exploration partners.  Inversely, if a focal 
firm deals with a set of alliances that obtain a high number of drug applications issued at the 
FDA, the focal firm collaborates with exploitation partners. 
 The last set of interfirm predictors is more complicated than the previous set of variables, 
because it involves the positions of a focal firm and its alliances in the drug development 
process.  Using the same scheme to determine exploration and exploitation types of focal 
firms, I compare the posture of a focal firm and its alliances to determine the position of the 
focal firm and its networks—upstream and downstream horizontal networks and the upstream 
and downstream vertical networks.  After testing for the impacts of multiple dimensions of 
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interfirm networks on invention and commercialization, the study evaluates the directions of 
all predictors to test the seventh hypothesis.                    
 In the last section of Chapter 5, the study addresses the control variables.  According to 
previous studies, the invention and commercialization outcomes of a focal firm are 
determined by several external and internal variables that are independent to the interfirm 
factors.  Therefore, this study controls for a focal firm’s propensities to invention and 
commercialization and its status, measured by the focal firm’s tenure as a public firm and the 
closing stock price.  Equity financing events are also added to control for instantaneous 
effects on invention and commercialization.  Additionally, the research controls for the 
diversification level and profitability levels of a focal firm.  Size as captured by the number 
of employees is also another controlled variable.  To control for a focal firm’s internal source 
of innovativeness, the study focuses on the focal firm’s R&D expense.  Lastly, the study 
controls for differences in years and industries among focal firms. 
 Chapter 6 reports the analytical techniques and results of the study.  The beginning of the 
chapter discusses the model specifications and estimations.  An elaboration of the fixed-
effects and random-effects models explains why the random-effects models are more 
appropriate in my study.  The study also examines the basic characteristics of the dataset and 
proposes to use the panel negative binomial regression model, the panel zero-inflated 
binomial regression model, and the generalized least squares (GLS) estimator to test 
significant contributions of all proposed interfirm variables on the patenting rates, the number 
of marketed drug applications, and the revenues of focal firms, respectively. 
 In this chapter, the basic statistical information (i.e., the number of direct ties, the number 
of indirect ties) suggests that the biopharmaceutical industry approaches maturity.  The focal 
firms collaborate with their alliances to achieve invention and commercialization 
performances.  Some findings about the impacts of direct and indirect ties toward invention 
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are consistent with prior studies.  In the commercialization activities, while the number of 
direct ties contributes to the revenue, the number of indirect ties deteriorates it.  The density 
of a focal firm’s network contributes negatively to the number of marketed drug applications.  
Likewise, the brokerage opportunities of a focal firm’s network suggest negative revenue for 
the focal firm.   
 Next, the tenure of a focal firm’s network negatively contributes to the patenting rate, yet 
increases the focal firm’s revenue.  The prominence of alliances increases the number of 
marketed drug applications.  However, the prominence reduces the revenue of the focal firm.  
Additionally, while the exploration ties improve revenue, they reduce the number of 
marketed drug applications for a focal firm.  For the last set of the predictors, the horizontal 
upstream network decreases revenues, whereas the downstream vertical network jeopardizes 
the number of patents of a focal firm.  Because of the complementary effects generated by the 
two vertical networks—upstream and downstream vertical networks—the two networks 
improve the revenue for a focal firm.  
 Chapter 7 discusses the results and concludes the dissertation, revisiting all significant 
predictors, in an attempt to understand the discrepancies between the hypotheses and the 
significant findings.  The study deploys theoretical perspectives from organizational learning 
and institutional theory to further explain the significant results.  Stating the importance of 
the integrated framework of invention and commercialization allows an address of some 
effects not previously seen or examined in previous studies.  The study discusses the external 
and internal validity of this study, as well as managerial implications, research implications, 
and limitations at the end of the final chapter.    
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CHAPTER 2: EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
 In this chapter, the study provides details of the biopharmaceutical industry as the 
empirical setting.  Beginning with the definition and scope of the industry, specific 
information examines characteristics of the industry, roles of patent protection in the industry, 
and collaborative environments among different types of organizations.  Lastly, the study 
gathers all important studies and elaborates on empirical findings, as well as data sources 
used to study the particular industry. 
2.1 The Scope of the Biopharmaceutical Industry 
 The term “biotechnology” was coined by a Hungarian farmer in 1917; however, its 
definition varies considerably across countries, as well as different periods in history (Stehr, 
2004).  Biotechnology comprises three main technologies: recombinant DNA, first 
discovered by Boyer and Cohen in 1973; monoclonal anti-body, first discovered by Kohler 
and Milstein in 1975; and protein engineering technology, developed in the 1980s.  These 
three main technologies offer the “prospect of producing an array of highly valuable 
processes and products in areas such as human health, crop production and protection, 
chemical feedstock production and processing, food processing, and waste management” 
(Liebeskind, Oliver, Zucker, & Brewer, 1996).   
 Regarding the formal definition of biotechnology, the office of Technology Assessment 
of the United States Congress (dismantled in 1995) defined “biotechnology” as any specific 
technique that uses substance from living organisms to generate a product, to improve plants 
or animals, or to develop microorganisms for specific uses.  Thus, formally defined, the scope 
of biotechnology may be so broad as to cover several areas of natural sciences, including cell 
and molecular biology, biochemistry, and engineering and computer science, to name only 
the major areas.  Additionally, many applications of biotechnology include the production of 
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new and improved foods, industrial chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and livestock (Barnum, 
2005).   
 Regarding the scope of its industry, Bergeron and Chan (2004) suggested that “at 
minimum, biotech is synonymous with the high-stakes pharmaceutical industry.”  However, 
because a number and range of stakeholders are involved in the biotech value chain, it is 
difficult to pinpoint the overlapped areas of the biotechnology industry and pharmaceutical 
industry.  According to the authors, “bringing a drug into market involves equipment 
manufacturers, highly skilled research, a research and production facility, a fulfillment 
infrastructure, a score of legal personnel to handle patents and liability issues, a marketing 
and sales force, advertising agencies, journals, and other media outlets” (Bergeron & Chan, 
2004).  Therefore, due to the interdependency of the overlapped activities in the 
biotechnology industry of the pharmaceutical industry, it is reasonable to include all types of 
organizations in the biotech value chain into the same boundary.   
 To simplify the situation, the study adopts the term “the biopharmaceutical industry” 
(Rothaermel, 2001) to represent a boundary that combines the biotechnology industry with 
the pharmaceutical industry.  The biopharmaceutical industry reflects “the industry composed 
of traditional pharmaceutical companies, such as Merck or Eli Lilly, that utilize 
biotechnology for drug discovery and development, as well as fully dedicated biotechnology 
firms, such as Amgen or Genentech, and nonprofit research institutions and universities 
engaged in biotechnology research” (Rothaermel, 2001).   
 In fact, the interdependence of the activities among biotechnology firms and 
pharmaceutical firms may be seen more clearly if the economy is divided into specific groups 
of industries.  Before 1997, the standard industrial classification (SIC) represented an attempt 
of the US Bureau of the Census to classify differences among industries.  Since then, SIC has 
been revised as the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) to classify 
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different industries.  According to NAICS, the manufacturing sector is section 31-33, while 
chemical manufacturing is specifically assigned to fall into section 325.  Within chemical 
manufacturing, the section of NAICS 3254 is particularly assigned for industries of 
pharmaceuticals and medicines (i.e., NAICS 325411-325414).  According to this 
classification, this is where firms in the biopharmaceutical industry operate.  The NAICS 
codes and their details for the pharmaceutical industry are shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Pharmaceutical Industry 2001 (NAICS 3254)   




3254 Pharmaceuticals and Medicines 140.66 101.93
325411 Medicinal and Botanicals 11.59 7.34
325412 Pharmaceutical preparations 113.99 83.56
325413 In vitro diagnostic substances 7.29 5.42
325414 Biological products (except diagnostic) 7.79 5.61
Source: Medicinal and Botanical Manufacturing, U.S. Census Bureau, December 2004. 
 The combined value of shipment is the total sales of all firms operating in the industry.  
The value added is defined as the value of shipments, less cost of raw materials and cost of 
manufacture.  In other words, it is the additional value created by all firms in the industry.  
The products from the subsection of pharmaceutical preparations represent the largest total 
sales and the highest value added to the overall biopharmaceutical industry.  Interestingly, 
despite the fact that in vitro diagnostic substances (NAICS 725413) are therapeutics used 
outside the human body and thus are supposedly being scrutinized less carefully than those of 
other in vivo therapeutics by the FDA, in vitro diagnostic substances accounted for only 2.6% 
of total shipments in the pharmaceutical industry.      
2.2 Important Characteristics of the Biopharmaceutical Industry 
In the mid-1970s, the development of the U.S. biotechnology industry included the 
founding of large numbers of new biotechnology firms, dedicated to the commercialization of 
scientific developments in genetic engineering.  Rothaermel et al. wrote: “the emergence of 
the biotechnology industry can be interpreted as a radical process of innovation that broke the 
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barriers of entry into the pharmaceutical industry, among other industries” (2004: 208).  
Lacking biotechnology knowledge, established pharmaceutical firms engaged in 
biotechnology research by forming alliances with the new biotech firms through long-term 
contracts or by forming joint ventures.   
In turn, the new biotech firms entered into long-term relationships with established firms 
to obtain such complementary assets as product testing, production, marketing and 
distribution capabilities that the new biotech firms lacked at the outset of their development.  
Thus, the first and the most important characteristic of the biopharmaceutical industry was its 
network structure of interorganizational alliances that govern the exchange of complementary 
assets among the biotech firms, scientists, and established pharmaceutical firms (Liebeskind 
et al., 1996).  According to Lerner et al. (2003), numerous small research-intensive firms in 
the biopharmaceutical industry finance primarily through public financing by entering into 
strategic alliances with pharmaceutical companies.  Because of a unique tendency toward 
strategic alliances, the biopharmaceutical industry is identified as the industry with the 
highest alliance frequency among several other industries (Hagedoorn, 1993).  The study 
discusses collaborative environmental details of the biopharmaceutical industry in the next 
section.     
 Second, similar to the pharmaceutical industry, the business model of the 
biopharmaceutical industry is recognized as a blockbuster.  Regarding the model, Bergeron 
and Chan (2004) explained that the blockbuster business model of firms in the 
pharmaceutical industry generally reflects firm behaviors in the biopharmaceutical industry.  
They indicated that, in tandem to companies in movie and book-publishing industries, 
pharmaceutical companies live or die based on the success of one or two blockbusters every 
year or so.  Particularly in the pharmaceutical industry, a blockbuster drug may earn as much 
as $1 billion or more in annual revenue.   
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 Drugs such as SmithKline’s Tagmet®, Glaxo’s Zantac®, Syntex’s Naprosyn®, and 
Bristol-Meyers’ Capoten® provide examples of blockbuster drugs.  The blockbuster business 
model draws biopharmaceutical firms to rely on huge revenue from one or two drugs to cover 
their expenses.  It is more difficult for the firms to develop biotechnological drugs that target 
special or niche markets to fetch high levels of income.  Thus, the firms tend to pursue cheap 
and general medicines for a larger mass of population.  As a result, this action draws the 
biopharmaceutical industry to produce, market, and distribute mass-produced medicine for a 
larger group of people, rather than the more expensive biotechnological medicines that 
potentially offer fewer side effects and greater efficacy.   
 Third, despite a previous speculation by investors toward biotech, like that in dot-coms, 
statistical records suggest that biotech products represent less than 10 percent of the 
pharmaceutical market.  For instance, pharmaceuticals created using biotechnology, despite 
all hype, represent only about $35 billion of the quarter-trillion dollar pharmaceutical market.  
Due to the expensive, marked-up prices, most people in developing countries, the large global 
market for medicine, can not afford biotechnological products (Bergeron et al., 2004).  The 
limitation in terms of market restriction weakens the significant expectations of 
biotechnology in the pharmaceutical industry, especially in the eyes of multiple investors.      
 Fourth, the hype has gone for the biotech industry after 2000, and there exists tough 
processes of the clinical trials imposed by regulatory agencies.  The tougher trials not only 
pose significant threats to all firms in the biopharmaceutical industry, but also prevent 
numerous biotech drugs delivered through pipelines from to reach the marketplace.  Because 
of this market environment, drugs successfully reaching the marketplace tend to be 
significantly more expensive than traditional pharmaceuticals (Bergeron et al., 2004).  This 
fact contributes substantially to the potentiality of biotechnology in the pharmaceutical 
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industry, by proving that although new technologies are necessary, such technology is not 
sufficient for commercial success.   
 One study in strategic management suggested important strategies for small-and medium-
sized enterprises in the biotechnology industry.  The authors indicated that small-and-medium 
biotech firms should adopt an innovator strategy and invest considerably in R&D activity to 
establish and maintain their first-mover advantages.  Since these smaller firms generally 
suffer size constraints and in turn, consequent resource shortages, the firms must concentrate 
limited resources on particular market niches in the pursuit of an innovator strategy.  
Additionally, the traditional belief that high risks can lead to high returns also may apply for 
large firms, yet that belief fails to apply for small-and-medium sized firms in the 
biotechnology industry (Qian & Li, 2003).   
 This particular research indicated that independent small-and-medium size firms, as 
opposed to corporate-sponsored counterparts and large firms, will carry a higher propensity 
to fail rather than to be successful, due to both disadvantage of their sizes and market jolts 
caused by frequent product obsolescence and unpredictable technological breakthroughs.  
Given risky situations in the biopharmaceutical industry, it is important to elaborate on the 
drug development process to illustrate why the developmental process significantly 
contributes to the success or failure of biopharmaceutical firms.  Additionally, understanding 
the drug development process explains the necessity of collaborations among firms in this 
particular industry. 
2.2.1 Drug Development Process 
 Derived from Bergeron and Chan (2004), Figure 2.1 provides information in regard to the 
modern drug development process as practiced by typical pharmaceutical firms in the United 
States.  The figure illustrates that the first stage, involving drug discovery, pursues 
opportunities to bring natural plants or raw materials to the laboratory.  During the drug 
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discovery stage, firms may gather or collect thousands of candidate drugs.  Therefore, the 
process could take from 2 to 20 years to randomly explore and regard the complex logistic 
processes required to obtain and import the materials.  The next three to six years after the 
drug discovery process include screening and lead development stages for identifying 
candidate drugs that have a desired effect in vitro or in the laboratory using test tubes.   
      Drug Discovery (5,000) 
• Screening 
• Lead Development (10) 
• Preclinical Trials 
 2-20 years  
 }  3-6 Years  
Regulatory Approval                    1-5 Years  
Phase I Clinical Trials (5) 
Phase II Clinical Trials  
Phase III Clinical Trials  }                     5-10 Years  
Final Regulatory Approval (1)                                                        1-5 Years  
Phase IV Clinical Trials                                                                     7 years 
 
Adverse Reaction/Recall                      During Commercialization  
Sources: Bergeron and Chan (2004); Figures in parentheses are the number of candidate drugs, indicating the 
high failure rate of the process. 
Figure 2.1: The Modern Drug Development Process 
 
Elaborating on the in vitro and in vivo, Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) mentioned that in 
vivo represents therapeutics placed inside the human body, whereas in vitro represents 
therapeutics used outside the human body.  The candidate drugs that meet laboratory 
requirements, in this case in vivo, initiate with preclinical trials involving mice, rabbits, or 
other live subjects.  With data from these preclinical trials, a proposal is made to the Federal 
Drug Administration (FDA), requesting to clinically test the candidate drugs with human 
beings.  At this stage the regulatory approval from FDA may take from one to five years, 
depending on the results of the preclinical trials.  Typically, at this stage, only five drugs of 
5,000 candidate drugs, or 0.1 percent, are approved to proceed to the clinical trials. 
 Next, the following clinical trial stage uses three phases, with an increasing number of 
subjects in each phase.  While Phase I may involve dozens of volunteers, Phase II involves 
hundreds of them.  The effectiveness and side effects of the drugs are documented during one 
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to three years of both phases.  Phase III, the final phase for the clinical trial, involves 
thousands of volunteers for periods of two years or more.  Because Phase III is the largest and 
most comprehensive phase, Bergeron and Chan (2004) mentioned that this phase could 
account for 75% or more of a $200 to $800 million drug development budget.  With 
satisfactory results in terms of safety, efficacy, and clinical value of a drug from Phase III, a 
pharmaceutical firm may issue a final application to the FDA, requesting approval to 
commercialize the candidate drug.  Depending on the strength of clinical trials and 
circumstances, a drug with the potential to cure a previously untreatable, deadly disease may 
garner an approval process by exceptional FDA fast tracking.  At this stage, Bergeron and 
Chan (2004) indicated that a typical period without fast tracking by the FDA extended to 
approximately 13 months in 2002; this period, however, was reduced substantially from the 
past, i.e., 33 months in 1989.    
 During the final regulatory approval process, the pharmaceutical company typically 
engages in expensive marketing campaigns of the drugs, spending tens of millions of dollars 
to introduce the upcoming products to the market.  Soon after the approval by the FDA, the 
drug is released to the marketplace.  Then, the pharmaceutical company is responsible for the 
next stage of the modern drug development—Phase IV of clinical trials process.  Phase IV 
extends for as long as the drug is on the market, especially while the drug is patented-
protected and unavailable in generic form.  Within the final stage, if things should go wrong 
for the drug, a recall in this stage would be extremely costly for the firms.  This is because 
not only must the commercial firms deal with patient litigations, but also the monies invested 





2.2.2 Roles of Biotechnology in the Drug Development Process 
 Figure 2.1 shows that the typical drug development process inclusive of basic research, 
clinical trials, regulatory approval processes, and commercialization activities, covers from 
10 to 20 years.  Although the FDA has reduced the approval period of new drugs to the 
market, the process of modern drug development is still lengthy, extremely expensive, and 
fraught with risk.  During the earlier stages of discovery and invention, pharmaceutical firms 
spend millions of dollars for uncertain results.  During the later stages in commercialization, 
pharmaceutical firms also spend millions of dollar to introduce and educate people in the 
market to acknowledge the information regarding the active drug ingredients.  Although the 
amount of money spent on the later stages may equal or exceed that spent on the earlier 
stages of the drug development process, the risks in the commercialization stage are relatively 
less than that of earlier stages, when the firms had to randomly exhaust resources for 
unknown results.  
 Biotechnology contributes to the pharmaceutical industry by significantly decreasing a 
candidate drug’s time to market, thereby minimizing the likelihood of adverse reactions with 
a possible recall in Phase IV clinical trials.  Rather than randomly hunt for plants or natural 
materials that may affect a specific type of disease, researchers use computer modeling to 
determine the molecular structure of the drug that will most likely interfere with the 
metabolism of the disease.  Additionally, the profile of novel synthetic compounds that serve 
as candidate drugs may be stored in expansive libraries for future references and uses.  This 
process offers a potential for shortening the process of development during the drug 
discovery stage.  Thus, a challenge to the biopharmaceutical industry involves new 
approaches to drug development that are short enough to permit pharmaceutical companies to 
initiate favorable action before the patent protection expires, as well as being safe enough to 
avoid Phase IV adverse reaction and recall.  Research and development expenditures have 
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increased since the early 1980s, while the number of drugs approved for market has not 
increased in proportion to the total investment (Kermani & Bonacossa, 2003).  Consequently, 
proponents of biotech contend that the best way for pharmaceutical firms to survive and 
thrive is to leverage their opportunities in biotechnology and thus exploit this unique method 
in the drug development process (Bergeron & Chan, 2004).         
2.3 Roles of Patent Protection in the Biopharmaceutical Industry 
 The overview of biotechnology and the pharmaceutical industry from the previous section 
suggested that research-based pharmaceutical companies with few other interests, such as 
Merck and Bayer, could easily spend 10-25% of sales on their research and development 
projects (Wittcoff, Reuben, & Plotkin, 2004).  Further, for the dedicated biotechnology 
companies, this ratio can be considerably higher.  Between 1990 and 2000, biotechnology 
R&D expenditure increased by 262 percent, whereas that for pharmaceutical rose by 121 
percent over the corresponding period (Kermani et al., 2003).  However, the high ratios of 
R&D to sales of those firms do not guarantee success in the commercialization of new drugs 
in the industry.  Given the risky situation in terms of the modern drug development process in 
biotechnology and the pharmaceutical industry, it is pivoted to understand why and how 
firms in this particular industry willingly spend several million dollars to engage in uncertain 
drug development processes.   
 According to an article in a legal newspaper (Good, 2000), an important driving force in 
the biopharmaceutical economy is the need for an effective system of patent protection.  
Regarding their information, a top manager in a biopharmaceutical firm dramatically 
mentioned that “without patents, the biotechnology industry of today would not exist, and 
there would be no progress in development of new pharmaceutical products.”  Consistent 
with the previous argument, Bergeron and Chan (2004) indicated the importance of patent 
protection in biotech industry.  They mentioned that without patent protection, 
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“pharmaceutical companies would be averse to spend upwards of $800 million to develop a 
new drug for the market.”  Furthermore, universities and research institutes would have less 
economic incentive toward investing years of effort to complete important basic research.   
 Kermani and Bonacossa (2003) reported a 1988 study of 12 industries conducted by the 
University of Pennsylvania; the study estimated that “around 60 percent of pharmaceutical 
products would not have been introduced without adequate patent protection.”  The authors 
explained that the existing environment for intellectual property protection can influence the 
investment behavior of companies.  Specifically, for biopharmaceutical firms, strong patent 
laws are important; not only do the patent laws allow the firms a chance to recoup huge 
investments in R&D, but also the laws allow the firms to reward shareholders who have 
shown commitment and faith in the companies by investing from an early stage.   
 In fact, the effective system of patent protection in the U.S. allows the business of 
successful biopharmaceutical firms to become profitable.  Although the ratio of successful 
drugs to candidate drugs is extremely low (i.e., only one percent of the compounds examined 
in the pre-clinical stage reach the stage of human testing), pharmaceuticals ranked first in 
profits in the 1999 list of Fortune 500 global companies (Carbone, 2003).  Overall, patent 
protection has been essential to the high risk/high profit business structure of the 
biopharmaceutical industry.  Success stories of the biopharmaceutical firms illustrate the 
importance of the patent system in motivating private investment in research and 
development.  Thus, firms in this particular industry consistently outrank other industries in 
terms of patent-sensitivity and R&D expenditures.  
2.3.1 Basic Patent Law Concepts  
 A patent is a legal grant by a government to encourage innovation, technical 
development, and ultimately economic prosperity (Khight, 2001).  Patents are a device in 
which government grants inventors the sole right for a limited period of time to exploit their 
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inventions for commercialization (Wittcoff et al., 2004).  To obtain a patent, the inventor 
must show that the invention is novel and non-obvious.  Since the novel requirement in a 
patent law is difficult to meet for many innovators, it tends to hinder future inventions.  Thus, 
the patent system incorporates non-obviousness as an additional requirement for 
patentability, using non-obvious characteristics determined by a skilled person to help fine 
tune the novelty requirement for promotion of incremental inventions in the market.  
Although the standard for non-obviousness is especially difficult to apply in the chemical and 
biotechnological fields, it is worth remembering in the high technology era where most 
innovation occurs incrementally (Ducor, 1998).   
 The innovator must show that the invention is useful or has utility, in addition to being 
novel and non-obvious.  This usefulness or utility is a requirement that the invention has 
industrial use or value.  Recently, courts require a higher standard of usefulness, however.  In 
fact, patents dealing with advances in genetic technology receive even more stringent 
requirements in terms of usefulness.  According to Knight (2001), many patent offices on a 
world wide basis now require that patents on certain genetic material display ‘real-world’ 
utility, or a clearly expressed use.  In a practical standpoint, this means that, in their patent 
applications, innovators are required to illustrate an example of how the invention will make 
one become better.  Further, the last patent requirement is that innovators must pay not only a 
fee to file the application, but also a fee to have the patent issued.  In most countries, 
maintenance fees are required on a regular basis throughout the term of the patent or patent 
application, to keep the patent in force or the application pending (Knight, 2001).   
 After meeting all patentability requirements, the inventor must teach how to use and make 
the invention.  By publicly disclosing technical information of an invention, others may learn 
from the invention by paying processing fees.  Additionally, the government will grant the 
inventor the right to exclude others from utilizing the invention for a specific period.  So far, 
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the patent system has grown rapidly.  In the United States, Wittcoff et al. (2004) reported that 
whereas it took about 200 years to amass four million patents (until 1976), it took only 15 
more years, to 1991, to accumulate one million more patents.  Regarding a unique aspect of 
patent protection in the biopharmaceutical industry, Carbone (2003) indicated that “unlike 
innovations in information technology, which are often obsolete in a few years, best selling 
pharmaceuticals may generate blockbuster profits over the entire life of the patent.”  Wittcoff 
et al. (2004) wrote that as a result of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 
negotiations, the United States extended the period of patent protection for 20 years; however 
the protection period starts from the date of application instead of issuance (Wittcoff et al., 
2004).   
2.3.2 Specific Issues of Patents in the Biopharmaceutical Industry 
 According to the USPTO, there are three broad categories of patents: utility, design, and 
plant.  An article in Drug Discovery & Development reported that among these types, most 
biotechnology patents fall under the category of utility patent.  Particularly, there are two 
broad categories of utility patent: provisional and nonprovisional.  According to an 
intellectual property attorney in the same article, innovators can file “a provisional 
application before the full application as long as the full application is filed within one year of 
the provisional and the provisional contains a full description of the invention, the date at 
which the novelty of the invention is to be decided will be the date of filing the provisional 
and the date from which the 20-year term starts will be the date of filling the ‘full 
application’” (Terry, 2004).  Regarding the extension of the patent protection period, the 
same attorney reported that patents subject to regulation under the Food Drug and Cosmetic 
Act can be extended.  The period of extension relies on different circumstances, but the main 
reason for the extension relates to the length of the FDA approval process and represents an 
attempt to make up for lost time due to the lag period.     
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 Although the drug inventors require FDA approval to commercialize drugs, there is no 
need for the drug inventors to meet the FDA’s safe and effective requirements to apply for 
their patents (Terry, 2004).  In fact, inventors can apply for their patents as soon as they 
believe they have created patentable inventions and want to protect the inventions.  As soon 
as the scientists find that a discovery or invention has the potential to become a new treatment 
or a successful drug that will improve life for a million people, scientists should immediately 
contact lawyers if they work in a pharmaceutical or biotechnology company.  Otherwise, 
those who work for universities should contact the Office of Technology Transfer.  
According to the article, the Office of Technology Transfer moves technology at the 
university to the market place as effectively as possible either by licensing commercializable 
technology to industry or by patenting the technology (Terry, 2004).   
 While patenting processes are similar across industries, it is important to note that the 
patent system for drugs in the biopharmaceutical industry carries unique characteristics.  
Comparing implications of patent systems for the biopharmaceutical and information 
technology industries, Carbone (2003) explained that whereas firms in the information 
technology industry typically require the rights of many patented components to produce a 
product, drug companies are more likely to depend on a small number of successful patents to 
develop a drug.  Biopharmaceutical firms are more likely to avoid investment in research that 
may be similar to patent rights held by other companies.  Further, firms are more likely to 
aggressively enforce rights they possess (Carbone, 2003).  This suggests that the extent to 
which biotech innovators depend on others’ technology to generate their inventions is less 
than that of their counterparts in the information technology industry.   
 Specifically, Carbone (2003) explained that patents in biotechnology tend to be more 
valuable than patents issued for traditional pharmaceutical firms.  Whereas the traditional 
drug companies targeted small molecule chemicals with effects the drug companies 
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understood and that were relatively easy to design, biotech companies focused on a relatively 
small number of large molecules, reproducing in purified form proteins that were often 
already in use.  The biotech firms subsequently isolated the relevant gene sequence and used 
the recombinant DNA approach to produce an almost limitless supply.  Because the biotech 
mechanism producing the desired results is less well understood than that of the traditional 
drug firms, biotech firms were awarded by the patent authority with broader and more 
valuable patents than those of the chemical patents.  As a result, Carbone (2003) reported that 
“patents on products like insulin or growth hormone earned billions of dollars in profits.”  
 However, one major criticism regarding the broad-based patents acquired by 
biopharmaceutical firms is that the patents may block the next generation of biotechnological 
discoveries.  The broad-based patents reflect unfair practices of right distribution, and they 
are major obstacles to greater innovation in the industry (Carbone, 2003).  Given the fact that 
the biopharmaceutical industry is maturing (Wittcoff et al., 2004) and that there are many 
broad-based patents in the industry, it is difficult for new biotech inventors to develop new 
drugs without incurring additional expenditures.  The additional expenditures that the new 
inventors must spend to acquire and incorporate the broad-based patented technologies into 
their work potentially increase the cost of typically expensive biopharmaceutical 
developments.  This process leads to the extremely high prices of new drugs, preventing 
patients’ access to the new medicines on a global scale.  This fact validates critics who say 
that patents in the biopharmaceutical industry help companies put “profits” before “lives” 
(Kermani et al., 2003).             
2.4 Collaborative Environments in the Biopharmaceutical Industry  
Information about the blockbuster business model among major pharmaceutical firms 
and the patent process within the particular industry from the previous section indicated that 
the firms rely on the success of one or two drugs every year or two to survive in the industry.  
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Using the revenues from the blockbuster drugs to fill the regulatory pipeline with new drugs, 
the firms find indications for drugs already on the market, develop new formulations of 
proven blockbuster drugs, and maneuver around a variety of laws and regulations to exploit 
proprietary technology.  In addition to tactics and strategies to survive the competition in the 
biopharmaceutical industry, Bergeron and Chan (2004) indicated that “another popular way 
to acquire a continuous stream of revenue from blockbuster drugs is for the pharmaceutical 
firm to merge with a pharmaceutical company with an existing blockbuster drug in its 
pipeline.”  Because of their massive economic impact on the industry and national economy, 
several types of collaborative agreements among firms in the biopharmaceutical industry 
warranted front-page coverage in the popular press, as well as special attention from the 
various antitrust regulatory agencies (Bergeron et al., 2004).  The numerous collaborative 
agreements of firms in the biotechnology industry reported in the popular press suggest that 
secondary data on interfirm agreements between pharmaceutical firms and biotechnology 
firms in the United States should be available to collect and analyze.  This fact drew 
attentions of researchers in areas of strategic alliances to conduct several studies (i.e., during 
1994 – 2004), using the biopharmaceutical industry as a testing ground.   
Regarding the mergers and acquisitions of pharmaceutical firms, Bergeron and Chan 
(2004) indicated that such practices are so popular that a pharmaceutical firm that has not 
been acquired or that is not acquiring another firm is the exception rather than the rule.  From 
the news in 2002, Pfizer, a major pharmaceutical firm was planning to buy Pharmacia, a 
major competitor who commercializes Celebrex, the blockbuster arthritis therapy (McKenna, 
2002).  According to another article regarding Pfizer and Pharmacia after the merger, Pfizer 
blockbusters would combine its own blockbusters, Lipitor, Norvacs, Zoloft, and Viagra with 
those of Pharmacia including Celeblex, Xalatan, Detorl and Camptosar.  The article 
mentioned that although “most likely to be known simply as Pfizer, the new company 
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contains the ghosts not only of Warner-Lambert and Pharmacia, but also of Pharmacia’s past: 
Upjohn, Monsanto, and JD Searle” (Sellers, 2002).  Figure 2.2 illustrates the mergers and 
acquisitions (i.e., horizontal integrations) of marketing-based firms, such as Pfizer and 
Pharmacia.  The two headed arrows represent collaborative efforts and mutually 
interdependent patterns in terms of information and resource flows among several types of 
organizations in the biopharmaceutical industry.    
Regarding the vertical integration, Rothaermel (2001) explained that pharmaceutical 
companies used interfirm cooperative strategies to adapt themselves to radical technological 
changes in the industry.  During the technological breakthrough, the chemical-based 
pharmaceutical companies transformed themselves into biopharmaceutical companies by 
collaborating with new biotechnology entrants (i.e., upward vertical integration).  In turn, the 
biotechnology startups engaged in downward vertical integrations utilizing their collaborative 
alliances to commercialize their biotechnology (Shan et al., 1994).  To illustrate the case in 
point, another study indicated the collaboration of Eli Lilly, an established pharmaceutical 
firm, with Genentech, a biotechnology firm, in acquiring Genentech’s Humulin, a human 
insulin based on recombinant DNA technology (Rothaermel, 2000).  Rather than the 
destruction of existing pharmaceutical companies (which could not compete due to disruptive 
technologies) and the struggle of biotech startups (to commercialize inventions), the firms 
experienced mutual benefits from strategic alliances.  The two firms withnessed 
complementary and collaborative efforts, which were subsequently introduced to current 
biopharmaceutical environment in exploitation alliances. 
 As illustrated by Rothaermel (2001), exploitation alliances are market-oriented alliances 
that focus on clinical trials (i.e., phase IV), FDA regulatory management, and marketing and 
sales, whereas exploration alliances are technology-oriented alliances that focus on drug 
discovery and development, as well as clinical and commercial manufacturing.  
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Collaborations between exploitation alliances and exploration alliances result in a successful 
commercialization of biotechnology.  The argument that established pharmaceutical firms 
tend to engage in complementary collaborations, confirmed in a study by Kermani and 
Bonacossa (2003), reported that biopharmaceutical companies increasingly seek vertical 
collaborations with outsourcers such as contract research organizations (CROs).   
 
Figure 2.2 Collaborative Environments in the Biopharmaceutical Industry   
 
In fact, the authors indicated that in 2001, biopharmaceutical companies outsourced around 
60 percent of clinical work to CROs.  Use of CROs possessing extensive experience in 
running large scale international trials should substantially expedite the clinical development 
process for pharmaceutical firms.    
 Another study indicated that “it was not uncommon for a single pharmaceutical firm to 
initiate alliances with competing biotechnology laboratories” (Vassolo, Anand, & Folta, 
2004).  Specifically, the larger pharmaceutical companies exchange financial support and 
established organizational capabilities in clinical research, regulatory affairs, manufacturing, 
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emerged by the end of the 1990s, drastically reshaping the traditional pharmaceutical industry 
from that of the seventies. 
 Figure 2.2 also elaborates the roles of universities and contract research institutes as 
upstream partners for biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms.  Several studies addressed the 
importance of universities and research institutes as organizational partner, contributing to the 
tremendous success of biotechnology firms (Liebeskind et al., 1996; Silverman & Baum, 
2002).  Specifically, Liebeskind et al. (1996) indicated that “although the number of 
biotechnology scientists has increased rapidly, only a few ‘star’ researchers have made 
numerous commercially valuable discoveries, and many of these stars work in universities.”  
The relationship between universities and biopharmaceutical firms may be illustrated by 
examining the founding history of Velcura Therapeutics, Inc.—a leading biotechnology firm 
in the treatment of bone-related injuries and bone disorders.  The company spun from the 
University of Michigan not long after Michael Long, a professor in the pediatrics department, 
filed his first patent entitled “A method and composition of matter patent on the isolation of 
bone precursor cell.”  Dr. Long, current CEO of the company, mentioned that “the university 
was very helpful in marshaling resources to start the company.  But once the company 
incorporated, it became a separate entity and had to negotiate for the right to the technology, 
just like any other company” (Terry, 2004).   
 Velcura Therapeutics, Inc. is just one of many biotechnology firms that spun from 
universities and later established strong relationships with those same universities.  
Liebeskind et al. (1996) suggested that biotechnology firms that want to glean cutting edge 
technologies, must set up a “university-like” organizational context in order to encourage 
firm scientists to work on publications with university scientists.  In so doing, the social 
networks play an important role in promoting organizational learning and in fostering 
organizational flexibility in the biotech firms.  In turn, collaborations with biotech firms 
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provide several important benefits to scientists at the universities.  First, working with firms 
supports basic research in terms of funding.  Second, industrial involvement in university 
research addresses the issues that are industrially relevant problems, and allows a focus on 
those problems with the greatest potential for industrial payoffs.  Third, industrial 
involvement in the research program improves the capabilities of technology transfer by 
converting basic research results into products and services.  Last, collaborating with 
industrial partners promotes employment opportunities for graduate students and researchers 
who seek to work in the corporate research environment (Lechtenberg, 1989).   
2.5 Data Sources in the Biopharmaceutical Industry 
 Previous sections in this chapter elaborated on the general scope, general characteristics, 
roles of patent protection, collaborative environments, and current knowledge developed, 
using the biopharmaceutical industry as a testing ground.  For instance, several studies in 
strategic management contributed to knowledge of strategic alliances in the 
biopharmaceutical industry.  After the emergence of the biopharmaceutical industry in the 
mid–1970s (Lerner, Shane, & Tsai, 2003), information about the biopharmaceutical industry 
has become increasingly publicized and available to researchers who wish to observe the 
phenomenon and to develop and test hypotheses, using the industry as a testing ground.  
Table 2.2 attempts to list important sources of data in the biopharmaceutical industry used by 
several important studies during 1994–2004.     
 The information from Table 2.2 indicates that academicians have used several data 
sources to understand phenomenon related to the biopharmaceutical industry.  Interestingly, 
many researchers have used more than one source of database to crosscheck validity and 
reliability.  The three most popular sources in the industry are BioScan, Recombinant Capital 
Database, and Canadian Biotechnology Handbook.  First, “BioScan” has been used at least 
by 13 studies in management.  Walker, Kogut and Shan (1997) mentioned that BioScan is “a 
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commercial directory of biotechnology firms, published and updated quarterly by ORYX 
Press, Inc.”  The authors also commented that BioScan has generally been considered the 
most comprehensive compendium of information on relationships among biotechnology 
firms in the industry.  According to BioScan website, the database source of information on 
covers more than 1,800 international companies involved in biotech product research and 
development activities.  BioScan also provides a directory service containing detailed 
company profiles, inclusive of inside information on strategic alliances, mergers, product 
acquisitions, new products in development and coming to market, licensing and R&D 
agreements, and principal investors.     
 Likewise, multiple studies have used the Recombinant Capital database to collect data on 
strategic alliances of biopharmaceutical firms.  Recombinant Capital is a San Francisco-based 
consulting firm specializing in tracking the biotechnology industry (Lerner et al., 2003).  
According to its website, the database of Recombinant Capital provides information 
regarding alliances and clinical trial progress of drug developments.  The alliances database 
contains 19,303 high-level summaries of biotech alliances commenced since 1973 and 
currently tracks the progression of 1,619 clinical trials in which a biotech company is 
involved in the compound's development and/or commercialization.  
 Next is Canadian Biotechnology—the most comprehensive historical listing of Canadian 
biotechnology firms and their products, performance, and alliances (Silverman et al., 2002).  
The Canadian Biotechnology Handbook provides information for a more restricted set of 
“core” Canadian biotechnology firms.  Interestingly, while the database is comprehensive, 
only Baum, Silverman, and Calabress have used this data source in their studies.   
 From Table 2.2, it is important to note that several data sources of the biotechnology 
industry are located in the state of North Carolina.  These data sources include the University 
of North Carolina’s Database on Biotech Alliances, the North Carolina Center for 
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Biotechnology Information, the North Carolina Biotechnology Industry Database, and the 
North Carolina Biotechnology Center (NCBC) Actions Database.  Additionally, while many 
researchers used direct data source in the biopharmaceutical industry, Kotabe and Swan 
(1995) used 905 articles from the Wall Street Journal over a 5-year period in their study.  The 
authors conducted a content analysis to test their hypotheses regarding the role of strategic 
alliances in a high-tech product development.  They used three independent judges consisting 
of a technology researcher with a PhD degree, a product designer with an MBA degree, and a 
product engineer with a graduate engineering degree, to code their data; the effects produced 
92 percent inter-reliability. 
Table 2.2 Sources of the Biopharmaceutical Industry and Its Studies in Management 
Biopharmaceutical Sources Authors and Years 
BioScan  (Folta & D., 2002; Gulati & Higgins, 2003; 
Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003; Owen-Smith 
& Powell, 2004; Powell et al., 1996; Qian et 
al., 2003; Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002; 
Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel et al., 2004; 
Shan et al., 1994; Vassolo et al., 2004; 
Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997; Zollo, Reuer, 
& Singh, 2002)  
Recombinant Capital Database  (Gulati et al., 2003; Lerner et al., 2003; Wuyts 
et al., 2004) 
Canadian Biotechnology & The Canadian 
Biotechnology Handbook 
(Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; 
Silverman et al., 2002) 
The University of North Carolina’s 
Database on Biotech Alliances 
(Reuer et al., 2002; Zollo et al., 2002) 
The North Carolina Center for 
Biotechnology Information 
(Gulati et al., 2003) 
The North Carolina Biotechnology 
Industry Database  
(Vassolo et al., 2004) 
The North Carolina Biotechnology Center 
(NCBC) Actions Database 
(Folta et al., 2002; Walker et al., 1997) 
The Institute for Biotechnology 
Information (IBI) database 
(Gulati et al., 2003) 
Biotechnology Guide USA (Gulati et al., 2003) 
Wall Street Journal (Articles) (Kotabe & Swan, 1995) 
     
 Of all data sources, BioScan potentially offers the most data sources in regard to all types 
of collaboration among firms in the biopharmaceutical industry.  For instance, the database 
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offers basic characteristics of biopharmaceutical firms including key personnel, numbers of 
employees, company history, facilities, information about ownership structure, and financial 
information.  In terms of company history, the database includes an established date, a history 
of mergers and acquisitions, and name changes.  Regarding the strategic alliances, names of 
alliances, collaborative prod ucts, types of agreements including equity and non-equity 
collaborations, and dates of agreement are specified.  Additionally, the database suggests the 
names of all products in different development stages (i.e., in preclinicals, in phase II 
clinicals).  While BioScan provides information regarding interorganizational networks of 
biopharmaceutical firms and their invention and commercialization activities, additional data 
sources are needed to supplement the specific aspects of data (i.e., financial outcomes) to 
address variables from particular hypotheses.   
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CHAPTER 3: INNOVATION STUDIES 
 The objective of this chapter is to review literature relevant to innovation studies.  In the 
beginning of this chapter, innovation perspectives are separated into two concepts—one is 
accompanied with an uncontrollable outcome; the other is with a controllable outcome.  
Focusing on the controllable innovation perspectives, this study explains the concepts of 
“product” and “process” innovations.  Following the concepts of product innovation, the 
study considers several articles in the areas to review invention and commercialization, the 
two important activities determining success or failure of typical firms.  Then, in the 
following section, the study details the attempts to explain the relationships between 
interorganizational linkages and integrated innovation performance (i.e., invention and 
commercialization performance).  At the end of this chapter, the study considers several 
important scholarly examinations of innovation and identifies the empirical findings and data 
sources.   
3.1 Several Theoretical Perspectives in Innovation Studies 
 Schumpeter asserted that entrepreneurship is a process of “creative destruction” through 
which existing products or methods of production are destroyed and replaced with new ones 
(1934).  McDaniel (2005) provided a contemporary view of Schumpeter’s theory of the 
entrepreneur, noting that Schumpeter described the entrepreneur as an innovator who creates 
innovation.  Schumpeter also regarded innovation as the commercialization of an invention.  
In fact, Schumpeter stressed the importance of the entrepreneur as a person who carries out 
new combinations, and who leads the means of production into new channels, possibly 
reaping an entrepreneurial profit (McDaniel, 2005).  Nelson and Winter (1982) explained that 
the concept of innovation from Schumpeter’s perspective is a broad framework, covering all 
innovative ideas and market practices.  The authors quoted Schumpeter’s five identified cases 
to identifying his concepts of innovation as: 1) “carrying out new combinations, 2) The 
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introduction of a new good . . ., 3) The introduction of a new method of production . . ., 4) 
The opening of a new market . . ., 5) The opening of a new source of supply . . ., 6) The 
carrying out of the new organization of any industry, like the creation of a monopoly 
position” (Schumpeter, 1934: 66).  
 Based on this knowledge, both practitioners and scholars in the field of strategic 
management have recognized “perpetual innovation”—a term used to describe how quickly 
and consistently new technologies replace older ones.  For most organizations, innovation is a 
substantial influence on competitive dynamics since it mainly affects the strategic actions and 
responses of all firms competing for limited resources within slow-cycle, fast-cycle, or 
standard-cycle markets.  Accordingly, most organizations are required to possess resources 
and capabilities in order to generate and exploit innovation.   
 In terms of theoretical development, innovation studies began over three decades ago.  
However, both researchers and practitioners do not understand much about how they can 
control and influence the innovation processes and outcomes.  Like strategic management, 
innovation theory also appears to derive from practical rather than theoretical concerns 
(Drazin & Schoonhoven, 1996).  This means that firms recognize the importance of 
innovation, but they have little idea on how to deal with its uncertainty.  At its core, however, 
scholars in areas of innovation management have proposed three basic assumptions: 1) 
innovation is universally desirable for organizations, 2) once an organization increases its 
size beyond a critical mass, it becomes more inert, less capable of meaningful organizational 
change, and unsuitable for future innovation, and 3) certain structures and practices can 
overcome inertia and increase the generation rate of innovation (Drazin et al., 1996). 
 Whereas the three assumptions indicate relationships between organizations and 
innovation outcomes, innovation strategies are still relatively unknown and fraught with risk.  
Both academicians and practitioners do not know much about innovation process and how to 
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influence the innovation outcomes.  Organizations generate innovations, the vast majority of 
which are worth little to themselves; however, some are extremely important and valuable 
(Greve, 2003).  A study in management indicated that “despite continued scholarly efforts in 
the past three decades to understand the innovation process and the conditions under which 
innovation is facilitated, current empirically developed theories of organizational innovation 
are not adequately encompassing” (Damanpour, 1996: 693)  Drazin and Schoonhoven (1996) 
confirmed that innovation theory relatively models a less developed paradigm.  The author 
wrote:   
Unlike other evolving fields or organizational inquiry, such as organizational economics, 
 contingency theory, organizational ecology, and institutional theory, innovation research 
 demonstrates little in the way of common theoretical underpinnings to guide its 
 development (1996: 1065).   
 The arguments regarding the less developed paradigm of innovation theory are 
comparable to Pfeffer’s (1993) call for developing the paradigm of organizational science.  
Like organizational science, innovation knowledge is continuously developed and scrutinized 
by different academic perspectives including management, economics, sociology, and even a 
scientific field like engineering.  In the following pages, this paper illustrates several 
important perspectives: evolutionary, economics, behavioral, and sociological perspectives.  
The objective is to briefly review current academic knowledge of innovation.   
 In the broadest perspective, the innovation process can be understood by an evolutionary 
approach (Aldrich, 1999; Nelson & Winter, 1982).  According to Aldrich (1999: 21), 
“evolution results from the operation of four generic processes: variation, selection, retention 
and diffusion, and struggle over scare resources.”  According to the general concepts of 
evolutionary perspectives, firms differ in terms of unique routines and competencies or what 
Aldrich (1998) termed as “genes,” the particular structures developed through an internal 
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problematic search, founding of new organization by outsiders, and mistakes or 
misunderstandings in their business practices.  The variations produce unequal performances 
and different abilities among firms to survive the competitive environments.  Those firms that 
successfully deal with market forces and conform to institutionalized norms as well as 
additional pressures from internal factors are selected and preserved within the environments.  
Overtime, the successful structures or genes are duplicated or reproduced by others.  Because 
similar firms compete against one another for limited resources in the competitive 
environment, the process after variation, selection, retention, and diffusion represents the 
struggle among themselves. 
 Nelson and Winter (1982) followed the concepts of Schumpeterian competition to explain 
why some firms track emerging technological opportunities (i.e., innovation) with greater 
success than other firms.  The authors indicated that Schumpeter (1950) stressed the 
advantage for innovation for a large firm size.  Further, his concept implied that a market 
structure could be another factor influencing the opportunities in which firms could exploit 
and earn abnormal profit from their innovation.  Specifically, Schumpeter declared that 
perfect competition is an incompatible market structure for innovation, suggesting that the 
competitive environment in the market encourages a spur to innovation.  On the contrary, the 
monopolistic and/or oligopolistic markets reflect weak competition and thus encourage a 
permissive environment for an activity like Research and Development (R&D).  Further, 
whereas most analyses of the relationship between market structure and innovation indicate a 
one-way causation from market structure to innovation, under Schumpeterian competition, 
there is a reverse flow of the causation as well.  Schumpeter (1950) for example, argued that 
successful innovators who are second movers may invest their profit and grow in relation to 
their competitors.  Similarly, effective “fast second” firms may come ultimately to dominate 
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others once they successfully acquire substantial resources in their industries (Nelson et al., 
1982; Schumpeter, 1950; Setzer, 1974).  
 Applying the evolutionary approach to Schumpeter’s concept of innovation, Nelson and 
Winter (1982) claimed that they offer a model that permits firms to differ in their emphasis 
on innovation and imitation.  Specifically, the authors suggested that firms differ in terms of 
their policies toward two techniques of production: “by doing R&D that draws on a general 
fund of relevant technical knowledge [innovation] or by imitating the production processes of 
other firms [imitation]” (1982: 282)   Ultimately, the authors argued that the evolutionary 
approach is better than orthodox theory to understand the innovation process as a 
phenomenon.  Unlike the orthodox theory, which tends to relatively ignore genuine novelties, 
the evolutionary approach has the merit of placing issues of change at center stage.  The 
evolutionary approach views innovation process as dynamic activities of variation, selection, 
retention and diffusion, and the struggle over scarce resources, as well as the interdependent 
processes that explain the success and failure of innovation and organizations.    
 Whereas the evolution approach may be so broad that it covers an international level of 
technological progresses and successful growth of nations (Nelson & Winter, 1982), 
economics perspectives offer narrower concepts and more specific knowledge about 
innovation.  For instance, economics applies concepts of agency theory in comparing the 
conflicts of interest between agents and principal relationships with the conflicts of managers 
and their shareholders in terms of implementing innovation strategy.  Using agency theory, 
one study in management found a negative relationship between diversification strategy and 
R&D investment (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989).   
 Because an investment in R&D tends to associate with a higher level of risk, managers 
who are typically risk-averse are reluctant to engage in innovative activities, resulting in a 
loss of competitiveness and lower performance in firms (Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1993).  The 
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findings from this study suggest that a) managers (agents) will be likely to avoid innovation 
strategies because the strategies are too risky, and b) without innovation strategies and 
outcomes, firms will lose competitiveness and performance in the long term.  Further, a more 
recent study in strategy found that institutional ownership (as a governance device) is 
positively related to firms’ innovation (Kochhar & David, 1996).  Because the institutional 
owners prefer a higher level of risk pattern than managers, institutional owners tend to 
promote innovation activities as ways to enhance the value of organizations.  This particular 
study also confirms that ownership structure is one of the significant factors determining 
levels of corporate innovation.   
 According to behavioral perspectives, several learning theorists suggested necessary 
factors and conditions in which firms can learn and create innovation outcomes (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Kim, 1998; Van De Ven & Polley, 1992).  Drawing from learning theory, 
Cohen and Levinthal argued that organizations need prior related knowledge to better 
identify, assimilate, and use new knowledge (1990).  The prior related knowledge is an 
important condition for firms to create incremental innovations (i.e., competency-enhancing 
innovations).  Using concepts of prior related knowledge, Hill and Rothaermel (2003) 
suggested that if incumbent firms possess a high level of prior knowledge, yet such 
knowledge is irrelevant, the firms will be less likely to create radical innovations (i.e., 
competency-destructive innovations).  Likewise, Kim (1998) indicated that effective 
organizational learning and absorptive capacity require two major elements—prior 
knowledge base and intensity of efforts.  Using Hyundai Motor as a case study, Kim (1998) 
also detailed three stages of learning orientation—duplicative imitation, creative imitation, 
and innovation—which occur subsequently for Hyundai Motor.   
 While economics and behavioral perspectives reveal us innovation strategies that fall 
within organizations, sociological perspectives explain innovation strategies that fall outside 
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organizations.  In particular, population ecologists offered a concept of organizational inertia 
that constrains firms’ reactions toward innovations, while the institutionalization of market 
values and environments provides an important framework for consumers to understand 
innovation (Selznick, 1996).  Combining concepts from these perspectives, economics and 
behavioral scholars regard innovation as a controllable outcome while sociologists believe 
that innovation is an uncontrollable outcome.  In the following section, this paper reviews 
several studies to understand the position of innovation as an uncontrollable outcome. 
3.2 Innovation as an Uncontrollable Outcome 
 From an analysis of the past innovation research, three factors of innovation are located 
outside of management’s control.  Drawing from studies of sociologists, the first factor is 
organizational inertia.  Organizational ecologists asserted that organizations have an inertia 
which hinders or prevents radical changes in strategies and structures (Hannan & Freeman, 
1984).  Accordingly, organizational inertia is an important condition that hampers 
generations of innovation within organizations (Drazin et al., 1996; Hill & Rothaermel, 
2003).  As indicated by Hannan and Freeman (1984), sources of organizational inertia consist 
of both internal and external factors.  Whereas managers influence such internal factors as 
sunk costs and the dynamics of political coalitions, managers rarely influence such external 
factors of inertia as temporal patterns of opportunities and threats in relevant environments 
(i.e., other competitors, technological environments).  
 The next aspect of innovation which falls outside management’s influence is the 
occurrences and outcomes of technological breakthrough (Hargadon et al., 2001).  
Specifically, two types of innovations occur after the technological breakthroughs—
competency-enhancing and competency-destroying innovation.  The former innovation 
builds on know-how embodied in the technology that it replaces.  These competency-
enhancing innovations introduce “a new technical order, with a vastly enhanced performance 
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frontier, while building on the existing technical order rather than making it obsolete” 
(Hargadon et al., 2001).   
 The latter innovation provides new knowledge which entirely replaces existing 
technology (Anderson & Tushman, 1990).  Conversely, the concepts of competency-
destroying innovation are comparable to the concepts of discontinuous technologies, in that 
both represent price-performance improvements over existing technologies so significant that 
“no increase in scale, efficiency, or design can make older technologies competitive with the 
new technology” (Tushman & Anderson, 1986).  Because technological breakthroughs from 
the competency-destroying innovation are more radical, less predictable and less manageable 
than those breakthroughs from the competency-enhancing innovation, the breakthroughs 
from competency-destroying innovation are more likely to be another factor falling outside 
managerial control in terms of occurrences and innovation outcomes (Tushman et al., 1986).   
 The last factors related to innovation strategies that fall out of managerial control are 
institutional and market dynamics, which constitute an acceptable framework for constituents 
to evaluate innovation.  These factors, important for innovation strategies, seek to 
successfully diffuse generated innovation and to gain acceptance by public.  Hargadon and 
Douglas (2001) compared constituents in institutional perspectives with social actors in the 
market (i.e., consumers, dealers).  In the market, social actors or consumers interpret the 
meanings of innovative products using current understandings located within institutional 
framework.  If the concepts or appearances of innovation fall outside the default framework, 
consumers will not understand such concepts or appearance.  Thus, they will not support or 
accept the innovation.  Recently, several studies mentioned that innovators may influence the 
market and technological framework (Spencer, 2003; Zahra & Nielsen, 2002).  However, in 
so doing, the innovators need support from interorganizational linkages.      
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3.3 Innovation as a Controllable Outcome 
After elaborating the important aspects of innovation that fall outside of management’s 
control, it is important to discuss what managers can do to compensate for those factors.  
Although managers cannot directly influence external uncertainties (i.e., they cannot change 
the general environment), they can directly influence their strategies (Nohria & Gulati, 1996), 
organizational structures (Damanpour, 1996), and behaviors (Dougherty & Hardy, 1996) to 
achieve innovation outcomes.  In fact, given the evidence that some firms continuously and 
successfully generate and exploit innovations, whereas many others fail to do so, several 
researchers in innovation areas attempted to understand the influence of managers in 
determining the innovation outcomes.     
Drazin and Schoonhoven (1996) indicated the importance of innovation studies by 
reviewing several important works on innovation.  The authors suggested that because of the 
importance of innovation, Administrative Science Quarterly (Tushman & Nelson, 1990), 
Strategic Management Journal (Guth & Ginsburg, 1990), and Academy of Management 
Journal (Drazin et al., 1996) publications in the genre devote special issues to understanding 
the concepts of innovation.  The authors claimed that “it is clear that the study of the 
generation of innovation is central to the study of organizations and organizational theory.”  
Despite the fact that the previous statement was made almost a decade ago, organizational 
factors, if clearly understood, should explain the complexity and uncertainty of innovation.    
Regardless of the popularity of innovation studies to uncover the length and complexity 
of innovation activities, the terminological concepts of innovation remain unorganized and 
unkempt.  For instance, several articles on management (Damanpour, 1996; Nohria et al., 
1996) applied the term “innovation” to represent the term of “invention” as initiated by 
Schumpeter (1934).  Additionally, others used the term “adoption” and “diffusion” 
interchangeably to represent Schumpeter’s term “imitation” (Davis, 1991; Goes & Park, 
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1997).  Consequently, despite Schumpeter’s development of a categorization of innovation 
activities in 1934, few scholars have seriously followed a consistent use of the terms.   
Particularly, Schumpeter (1934) indicated three important and distinctive activities in 
innovation processes—invention, innovation, and imitation.  The author noted that 1) 
invention represents the act of creating or developing a new product or process; 2) innovation 
represents the process of creating a commercial product from an invention; and 3) imitation 
represents the adoption of an innovation by similar firms.  The fact that Schumpeter used 
“innovation” to involve three types of innovation activity simultaneously confused several 
scholars from the beginning.  As a result, few scholars applied Schumpeter’s terms in 
following studies.  To clarify and categorize different activities of innovation and to honor 
Schumpeter’s work (1934), this study matched several terms used in various studies that 
applied Schumpeter’s categorizations of three innovation activities.  These terms are 
presented in Table 3.1.  As illustrated by the table, the comparable concepts in later studies 
confirm that three existing sequential stages of innovation proposed by Schumpeter (1934) 
are valid and deserve recognition by other scholars in the field of innovation.  
 Drawing from Schumpter’s (1934) terms of innovation activities, this paper suggests that 
invention and the combination of innovation and imitation are similar to exploration and 
exploitation as initiated by March (1991).  According to March, exploration activities capture 
such terms as “search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, 
innovation.”  Additionally, the exploitation activities include such terms as “refinement, 
choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, execution.”  During exploration, 
firms engage a generating process to create new products and processes.  Once successful in 
terms of invention, the same firms then commercialize the new products and processes during 
the exploitation period.    
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 Given Schumpeter’s definition of imitation, a view of March’s concept of exploitation 
also reflects behaviors of firms in the selection, refinement, and implementation of new 
products or processes derived from external partners.  These behaviors clearly reflect the 
concept of imitation coined by Schumpeter (1934).  Therefore, the study includes imitation 
activities in the concept of exploitation.   
Table 3.1 Innovation Concepts 
Original Innovation Concepts  Innovation Activities 
(Schumpeter, 1934)  Invention  Innovation  Imitation 
(March, 1991) Exploration Exploitation 








(Rogers, 1995) Innovation 
and 
Technology 
Diffusion of Innovation 
(Wejnert, 2002) Innovation  Public Consequence Private 
Consequence 
(Kelm, Narayanan, & Pinches, 
1995) 
Innovation Commercialization N/A 





Proposed Terms of Innovation* Invention Commercialization Adoption 
 
 Leblebici et al. (1991) studied the imitating process in which established firms adopted 
new practices from peripheral firms in the radio industry.  The authors used an institutional 
approach to explain the establishment of an innovative field by acceptance of central players 
in the radio industry.  Davis (1991) examined the adoption of innovative organizational 
practices among corporations during a specific period.  The author found that specific, 
innovative, organizational practices such as golden parachutes and poison pills were adopted 
by several organizations through networks of executives.  In sum, the two studies suggested 
that by means of interorganizational linkages, established firms adopted new practices 
(innovations) into their organizations; further, adoption process is comparable to March’s 
exploitation activities.      
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 Next, to specify the scope of diffusion of innovation, this paper refers the previous work 
of a prominent sociologist, Rogers (1995) who asserts that “an innovation is an idea, practice, 
or object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption.”  In his book—
Diffusion of Innovation—Rogers analyzed technological innovation, using the terms 
“innovation” and “technology” interchangeably (Rogers, 1995).  According to the analytical 
scope, it was apparent that Rogers regarded innovation as a new technological improvement 
in the broadest sense (i.e., including commercialized activities of the new technology).  
Therefore, according to Rogers, a diffusion of innovation is “a process by which an 
innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a 
social system” (1995).   
 Although innovation diffusion (Rogers, 1995) and innovation adoption involve transfers 
of new knowledge or practices from innovators or diffusing units to recipients of knowledge 
or adopters, these dual concepts are not necessarily the same.  Whereas the innovation 
adoptions primarily occur within an organizational level as a recipient organization attempts 
to imitate or copy the legitimate structures or forms of superior organizations (Deephouse, 
1996), the broader concept of innovation diffusions involves all levels of recipients (i.e., from 
organizations to individuals or from individuals to individuals).  Wejnert (2002) described the 
two impacts of an innovation’s diffusion, involving both public and private actors.  For those 
innovations that carry public consequences, the adoption of innovations often leads to 
reforms that are historical breakthroughs.  The authors mentioned further that such 
breakthroughs include laws protecting civil rights, welfare policy, patent laws, or 
international regulations protecting the natural environment.   
 For innovations with private consequences, the diffusion should affect the well-being of 
adopters that are either individuals or small collective entities such as organizations, peer 
groups, and rural communities (Wejnert, 2002).  Following the concepts of Wejnert (2002), 
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this paper suggests that the diffusion of inventions from organizations to market (i.e., 
commercialization process) should have scope at the public consequences, rather than the 
private consequences.  On the other hand, the diffusion of inventions that creates the private 
consequences should be regarded as the adoption process.   
 While several articles in management primarily focus interest on the factors related to 
invention and the private consequence (i.e., innovation adoption), relatively few scholars 
elaborate invention and its public consequence (i.e., commercialization.)  Drawing from 
perspectives of the prior research of innovation, Greve (2003) noted that innovation involved 
two processes: a development stage leading to an innovation and a decision-making stage that 
launches a product that incorporates the innovation.  These two distinct processes have 
caused research on innovation to be split into two traditions.  Unfortunately, since only a few 
studies integrated the two processes of innovation, the author proposed that innovation 
research would be enriched if more studies would consider the distinct difference between 
developing and launching innovation (Greve, 2003).   
 Whereas the integration of the two innovation processes in innovation studies are rare, 
Kelm, Narayanan, and Pinches (1995) illustrated a remarkable study of integration.  The 
authors specified that their innovation version consisted of two different stages—innovation 
and commercialization—which contributed to differring organizational performances (see 
table 2.1).  In their study, the scholars specifically studied perceptions of shareholders as 
reflected by stock prices of the firms during the two different stages of innovation.  They 
gathered two types of announcements in categories of biotechnology, new products, science 
and research, and technology from the Wall Street Journal Index from 1977 through 1989.  
The authors viewed the firms’ announcements of positive progress of projects as innovation 
(i.e., generation of innovation), together with the firms’ announcements of new product 
introductions as commercialization (i.e., diffusion of innovation).  By integrating the two 
 46
processes of innovation, Kelm et al. (1994) successfully captured an aspect of knowledge in 
terms of generating and diffusing innovation.  The study suggests that invention and 
commercialization contribute differently toward organizational successes (i.e., increasing 
stock prices).  
 In the following, this study will review literature to represent the roles of managerial 
factors and innovation outcomes based on Schumpeter’s invention and commercialization 
(1934).  It is important to note that this paper strictly follows the proposed terms of 
innovation according to Table 3.1 in categorization of the following studies.  Therefore, 
hereafter, the term “innovation” is used to represent all types of activities involving 
invention, commercialization, and adoption.  The term “invention” is used to represent the 
first stage of innovation (when inventors convert ideas into existence).  “Commercialization” 
is used when inventors or firms attempt to introduce an invention into market (converting 
new beings into well-known and useful products), resulting in the public consequence 
(Wejnert, 2002).  Last, “adoption” is used to represent activities involving firms that imitate 
or adopt invention from other successful firms, resulting in the private consequence (Wejnert, 
2002).   
3.3.1 Product and Process Innovations  
 From the earlier section, it is obvious that successful invention activities normally 
precede commercialization activities.  However, this relationship may not always be true for 
all types of innovation.  As Wejnert (2002) elaborates, for instance, innovation activities with 
private consequences begin with invention activities and then are followed by adoption 
activities.  Therefore, invention activities may not always link directly to commercialization 
activities.  A firm inventing a new process or an innovative method to increase the internal 
efficiency and effectiveness of its manufacturing procedures may not or will not 
commercialize the new process or the method to the public.  Instead, it may want to keep the 
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invention as a trade secret to use internally to increase its competitiveness against 
competitors.  Instead of commercializing its invention, the same firm may want to transfer or 
diffuse the trade secret to another factory, new strategic business units, and even its strategic 
alliances to improve its competitive positions in the market.  This diffusion activity of the 
particular invention exclusively deals with adoption activity. Thus, it has nothing to do with 
commercialization activity.   
 Generally, the innovation activities mentioned earlier are termed “process” innovation.  
Unlike the “product” innovation in which the invention activities are normally followed by 
commercialization activities, the “process” innovation includes all changes in the 
manufacturing methods and equipment used to produce typical goods or services in the 
market, or in office procedures and sequencing in work routines.  This process innovation 
usually is followed by adoption activities.  Whereas product innovations are often seen as the 
cutting edge in the market-place, process innovations play equally important a strategic role 
contributing to a powerful source of advantage—“being able to make something no one else 
can, or to do so in ways which are better than anyone else” (Tidd, Bessant, & Pavitt, 1997).  
Recognizing this fact, several scholars in management have focused their attention to the 
generation and diffusion of not only product innovations but also process innovations 
(Leblebici et al., 1991; Davis, 1991; and Goes & Park, 1997). 
 From traditional perspectives, concepts of “product” and “process” innovation can 
sometimes be confusing (Tidd et al., 1997).  For example, the issuance of a credit card by 
financial institutes to facilitate their customers in terms of financial transactions was a 
combination of product and process innovation.  Therefore, using only traditional concepts to 
distinguish between the two types of innovation reflects a somewhat blurred dividing line.  
Using the concepts of invention, commercialization, and adoption, this paper suggests that 
the concepts of product and process innovation should be clarified before the advancement of 
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theoretical knowledge in the innovation areas can proceed.  Particularly, if an innovation 
process involves commercialization activities, the innovation should be regarded as product 
innovation.  On the contrary, if the commercialization activities are absent in an innovation 
process, the innovation is a process innovation.   
 Because the concepts of innovation in this present study involve commercialization 
activities, innovation concepts from the following sections directly apply to the context of 
product innovation.  In general, the scope of the present study basically aims to cover 
invention and commercialization activities, as integrated innovation activities that generate 
substantial values for innovators.  In the pharmaceutical industry, specifically, the 
commercialization of new drugs means success or failure for pharmaceutical firms.  For 
instance, by commercializing its Prozac in the period of six months, Eli Lilly could generate 
as much as $800 million in profit.  In contrast, a significant saving in manufacturing or 
accounting costs would have much less impact on the firm’s financial results.  In this 
particular case, a 25 percent reduction in the manufacturing costs of Prozac would have saved 
only $60 million per year (Rochin, 2006). 
 Because of the significant contribution of product innovation, this paper focuses its 
attention on two important innovation activities (invention and commercialization).  The 
outcomes of process innovation may be internally recognized as firms could effectively and 
efficiently arrange and exploit their resources to produce goods and services.  However, the 
outcomes of product innovation reflect higher market values of the firms, for firms could 
invent and commercialize new products and, thereby acquiring acceptance and support from 
the constituents.  Thus, one distinct advantage of studying product innovation is the obvious 
direct and causal relationship of focal firms’ successful product innovation and revenue 
growth.  In the following sections, this paper will explain the current knowledge of invention 
and commercialization as main innovation activities of product innovation. 
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3.3.2 Invention 
 Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, and Mosel (1996) studied the ability of different organizational 
contexts to invent.  These scholars provided theoretical perspectives and empirical findings to 
explain why and how specific corporate strategies—mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures—
as strategic choices are harmful to firms’ ability to generate innovative outcomes (Hitt et al., 
1996).  According to the study, firms are more likely to use financial controls rather than 
strategic controls to manage business units as the firms engage in specific corporate 
strategies; the emphasis on financial controls tends to drive out internal innovation, fostering 
a short time horizon.  Empirically, the authors concluded that different organizational 
strategies could contribute to different innovative outcomes.   
 Damanpour (1996) discussed organizational size and complexity as important contextual 
factors to foster or to inhibit invention.  The authors explained that while several studies 
suggested that large organizations have more potential, flexible structures, and slack 
resources to handle innovative challenges, other studies indicated that large organizations are 
typically more formalized, standardized, and highly inert and thus are said to be less 
innovative than smaller organizations.  Nohria and Gulati (1996) proposed that there is an 
inverse U-shaped relationship between the degree of organizational slack available to 
organizational subunits and the extent of innovation these units produce.  Whereas “slack 
allows for experimentation, provides resources to meet environmental uncertainty, promotes 
chance discovery, and frees managerial attention to support innovation,” it also can lead to 
promotions of pet projects and inefficiency (Nohria et al., 1996).  As both perspectives are 
valid, it is possible to see a predicted inverse U-shaped relationship between slack and 
innovation (i.e., invention, commercialization, and adoption).   
 Dougherty and Hardy (1996) conducted a longitudinal study of 40 new product 
development efforts.  From the findings, they indicated that there are three generic innovation 
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problems in their study: 1) resource flows and mechanisms to sustain resource flows were 
absent; 2) the organizations possessed little in the way of collaborative structures to develop 
innovations across functional departments; and 3) strategic support for innovations was 
absent—the data suggest that senior managers in the organizations studied either never 
supported the projects or did so only temporarily (Dougherty et al., 1996).  From the generic 
innovation problems, it is clear that senior managers can implement their innovation 
strategies to influence several organizational contexts, to resolve the generic innovation 
problems, and to create innovation outcomes.   
 The review of studies relating to invention indicates that the current stream of studies use 
the two terms of “innovation” and “invention” interchangeably.  This section of the chapter 
will indicate that from methodology perspectives, these studies have captured several 
measures (i.e., R&D intensity, patents, and new product development) to use in their studies.  
Such measures only use the term “invention,” defined as the capability to generate new and 
patentable products or processes to the market.  The measures did not address 
commercialization and adoption, which subsequently are the important innovation activities 
suggested by Schumpeter (1934).   
3.3.3 Commercialization  
 The second process of product innovation is commercialization.  One study in 
management suggests that “commercializing knowledge involves transfer from discovering 
scientists to those who will develop it commercially” (Zucker, Darby, & Armstrong, 2002).  
Because commercialization falls into the concepts of information distribution or knowledge 
diffusion, the reviews of diffusion elaborate on basic ideas of how innovators communicate 
information about their innovations.  In other words, the concepts of diffusion should suggest 
how innovators might sell their innovations to the market.  Using concepts of Rogers (1995), 
Cool, Dierickx, and Szulanski (1997) studied diffusion of innovations within an organization.  
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The authors compared the explanatory power of factors emphasized by the traditional 
diffusion perspective (i.e., Rogers, 1995), with factors deemphasized or neglected by that 
perspective.  The comparisons suggest that the traditional perspective (i.e., Roger, 1995) may 
not apply exactly within the organizational context because factors other than those 
traditionally emphasized seem to play an important role in the diffusion of innovation within 
organization (Cool, Dierickx, & Szulanski, 1997).   
 Specifically, Cool et al. (1997) found that before critical mass (adoption of the invention 
by 25% of the decision units) is reached, supply factors, i.e., contents of innovation and 
technology, are dominant in the diffusion process.  However, after critical mass is reached, 
demand factors (i.e., innovation adopters, opinion leaders) are dominant, which is when 
advice derived from the traditional perspective applies best.  The findings suggest that within 
the organizational context and before the critical mass is reached, supply-related factors are 
more likely to accelerate the process of diffusion than are demand-related factors emphasized 
by the traditional perspective (Cool et al., 1997).  
 Regarding commercialization, Hargadon and Douglas (2001) introduced the concepts of 
product design as innovation strategies to explain the successful diffusion of innovation in the 
market.  They conducted a case study analysis to understand how Thomas Edison’s design 
strategy enabled his organization to successfully gain acceptance for an invention that would 
ultimately displace the existing institutions of the gas industry.  According to Hargadon et al. 
(2001), managers need to develop competencies in the design process to create a “robust 
design”1 and/or a “dominant design.”2  They wrote that “while innovations must appear novel 
to draw attention and suggest an advantage, entrepreneurs must initially present the meaning 
and value of their innovations, including their novel features, in the language of existing 
                                                 
1 The robust design is an adoption of innovators’ ideas by designing the concrete details of their embodiment to 
embed them within rather than distinguish them from the established social system that they seek to change.      
2 Dominant design is a single architecture that establishes dominance in a product class Anderson, P., & 
Tushman, M. L. 1990. Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Designs: A Cyclical Model of 
Technological Change. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(4): 604-633. 
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institutions by giving them the appearance of familiar ideas. . . . Purely novel actions and 
ideas cannot register because no established logics exist to describe them” (2001: 478).  The 
previous quotation indicates that managers need to pay attention to the design, which is the 
particular arrangement of concrete details that embodies an innovation and provides the 
means to mediate between innovation and institutions.  If managers neglect the importance of 
product designs, they will find their products being ignored by customers in the market.  
Hargadon and Douglas (2001) suggested that the design process is important for successful 
diffusion of innovation because it grounds a particular innovation in its particular time and 
place by providing it with a set of meanings and values that are embedded in the existing 
institutional environment.   
3.4 Interorganizational Networks and Innovation Activities 
Whereas prior innovation studies already examined several organizational factors, a 
current stream of research mainly switches to innovation outcomes generated by 
interorganizational networks.  Since all firms operate in an open system, it is important to 
involve examinations of interorganizational contexts to improve our knowledge of innovation 
outcomes.  Participating in interorganizational linkages, organizational innovators have a 
better chance to influence several uncontrollable factors of innovation in the external 
environment (Spencer, 2003).  In fact, Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr (1996: 116) 
suggested that “the locus of innovation will be found in networks of learning, rather than in 
individual firms.”  To provide an overview of the relationships of interorganizational linkages 
and innovation outcomes, this paper will explain fundamental concepts in an area of 
interorganizational networks and then report the current development of this area in terms of 
innovation outcomes.    
The period after Granovetter’s (1973) seminal work, “Strength of Weak Ties,” saw 
interfirm network researchers begin to apply the concept of ties to understand relationships 
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among and between organizations.  According to Poldony and Page (1998), the definition of 
a network form of organization includes a wide array of joint ventures, strategic alliances, 
business groups, franchises, research consortia, relational contracts, and outsourcing 
agreements.  In particular, the interorganizational networks of firms significantly reflect 
embedded ties as “strong enduring relationships between trustworthy partners with no 
shadow of a future to ensure cooperation in the present” (Podolny & Page, 1998; Uzzi, 1997).                        
In fact, research in different areas attempted to explain why organizations need alliances.  
For example, a study in sociology indicated that organizations collaborate to stabilize 
environmental uncertainty and to satisfy their resource needs (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999).  
Stuart (1998) investigated strategic alliance in a high-tech industry and asserted that 
organizations in crowded positions and those with high prestige are most likely to form 
alliances.  The author mentioned that the concepts of crowded positions and high prestige 
confirmed the importance of relationship positions among partners and reputations of firms as 
factors in determining whether or not focal firms would engage in cooperative strategies 
(Stuart, 1998).    
In line with studies in sociology, Kenis and Knoke (2002) explained that organizations 
collaborate because of socio-economic factors—interdependency, prior mutual relationship, 
mutual centrality, and reciprocity.  These four socio-economic factors are comparable with 
inducement and opportunity, the two important factors that maintain interorganizational 
networks (Kenis & Knoke, 2002).  While inducement is the economic incentive causing 
inter-firm partners to collaborate, the opportunity reflects the prior network positions shaping 
future collaborations among previous network members (Ahuja, 2000b).  
Further, the formation of interorganizational relationships and their implications have 
been investigated in the context of institutional linkages (Ahuja, 2000b; Baum & Oliver, 
1991) and alliance networks (Baum et al., 2000; Doz, 1996; Gulati, 1995; Gulati et al., 1999; 
 54
Hamel, 1991).  Additionally, network scholars have found that interorganizational ties can 
support organizational change, and enhance organizational survival chances (Miner, 
Amburgey, & Stearns, 1990).  Using interorganizational linkages to understand innovation or 
new product development, several scholars have studied the direct relationships between 
firms’ strategic alliances and their innovative outputs (Ahuja, 2000a; Almeida & Phene, 
2004; Kotabe et al., 1995; Shan et al., 1994; Stuart, 2000; Wuyts et al., 2004).             
 Whereas our understanding of the impact of interorganizational linkages on invention are 
clearly evident in contemporary contexts, researchers offer limited knowledge regarding 
integrated frameworks that comprehensively address the issues of invention and 
commercialization (Rothaermel et al., 2004; Spencer, 2003; Wuyts et al., 2004).  Because 
most generated inventions fail after the commercialization process, it is important to 
understand the importance of the interdependent pattern between the two processes 
simultaneously (Rothaermel et al., 2004).  Accordingly, this paper follows Greve’s (2003) 
call for researchers to integrate important activities of innovation to understand contributions 
of interorganizational linkages on overall innovation performance.  However, due to the 
traditional aspects of innovation research in the interorganizational area that separated two 
innovation activities—invention and commercialization—this paper will separately elaborate 
on studies in the two areas to provide a review of current knowledge within the field.  
Afterward, this paper will discuss in detail the few existing studies that integrate the two 
innovation processes in order to understand the roles of interorganizational linkages and 
innovation outcomes.       
3.4.1 Interorganizational Networks as Invention Generators 
 Regarding the roles of interfirm networks toward generated innovation outputs (i.e., 
invention), Shan, Walker, and Kogut (1994) examined the association between interfirm 
cooperation and the invention outcomes of startup firms in the biotechnology industry.  Using 
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a commercial directory of biotechnology firms (BioScan), the authors gathered data relating 
to cooperative agreements between startups and established firms.  They measured the 
number of patents granted to startups as results of the cooperative agreement.  From the 
findings, the authors indicated that “startup innovation [invention] output does not attract 
large firm relationships, but rather depends on them” (1994: 393).  They also summarized 
that “a startup’s size, access to public equity markets, and position in the network of 
agreements have important direct or ancillary effects on innovation [invention]” (Shan et al., 
1994: 393).  The attempt of Shan et al. (1994) may be recognized as one of the earliest 
studies to understand why firms need alliances to achieve better outcomes of invention.             
 Next, Kotabe and Swan (1995) reported the role of strategic alliances in a high-
technology product development.  The authors used the announcement of a new product 
introduction from The Wall Street Journal to capture the ability of a focal firm to invent.  
Their study indicated that several characteristics of alliances, including horizontal linkages 
and small firms, generate more innovative products.  Unlike vertical linkages which tend to 
be more concerned with cost economizing, horizontal linkages that include R&D consortia, 
patent swaps, technology transfers, and joint ventures are more likely to supplement the 
internal technology base.  As for the role of size, the authors reported that large firms are 
more efficient innovators than small firms because of their more diverse resources and skills, 
better developed marketing channels, and economies of scale.  Therefore, in order to compete 
with larger competitors, small firms must be highly innovative to attract customers.  In the 
context of interorganizational linkages, a mixture of large and small firms was supported as 
most conductive to generate inventions (Powell et al., 1996).      
 Further, Ahuja (2000) examined empirical relationships among collaborative networks, 
structural holes, and focal firms’ invention in the chemical industry.  Using the number of 
successful patent applications, or granted patents, as a measure of innovative output in focal 
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firms, Ahuja (2000) regarded the number of direct partners (i.e., joint ventures) of the focal 
firms and the number of indirect partners as the number of direct and indirect ties 
determining the innovative outputs of focal firms.  Following Burt (1991), Ahuja (2000) also 
measured the magnitudes of interfirm structural holes (i.e., a high index reflecting richness in 
structural holes).  Ahuja (2000) found that increasing levels of structural holes or the 
magnitudes of disconnections among partners in the collaboration networks decrease 
innovative outputs.  He also indicated that while both direct and indirect ties influence 
innovative outputs positively, the impact of indirect ties is moderated by the firm’s level of 
direct ties.  Interestingly, Ahuja (2000) did not address how relationships among 
collaborative networks and their structural holes determine the ability of the focal firms to 
commercialize inventions. 
 Recently, Wuyts et al. (2004) examined portfolios of interfirm agreements in technology-
intensive markets to understand the consequences for product development and profitability.  
The authors argued that firms can monitor and manage their portfolios of agreement to 
achieve their objectives.  Similar to Ahuja’s (2000a) suggestion that different types of 
networks provide different benefits, Wuyts et al. recommended: “firms that have the end 
objective of radical innovation invest in a technologically diverse portfolio to gain access to a 
diverse knowledge base in which it repeatedly contracts with the same partners to facilitate 
complex knowledge transfer” (2004: 98).  Since the authors used the new drugs classified by 
the FDA as a measurement of radical innovation, they focus on the firms’ capability to invent 
(Schumpeter, 1934) rather than to commercialize or to adopt.  
 Further, Wuyts et al. (2004) mentioned that frequent cooperation with the same partners 
operating in a diverse technology facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge, an important 
knowledge for successful inventions.  The authors explained that the implications of the 
diversity of technologies allow a focal firm to access a non-redundant knowledge and to 
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enhance its radical inventions.  However, the downside is that access to diverse or non-
redundant knowledge requires high investment costs, and firms often have a difficult time 
recouping their initial investments.  To confirm Wuyts et al.’s (2004) concepts that 
collaborations with the same partners facilitate invention outcomes for focal firms, a study in 
economics indicated that focal firms participating in the advance technology program tend to 
issue higher patents (Darby, Zucker, & Wang, 2004).  The authors followed the sociological 
concepts of social embeddedness to explain how particular focal firms exploit knowledge 
benefits from their member partners.  They suggested that the program promotes institution-
building, by encouraging partners to establish new organizational structures that facilitate 
innovation and capture of inventions in technologically advanced commercial products.  In 
sum, the findings of both Wutys et al. (2004) and Darby et al. (2004) not only confirm 
Ahuja’s (2000a) assertion of the roles of direct-tie partners, but also suggest the importance 
of qualitative relationships between partners during generation of inventions.      
 Further, Almeida and Phene (2004) examined a different type of interorganizational 
relationship between subsidiaries and multinational corporations (MNCs). The authors used 
patent citation data to measure the usefulness of inventions by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 
semiconductor firms to test the hypotheses.  They found that the technological richness of the 
MNCs, the subsidiary’s knowledge linkage to host country firms, and the technological 
diversity within the host country have a positive impact on capabilities to generate patentable 
inventions.  According to the findings, the authors explained that subsidiaries did not directly 
absorb the technological richness of the MNC, yet the subsidiaries did internalize the 
underlying organizing principles, systems, and processes that permit subsidiaries to generate 
useful inventions.   
 Additionally, subsidiaries did not directly benefit from the host country richness, but they 
tended to exploit the country’s technological diversity through knowledge linkages, seeking 
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to learn from a much narrower subset of firms in a specific region.  The authors suggested 
that in order to generate successful inventions, the MNC should require that certain 
subsidiaries play unique roles that may not require knowledge integration with the rest of the 
firm, but serve the MNC in terms of technological exploration through linkages within 
specialized regions and countries (Almeida et al., 2004).      
   Taking the important findings of all previous studies, several conclusions can be made to 
report the current knowledge of how and why interorganizational linkages facilitate a focal 
firm to generate patentable inventions.  First, when a small startup collaborates with large 
organizational members in the network, it tends to generate higher levels of patentable 
inventions.  Stuart (2000) confirmed that startups benefited from large and innovative 
strategic alliance partners.  In the situation in which growth and innovation rates are critical 
for survival, large firms in particular act as endorsements for the startups by building public 
confidence in the value of their organizational products and services while helping them to 
attract customers and other corporate partners (Stuart, 2000).     
 Second, Kotabe and Swan (1995: 631) indicated that “communication, coordination, and 
a multidisciplinary effort between and within firms are a key to building trust and superior 
performance.”  Accordingly, startups and established members in interorganizational 
networks need a balance between technology and strategy to generate numbers of new 
products to the market.  To explain the previous point, Li and Atuahene-Gima (2001) studied 
the product innovation strategy and the performance of new technology ventures in China.  
The authors indicated that support from government institutions plays a significant role in 
enhancing the effectiveness of a new technology venture’s product innovation strategy.  They 
surprisingly found that the relationship-based strategies do not enhance the effectiveness of a 
new technology venture’s product innovation strategy.  Accordingly, if firms place too much 
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importance on strategy as opposed to technology, they are less likely to achieve an innovation 
strategy. 
 In the study, political networking with high status officials appeared to play no role in 
terms of increasing product innovation performance, particularly in transitional economies.  
The authors explained that it is possible that difficulties in relationships between alliance 
partners (i.e., Chinese officials and authorities) and new technology ventures may divert 
limited managerial resources and attention away from core product innovation strategies.  To 
be successful in generating new and innovative products to the market, startups need to find 
the equilibrium point between the competing demand from their institutional partners and 
invention processes.  Without this equilibrium, startups tend to fail in terms of either 
establishing necessary relationships or generating product innovations.  The study of Li and 
Atuahene-gima (2001) therefore suggested that in a specific circumstance (i.e., in China), 
strategic alliances or interfirm networking strategies to collaborate with high status partners 
(i.e., Chinese officials) may not always yield successful innovative results.    
 Last, during the invention period, startups need more direct ties to support a technological 
base and knowledge management structure (i.e., how to manage technological richness).  
Regarding the relationships between focal firms and established members, Ahuja (2000) 
explained that because direct ties primarily benefit resource-sharing (over-information spill 
benefit), focal firms intending to accomplish innovative generation should gain benefits from 
interfirm networks with higher numbers of direct ties, rather than the networks with higher 
numbers of indirect ties. 
3.4.2 Interfirm Networks as Diffusion Drivers  
 Traditionally, researchers in marketing have focused on commercialization activities 
while the economics and management literature have presented a rich exploration of product 
innovativeness (Kotabe et al., 1995).  Comparing concepts of product innovativeness and 
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those of invention activities, this study found that a current trend of innovation studies 
expands its scope to offer broader activities.  For instance, a stream of research in 
interorganizational networks addressed the role of an interorganizational network, as a 
predictor of an organizational adoption of inventions (i.e., products and processes).  Recently, 
studies in interorganizational network also attempt to elaborate relationships between 
interfirm networks and commercialization activities.      
 Before reviewing the studies in diffusion, it is important to repeat the distinction between 
commercialization and adoption.  Commercialization includes subsequent activities occurring 
after invention activities (Kelm et al., 1995) and targets public consequences (Wejnert, 2002).  
Adoption, on the other hand, involves imitating activities of the organizational inventors.  
These activities are conducted by the adopters of inventions (i.e., process innovations) to 
copy new structures, practices, or strategies to achieve benefits in terms of effectiveness and 
efficiency (Davis, 1991).  The adoption also creates only private consequences (Wejnert, 
2002).  Accordingly, commercialization involves a diffusion of inventions (i.e., products or 
processes) aiming to gain market acceptance, whereas adoption most likely refers to a 
diffusion of new practices or organizational processes between organizations seeking to 
improve existing practices or the process of adopting organizations’ routines.  Next, I will 
review the following studies to understand the current knowledge of adoption.  Subsequently, 
studies of commercialization will be discussed.    
 Using institutional perspectives to examine the adoption process, Leblebici, Salancik, 
Copay, and King (1991) examined how inventions emerged and diffused over time in an 
interorganizational field, using the historical context of the U.S. radio broadcasting industry.  
The study is fairly parallel to the study of Christensen and Bower (1996) who considered the 
emergence of disruptive technologies and their impact on the failure of leading firms.  While 
both studies described the adoption of new products and practices among organizations 
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operating in different industries (i.e., the U.S. radio broadcasting and the disk drive 
industries), the studies also addressed similar theoretical puzzles: How do the inventors 
diffuse their inventions and justify the new and useful ideas?  And why do those who owe 
their positions of power to prevailing institutions willingly adopt these ideas?   
 According to the studies, the adoption process of inventions began when small and less 
dominant firms introduced new products and services (i.e., disruptive technologies) in the 
emerging or peripheral markets in order to compete with existing products and services 
offered by established firms.  At that time, the new products and services were not accepted 
because of deviation from standard practices or performance.  Since the dominant or 
established players had vested their interests in the institutionalized conventions (i.e., 
established technologies), these dominants players used their resources to maintain the status 
quo or introduce only practices and/or products that confirmed established conventions and 
satisfied their main customers (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Leblebici et al., 1991).  The two 
studies explained further that once the new products or services (i.e. innovation) offered a 
better performance than that of the existing practices and/or products in the markets, 
established firms accepted and replaced their established products or services with the 
invention.  With the acceptance of established firms in the industry, the invention initiated by 
new players was successfully endorsed and diffused to the public.  At this stage, invention 
became fully recognized as innovation.         
 The studies of Leblebici et al. (1991) and Christensen and Bower (1996) described the 
introduction of invention by startups, the reactions of established players, and the diffusions 
of invention as a way to achieve better performance and to gain acceptance by customers 
and/or other constituents in the markets.  Whereas the two studies considered how established 
organizations willingly change their technologies to adopt invention, the authors did not 
suggest the roles of interorganizational relationships in the process.   
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 To illustrate further in terms of innovation adoption or imitation, Goes and Park (1997) 
studied interfirm linkages—several types of links among 400 hospitals over ten years—as 
channels of innovation diffusion.  The authors investigated the effects of four distinct types of 
interorganizational links on a service innovation in hospitals and found considerable support 
for the relationship between several types of interorganizational linkages (i.e., structural 
links, administrative links, institutional links, and resource links) and the adoption of 
innovative services and technologies.  Unlike Roger (1995), who concentrated his studies on 
diffusion of innovation within communities, and Cool et al (1997), who studied diffusion of 
innovation within organizations, Goes and Park (1997) offered perspectives of interfirm 
networks as channels for a focal organization to adopt innovative services and technologies 
from organizational peers.  Additionally, Goes and Park (1997) illustrated that adoption 
activities do not necessarily involve interactions between established firms and peripheral 
firms.  Rather, the adoption of interorganizational networks reflects transfers of any practices, 
processes, or inventions that were considered new between organizations.    
 Whereas studies of adoption activities are common in management literature, a few 
studies discuss commercialization activities.  In the followings, this paper will describe two 
studies that addressed the importance of commercialization activities of innovation.  A study 
of Hargadon and Sutton (1997) provides a good illustration of how a product design firm—
IDEO—successfully commercialized inventions.  The authors blend the concepts of social 
network and organizational memory perspectives in a model of technology brokering that 
explains how IDEO develops innovative products.  IDEO acquires knowledge from its 
external network, stores the knowledge in the organization’s memory, and then retrieves that 
knowledge to successfully commercialize new innovations.  The study of Hargadon and 
Sutton (1997) illustrates the importance in interfirm networks diffusing invention. The diffuse 
of invention comes combining structural holes (Burt, 1992, 1997) and organizational memory 
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perspectives (Walsh & Ungson, 1991) to enhance technology brokering and innovation in a 
product development firm.  Unfortunately, because Hargadon and Sutton (1997) used the 
case study approach to singularly explore factors contributing to successful 
commercialization, they could not generalize and validate their findings.     
 Recently, Zahra and Nielson (2002) conducted a study to understand sources of 
capabilities, integration, and technology commercialization.  The authors used four indicators 
to represent technology commercialization in the study, noting that technology 
commercialization should 1) develop and introduce a large number of product and process 
technologies; 2) create radically new products; 3) expedite the introduction of these new 
products to the market; and 4) create new knowledge.  Further, the study offered interesting 
findings about a firm’s use of external sources to pursue competitive advantage through the 
effective and timely commercialization of new technology.  From the findings, the authors 
reported that whereas a firm’s use of external resources tends to increase its product 
introductions and the speed of introductions, the products tend to draw negative associations 
with technology radicalness and patents.  The authors explained that “outsourcing and other 
external sources adversely influence the development of tacit and firm-specific knowledge 
necessary for radical innovation that yields new knowledge” (Zahra et al., 2002: 393).  On the 
other hand, external sources encourage higher frequency and speed of product introduction 
and process of innovation for new and less radical innovation.     
 The previous studies of adoption and commercialization offered current knowledge in 
areas of interorganizational networks.  First, while the startups normally generate and 
introduce inventions in the industry, it was the adoptions of such inventions by established 
firms and public constituents that accomplished the transformation of inventions into 
innovations.  Powell et al. (1996) mentioned that rather than use external relations as a 
temporary mechanism to compensate for unmastered capabilities, firms use collaborations to 
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expand all their competencies.  Accordingly, successes or failures for the startups and 
established firms strongly rely on how the firms exploit new practices in the external 
environments.  In the current competitive landscape, both startups and established firms rely 
on one another.  The startups provide new practices, and established firms endorse and justify 
the practices. 
 Second, as suggested by several studies, when inventions are more controversial in 
nature, low-status and peripherally located innovators, as opposed to high-status and centrally 
located actors, tend to generate new practices and introduce practices to be adopted 
(Christensen et al., 1996; Leblebici et al., 1991).  Empirical evidences also confirmed that the 
low-status (or startup) innovators become more successful than the high-status (or 
established) ones when it comes to the context of radical innovations (Christensen et al., 
1996).  Third, whereas interorganizational linkages may be effective resources facilitating 
focal firms to successfully diffuse inventions, relying too much on external linkages can harm 
focal firms’ internal capability to generate new and radical technologies (Zahra et al., 2002).   
 In reference to the previous point, the question remains as to what extent firms should 
rely on external sources in order to successfully diffuse innovation while maintaining 
generating capabilities of internal radicalness and patents.  Powell et al. (1996) reported that 
although biotechnology firms expanded interorganizational relationships (i.e., degree of 
centrality), the firms tended to maintain a number of ties and partners.  According to Powell 
et al., “this suggests that firms are not ‘promiscuous’ in their use of ties; rather, they are 
deepening their connectedness without adding substantial numbers of new ties” (1996: 134).  
The fact that interorganizational relationships of innovation network are quite stable 
underscores the importance of using an integrated framework of invention, 
commercialization, and adoption in order to understand the overall innovation performance.  
This argument introduces the following section, which examines the framework of 
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interorganizational networks and overall innovation performance (i.e., invention, 
commercialization, and adoption activities).      
3.4.3 Integrated Framework of Interfirm Linkages and Innovation Activities 
 Several arguments supported an integrative framework to fully understand how 
interorganizational linkages could impact product innovation activities (i.e., invention and 
commercialization) (Greve, 2003; Rothaermel et al., 2004).  Since empirical research 
consistently claims that the process of interorganizational partner selection represents a 
partial function of inertia force (Li & Rowley, 2002), firms do not and cannot easily change 
interfirm networks (Powell et al., 1996).  Yet, interorganizational linkages are empirically 
stable (Powell et al., 1996), the integrative framework of innovation processes should enrich 
our understanding about the roles of interorganizational linkage and focal firms’ innovation 
performance (Greve, 2003).  To report the current knowledge in the area, this paper will 
review several articles that use the integrative framework of innovation process.   
 Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) offered the most comprehensive framework to discuss the 
interorganizational networks of biotechnology firms and innovation processes.  In the study, 
the authors developed a comprehensive framework of sequential activities in innovation 
activities—generating and diffusing innovations—and matched the activities with two types 
of alliances—exploration and exploitation alliances.  Using concepts from organizational 
learning, the authors found that “exploration alliances predict products in development, 
which in turn predict exploitation alliances, and that exploitation alliances predict product on 
the market” (2004: 216).       
 During one period of invention, firms sought help from exploration alliances to enhance 
technological knowledge and capability to transform ideas into products.  Once the firms 
achieved their primary objectives in terms of new product development, they acquired 
exploitation firms to commercialize the products into market.  The authors mentioned that on 
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an average, new technology ventures that use an exploration-exploitation strategy tend to be 
more successful in terms of having more products in development and in the market 
(Rothaermel et al., 2004).   
 Additionally, Rothaermel et al. (2004) asserted that the size of focal firms can moderate 
any propensity to engage in alliances.  Using the concepts of transaction cost economics and 
the “pecking order” hypothesis of the optimal capital structure model, the authors explained 
that once a firm has sufficient internal resources to handle innovation activities, the firm must 
compare the costs and benefits of engaging in alliances with those of using its own internal 
resources in the product development process.  Because the commercialization activities in 
the biopharmaceutical industry are more certain than invention activities, biotechnology firms 
tend to withdraw from exploitation alliances while sticking with exploration alliances (Koza 
& Lewin, 1999).  The study of Rothaermel et al. (2004) illustrated that as firms grow larger, 
they will integrate vertically by terminating exploitation alliances first, and then exploration 
alliances.   
 Unlike Shan et al.’s (1994) finding that alliances predict the number of focal firms’ 
patents, Rothaermel et al. (2004) indicated that the study extends knowledge by showing that 
although patents explain alliances, patents address a specific and particular type of alliance—
an exploitation alliance.  In other words, firms with large numbers of patents induce a high 
number of exploitation partners.  Whereas Rothaermel et al. (2004) indicated the process in 
which different types of partners in interorganizational linkages contribute to innovation 
performance, Spencer (2003) illustrated that focal firms engage in the strategies to share 
knowledge with an innovation system, seeking to increase innovation performance.  Spencer 
argued that “firms that shared relevant knowledge with their innovation system earned higher 
innovative performance than firms that did not share knowledge” (2003: 217).  Although 
Spencer (2003) indicated that her paper focuses only on the relationship between a firm’s 
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knowledge-sharing strategy and its innovative performance during the pre-commercial phase 
of industry emergence, this section includes the study because the knowledge-sharing 
strategy substantially influences the success and failure of invention and commercialization 
activities.  By indicating that firms can shape an institutional environment during the early 
period of generating innovation (Spencer, 2003), this study also provides concepts which fall 
in line with the concept that robust designs shape institutional framework and market 
dynamics of diffusing innovation (Hargadon et al., 2001).     
 According to the findings, Spencer (2003) indicated that by sharing technological 
knowledge with external researchers in terms of publications or basic research, a firm can 
influence the institutional environment in at least two ways.  First, firms can shape 
technological and environmental standards by sharing a portion of their own knowledge with 
the technological community, thus directing an industry-wide conversation toward advances 
in technology.  Second, by attracting other innovators to a technological trajectory, firms 
form a critical mass of alliances with a mutual interest in the success of the technology 
(Spencer, 2003).  Interestingly, concepts of critical mass indicated by Spencer (2003) during 
the generating innovation period is comparable to Roger’s (1995) concepts of opinion leaders 
and the critical mass, which influence the successful diffusion networks.  The “critical mass” 
refers to an important referent stage occurring at the point where enough individuals have 
adopted an innovation so that the innovation’s further rate of adoption becomes self-
sustaining.  According to Rogers (1995), opinion leaders are individuals who lead in 
influencing opinion about innovations.  The number of opinion leaders positively relates to 
the critical mass.   
 Spencer (2003), by addressing the importance of having a critical mass of competitors on 
the same technology trajectory, extends the understandings of interorganizational linkages 
with alliances in networked industries.  Importantly, firms should acquire opinion leaders—
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externally individual researchers, organizations, and even competitors—to develop evaluation 
standards that favor the firms’ product designs and build a strong industry infrastructure.  In 
this regard, firms should focus attention to all possibly important knowledge contributors in 
the broadest environment.  Specifically, in the flat panel display industry, the author 
mentioned that firms need to implement strategies to influence not only the national 
innovation system, but also a global innovation system to achieve high innovative 
performance.  The author defined “an innovation system” as one that consists of resources 
and institutions, built through interactions among universities, research institutes, and 
innovating firms, which a company can harness to successfully commercialize innovations” 
(2003: 217).  Spencer wrote: “Firms that interacted with their global innovation system 
earned higher innovation performance than firms that interacted with only their national 
innovation system” (Spencer, 2003: 217).  Overall, this particular study contributes to the 
knowledge of relationships between interorganizational linkages and innovation outcomes by 
including the implications of innovation systems on both national and global levels.    
 The last research that integrates the two innovation activities used innovation speed as its 
dependent variable to reflect the period from the onset of generating innovation to the end of 
diffusing innovation (Kessler et al., 2000).  In this study, Kessler et al. (2000) used three 
relative measures (speed relative to schedule, speed relative to similar, previously completed 
projects, and speed relative to similar projects of competitors) to represent innovation speed 
of several projects in organizations.  The authors asked respondents to check off one of 13 
boxes describing projects as relatively faster, slower, or equal in speed to schedules, past 
projects, or competitor projects.  According to previous research by Kessler et al., the 
concepts of “innovation speed” are referred to as “the time elapsed between a) initial 
development, including the conception and definition of an innovation, and b) ultimate 
commercialization, which is the introduction of a new product into the market place” (1996: 
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1144).  Thus, in Kessler et al. (2000), innovation speed represents an integrative framework 
to understand the speed at which firms convert ideas into commercialization.   
 Using innovation speed as their dependent variable, the authors found that a specific type 
of interfirm network (i.e., external sourcing partners) was not only associated with lower 
competitive success, but also related to slower innovation speed.  The authors reasoned that 
the integration of external and internal knowledge could be very difficult and problematic, 
especially during the idea generation stage.  Additionally, knowledge from external sources 
faces more organizational barriers than internally developed knowledge.  Last, because an 
idea is initiated from an outside organization, or external source, it is unlikely that the project 
champion will motivate employees and push along the project.  According to the findings of 
Kessler et al. (2000), external learning by an outsourcing approach harms generating 
innovations, and will subsequently determine unsuccessful results in diffusing innovation.  
These negative outcomes from the strategy of outsourcings were demonstrated by lower 
competitive success and slower innovation speed.  For the researchers, the outcomes from 
this study underline the necessity of examining innovation process in distinct phases, 
particularly when attempting to understand the contributions of interfirm networks toward 
innovation outcomes.  
3.5 Summarizing Innovation Studies  
 The previous sections explained several important innovation studies.  At the end of this 
chapter, Table 3.2 summarizes how these studies assess and measure the performance of 
innovation activities.  Drawing on concepts of invention activities from Schumpeter (1934), 
as well as several scholars in innovation areas, this paper gathers several important 
innovation studies in the pre-commercial stage (Spencer, 2003) and commercialization stage.  
The first ten studies explained how firms generate inventions from both organizational and 
interorganizational perspectives.  Interestingly, scholars use different indicators to capture 
 70
dimensions of invention performance in the pre-commercial stage.  The most common 
variables in the invention stage, however, are the number of granted patents (Ahuja, 2000a; 
Almeida et al., 2004; Shan et al., 1994).  Additionally, the most popular source of data was 
from the United States Patent Trademark Office (USPTO).   
 Stuart (2000), particularly, used patent citations to determine the innovativeness of a firm.  
He mentioned that firms are required to list citations to all previously-granted patents which 
made technological claims similar to those claimed in their applications.  Accordingly, the 
patent citations trace all technological ancestries.  Assuming that the most important patented 
inventions are those highly cited in later patents, Stuart (2000) indicated that the most 
innovative firms are those that developed a significant fraction of the highly-cited patents.              
 Next, seven studies used several different measurements to capture commercialization 
activities.  Most studies in this area followed a methodology of case study analysis to 
examine factors relating to diffusion activities.  For example, Hargadon and Douglas (2001) 
examined the successful strategy of Thomas Edison to commercialize innovations, whereas 
Leblebici et al. (1991) used the radio industry to illustrate the diffusion process of innovation.  
Regarding the studies of diffusion, a singular study attempted to empirically measure 
commercialization.  In this particular study, Zahra and Nielson (2002) used a survey method 
to understand capabilities and technology commercialization (TC).  The authors used 
numbers of new products, technology commercialization speed, radicalness of the products, 
and number of patents as their dependent variables.  Interestingly, Zahra and Nielson’s TC is 
so broad that it covers several dimensions of innovation.  
 Rogers (1995) specified that diffusion of innovation is a process by which an innovation 
is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system 
(1995).  Consequently, several studies examined the process to understand the adoption of 
innovation.  This paper includes several studies of the adoption process in Table 3.2 to 
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illustrate relevant variables and measurements.  At least three studies in this area empirically 
examine the adoption of innovations (Christensen et al., 1996; Davis, 1991; Goes et al., 
1997).  Using results from interviews in a case study of the world disk-drive industry, 
Christensen et al. (1996) suggested how leading firms fail to adopt disruptive technologies.  
Within the article, the authors indirectly illustrate influential factors of technology diffusion.  
The authors noted the model: established firms invest chunks of their resources in existing 
technologies, but ignore the potentially new technologies; thus, fail to compete with the 
startups who allocate resources and efforts to develop their own new technologies.  Later, 
when the new technologies are accepted and supported by consumers and the performance of 
the new technologies is found to exceed the established firms’ existing technologies, the 
adoption pattern is clearly witnessed. 
 Further, using empirical analyses of the proxy statements of focal firms and the annual 
hospital disclosure reports as main sources of information, Davis (1991) and Goes and Park 
(1997), respectively, explained factors affecting firms’ decisions to adopt innovations into 
their organizational practices.  In sum, these two studies suggested that different 
interorganizational linkages are responsible for successful innovation adoptions among 
hospitals who implemented the new technologies.   
 The last segment of Table 3.2 includes innovation studies that examined performance of 
the integrated innovation activities (the interorganizational innovation system).  Two aspects 
of innovation studies fall into this section.  The first aspect involves studies that integrate 
invention activities and diffusion activities into a single framework; the second aspect 
involves studies that use dependent variables to capture the total effect of innovation 
development (i.e., innovation speed and patent renewals).  For the first aspect, at the 
organizational level, Kelm et al. (1994) and Greve (2003) illustrated the importance of 
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integrating invention and diffusion studies to understand comprehensive framework and 
consequences of innovation processes.   
 It is surprising that few studies offered an integrated framework to study overall 
innovation processes.  As Kelm et al. (1995) indicated, announcements of biotech inventions 
and their product commercialization (diffusing innovation) engender different, but sequential 
outcomes to the values of firms, thus, analyzation of either one of the two continuous 
activities is incomplete.  Rothaermel and Deed (2004) also confirmed that a link exists 
between different alliances participating in the different innovation processes, beginning with 
generating and ending with commercializing products on the market. 
Thus, in order to understand the processes of how interorganizational linkages contribute 
to innovation development, Rothaermel and Deed (2004) offered an integrative framework to 
examine the early stage of invention (i.e., drug discovery, preclinical trials) to the latter stages 
of diffusion of new products on the market (i.e., clinical trials, FDA approvals, and 
commercialization).  With the integrative framework, the scholars successfully captured the 
fact that different sets of alliance partners determine the number of products in developments, 
as well as the number of products in the market.      
For the second aspect, Spencer (2003) and Kessler et al. (2000) offered interesting 
variables as proxies that captured abilities of firms to generate and diffuse innovation outputs.  
Following innovative methods from studies in economics, Spencer (2003) used patent 
renewal methods as an estimate of patent portfolio value to capture the value of a firm’s 
patented innovations.  The author mentioned that in some European countries, inventors must 
pay a significant annual fee to maintain intellectual property protection for their patented 
technology.       
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   Table 3.2 Summaries of Empirical Innovation Studies between 1991 and 2004  
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 Thus, “the patent renewal methodology assumes that firms will renew patents as long as 
they are useful for the firms, and allow unproductive patents to lapse” (Spencer, 2003).  
Drawing from this process, Spencer (2003) was able to capture the firms’ capability to 
generate useful and valuable inventions.  However, to some extent, patent renewal methods 
only indicated that particular inventions may be successfully commercialized in the 
inventors’ perspective.   
 Kessler et al. (2000), applied an original variable, “innovation speed,” to cover the period 
of firms from an early stage of generating innovation to the last stage of diffusing innovation 
to the market. Thus, the innovation speed as a variable reflects the capabilities of firms to 
deal with speeds of both generating and diffusing innovation.  Because the innovation speed 
is an indicator designated to capture the sum of invention speed and commercialization speed, 
one may argue that the indicator does not elaborate on information regarding individual 
outcomes of invention and diffusion activities.   
Taken together, studies in the integrated innovation performance section suggest several 
important implications.  First, since Rothaermel et al. (2004) indicated the path dependence 
among four linking variables—exploration alliances, products in development, exploitation 
alliances, and products on the market—it is important for researchers to understand the nature 
of overall alliances to determine the consequences of invention activities and diffusion 
activities to understand overall innovation performance.  Second, the inclusion of relevant 
organizational partners in the innovation system is a required methodology to understand 
specific types and characteristics of interorganizational linkages leading to successful 
innovation outcomes (Spencer, 2003).   
Because all organizations operate in an open system, research should include relational 
contents and relational multiplexity in the study to deal with the complexity of 
interorganizational linkages.  The relational contents involve complex issues of information 
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exchanges among organizations while the multiplexity exists when multiple and overlapping 
ties are in place between the nodes in a network.  These two variables are important concepts 
in the interorganizational network research, because they enable researchers to consider 
various impacts from relevant factors in the system simultaneously (Zaheer & Usai, in press).     
 Last, the use of innovation speed or patent renewals as dependent variables seems to be 
appropriate when scholars intend to capture the total effect of innovation outcomes.  
However, according to several studies of innovation, focal firms change organizational 
networks to achieve current objectives (Ahuja, 2000a; Rothaermel et al., 2004; Wuyts et al., 
2004).  While a direct empirical study is still needed to explain the influence of the specific 
exploration-exploitation ratios on the focal firms’ innovation performance (Rothaermel et al., 
2004), the use of an integrative framework to understand the path-dependent processes of 
invention and commercialization activities is deemed to be necessary. 
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CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 The development of the biopharmaceutical industry described in the second chapter was a 
complex and fundamentally unique phenomenon.  In general, the biopharmaceutical industry 
is a nearly perfect testing ground to combine academic concepts of interorganizational 
linkages and innovation theories.  The industry consists of many strategic alliances 
collaborating to achieve innovation performance.  Prevalent collaborations in various forms 
of agreement among pharmaceutical firms, biotechnology firms, research institutions, and 
universities have been witnessed throughout the past decades (Darby et al., 2004; Zucker, 
Darby, & Brewer, 1998).   
 Comments of biopharmaceutical experts consistently indicate the importance of a patent 
protection system that encourages collective efforts and collaborative environments of 
interorganizational networks.  Since biopharmaceutical firms are confident with the patent 
law enforcement and the process of intellectual protection, they willingly share their 
developed proprietary technologies with alliance partners to further develop and 
commercialize new and potential drugs to the market.  With this evidence, theorists have 
conducted a number of studies to understand organizational factors involved in strategic 
alliances and innovation outcomes since the 1980s.   
 Whereas prior studies successfully confirmed alliances as primary predictors of 
innovation performance, the studies seldom included several aspects of relational networks 
among alliances.  Additionally, prior research generally ignored the fact that the innovation 
process (i.e., product innovation) is a path-dependent pattern with continuous and 
interdependent activities of invention and commercialization (Greve, 2003; Rothaermel et al., 
2004).  To fill the literature gap, an integrative framework warrants.  Further, as the 
biopharmaceutical industry reaches a mature phase (Wittcoff et al., 2004), behaviors of 
relevant organizations and patterns of interorganizational linkages become increasingly 
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consistent and stable.  One can argue that perhaps this specific period represents a better time 
to re-assess the relationships between strategic alliances and innovation outcomes in the 
particular industry.   
 BioScan, the most popular database used by many studies, details most collaborative 
types of the biopharmaceutical industry.  The directory contains the content of agreements 
including R&D agreements, licensing agreements, clinical and contract research services, 
analytical and pharmaceutical formulation services, and feasibility studies.  The same 
database also describes company history in terms of ownership structures (i.e., acquisitions 
and mergers).  These collaborative efforts and environment reflect what Poldony and Page 
(1998) defined as the “network form of organizations,” a wide array of collaboration 
including joint ventures, strategic alliances, business groups, franchises, research consortia, 
relational contracts, and outsourcing agreements.   
 Whereas several studies in interorganizational networks have already indicated motives 
and outcomes of collaborative efforts among firms, relatively few studies offer the 
comprehensive knowledge of how interorganizational networks could influence overall 
innovation activities.  For instance, whereas Shan et al. (1994), Kotabe and Swan (1995), and 
Ahuja (2000a), and Darby et al. (2004) elaborated on the importance of interfirm networks in 
generating innovation, the scope of innovation only covered invention performance as 
measured by patentable inventions.  This is surprising, given the fact that success or failure of 
invention activities (i.e., product innovation process) largely depends on performances of 
commercialization activities.  Whereas some firms produce a number of inventions that have 
no market value, other firms produce fewer and much more profitable inventions.  All firms 
want to be successful in both invention and commercialization; however, few have achieved 
both simultaneously.  In academic literature, whereas several scholars contribute in terms of 
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invention, there is no empirical study to understand the commercialization activities among 
alliances. 
4.1 Theoretical Backgrounds    
 From the review of innovation studies in Chapter 3, management scholars have used 
concepts of several theoretical frameworks to explain innovation processes (i.e., evolutionary 
economics, behavioral, and sociological perspectives).  However, Drazin and Schoonhoven 
(1996) indicated that innovation studies are still less developed.  The knowledge in those 
areas could not fully explain directions and causal relationships of factors relevant to 
invention and commercialization.  Drawing upon several theoretical perspectives from the 
exhaustive literature review in chapter 3, most scholars used two important theoretical 
perspectives—organizational learning and institutional approaches—to understand the 
innovation phenomenon and to explain consequences of innovation related organizational 
behaviors.  Before applying the two perspectives to develop the hypotheses in this chapter, 
this study will briefly review the main concepts of organizational learning and institutional 
approaches to highlight their current contributions toward innovation. 
 First, organizational learning focuses on issues of how organizations or groups within the 
organization recognize, acquire, and exploit information or knowledge to alter their fits with 
external environment (Aldrich, 1999; Cohen et al., 1990).  The notable point of the approach 
is that some alterations may improve the organizational fit within the environment, whereas 
others may worsen it.  March (1991) suggested that firms would be successful in the short-
run through engagement in exploitation activities, but that the same firms would have 
difficulties in the long-run if there were no concentration on exploration activities.  Thus, the 
concepts of organizational learning are relevant to the trade-off decisions, complicated 
processes, and activities that have no inherent link to success. 
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 Aldrich (1999) suggested that research in organizational learning can be separated into 
two strands; the adaptive learning (Argote, 1993) and the knowledge development 
perspectives (Cyert & March, 1963).  The former perspective treats organizations as goal-
oriented activity, a system that learns from experience by repeating successful behaviors and 
discarding unsuccessful ones.  Aldrich (1998) suggested that the adaptive learning 
perspectives are highly comparable to the concepts within evolutionary process, in which the 
variations of organizational structures and behaviors are selected, retained, and diffused 
among similar firms in the competitive environment.  In the second strand of organizational 
learning, the knowledge development perspective, learning is not only about trials and errors, 
but also occurs as patterns of cognitive association and casual belief that are communicated 
and institutionalized.  Therefore, learning can be inferential and vicarious, and organizations 
can generate new knowledge through experimentation and creativity (Aldrich, 1998).   
 With regard to institutional perspectives, the knowledge development perspective of 
learning approach and the concepts of institutional approach are highly overlapped 
(DiMaggio, 1991a).  Firms learn from their environments and adjust themselves so that they 
are similar to other firms operating in the same industries.  The similarity ensures that the 
firms conform to the institutionalized framework and that the firms survive the competition 
because they gain acceptance and support from the constituents.  In the following, there will 
be a brief summarization of the main concepts of the institutional approach.  Regarding this 
approach, Aldrich (1998) indicated that scholars have extended concepts of 
institutionalization into multiple dimensions.  For instance, Parson (1956) argued that 
institutional patterns within organizations must be similar to the patterns of other 
organizations and social units within the same society.  Further, Selznick (1957) offered 
another theme of institutional approach as a process of instilling values, by use of critical 
statements as presented by participants in organizational environments.  Tolbert and Zucker 
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(1996) defined the process involved in the growth, coupled with deeply shared meanings 
among social actors as “habitualization” and “objectification.”  The authors described 
habitualization as the rise of patterned problem-solving behaviors, with objectification 
serving as the shared social meaning attached to these behaviors (Aldrich, 1998).   
 Applying the concepts of institutional approach in understanding of commercialization, 
Hargadon and Douglas (2001) proposed the implication of “robust design” as the practical 
approach of successful innovators, intended to draw attention and to convince public 
constituents or consumers to support the rise of innovation.  In order to be successful in terms 
of commercialization, inventors must understand the institutionalized framework of the 
public, in a scope that allows people to commonly understand and accept the new 
technologies and innovative products.  Inventors must balance the novelty of the products and 
the existing knowledge of the public to ensure that everyone in the public understands the 
occurrence, accepts the extension of technologies and products, and supports the inventions.   
 Incorporating the innovation concepts into several interorganizational network variables, 
the study uses the theoretical concepts of organizational learning and institutional approach to 
develop the hypotheses.  The theoretical concepts of learning provide a framework for 
understanding the need of collaboration at the dual stages of product innovation process (i.e., 
invention and commercialization) (Rothaermel et al., 2004).  Although, firms may alter their 
interfirm networks to fit the external environment, the new networks do not always guarantee 
success.   
 Additionally, learning provides concepts of exploration and exploitation activities 
(March, 1991).  These activities are important factors in contributing to the formation of a 
focal firm’s network to generate invention and commercialization.  However, since there are 
several dimensions of the network, focal firms engaging in different dimensions of the 
network perform differently.  During the early stage of the product innovation process, firms 
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engage in exploratory search involving invention activities and innovative capabilities to 
develop new knowledge, which subsequently generates additional value.  Once the firms 
achieve performance from exploration activities, they turn to exploitation activities.  
 Rothaermel and Deed (2004) indicated that in reality, most firms engage in exploration 
and exploitation activities simultaneously because firms manage several concurrent projects 
at different stages in the product innovation process.  However, from a learning perspective, 
the knowledge and capabilities currently exploited must have been explored at some earlier 
time. 
 Theoretical concepts of institutional perspectives primarily facilitate the understanding of  
the network formation during the commercialization process (Hargadon et al., 2001; Stuart, 
2000).  Institutional perspectives explain firm behaviors in gaining acceptance and legitimacy 
from the society.  The formation of a focal firm’s network to ensure the acceptance and 
legitimacy of its innovative products as well as acceptance into the social status of the focal 
firms reflects such behavior.  For instance, Stuart (2000) recommended that startups 
collaborate with established firms to ensure survival and to increase revenue growth.   
 In the context of institutional perspective, a high status or prominent network enhances a 
focal firm’s acceptance and legitimacy.  However, the institutional perspective suggests that 
established partners tend to stick with default assumptions or an existing framework of 
technologies (Christensen et al., 1996; Tushman et al., 1986).  It would be interesting to 
examine the impact of the established partners of the focal firm on invention performance.         
 Integrating the learning theory and institutional perspective, this chapter examines the 
implications of roles and collaborative structures of strategic alliances.  The proposed model 
indicates how several dimensions of the interfirm network reflect the effective product 
innovation.  Please refer to Figure 4.1 for the overall model of the study. 
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Figure 4.1: Interorganizational Networks for Product Innovation 
 
4.2 Interorganizational Network Variables 
 In this section, the study will briefly summarize the six dimensions of the interfirm 
network variables and discuss the hypothetical relationship between invention and 
commercialization performances.  Afterward, an elaboration on theoretical development will 
follow.  Regarding the first dimension, direct and indirect ties, Ahuja (2000a) successfully 
indicated that these ties promote patentable inventions.  The author, however, mentioned that 
the contents of ties that go through the networks were not directly examined.  Additionally, 
because the dependent variable represented a number of successful patent applications, or 
granted patents, the author did not apply the concepts of direct and indirect ties toward an 
understanding of the performance of commercialization activities.  The second and third 
dimensions of interorganizational variables involve two important concepts: the structural 
holes and the strength of ties.  Prior studies in organizational learning offer knowledge 
regarding how the variables explain invention performance; this present study extends those 
concepts to understand how the levels of structural holes, weak ties and strong ties explain 
the outcomes of product innovation process (invention and commercialization activities). 
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focal firms in the networks perform differently in terms of invention and adoption capabilities 
(Christensen et al., 1996; Leblebici et al., 1991; Rochin, 2006).  The studies also 
acknowledge that the adoptions of innovation process among organizations are facilitated by 
specific characteristics of interorganizational networks (Davis, 1991; Kraatz, 1998).  
Regarding this issue, institutional scholars suggested that the prestige or legitimacy of focal 
firms’ linkages help them survive and thrive in the industry (Baum & Ingram, 1998; Baum et 
al., 1991).  However, given the development of all the related knowledge in the area, the 
impact of the prestige in the focal firm’s network on the integrated framework of invention 
and commercialization has been relatively ignored.   
 The fifth dimension deals with orientations of focal firms in integrated innovation 
networks.  Rothaermel et al. (2004) categorizes two types of network orientations.  The 
authors found that exploration partners help focal firms in terms of invention activities and 
that exploitation partners facilitate commercialization activities.  However, the authors 
suggested that future research should examine the mix of exploration and exploitation and its 
contribution in terms of performance.  The comprehensive framework of this present study 
provides a further analytical model regarding how different alliances simultaneously 
contribute to performances of product innovation. 
 The last dimension to be examined in this study is the position of focal firms in the 
alliance networks.  This dimension offers a set of hypotheses that closely relates to the 
findings of Rothaermel et al. (2004).  The hypotheses involve the relationships of focal firms 
and their horizontal and vertical alliances (i.e., downstream and upstream alliances) and the 
influences of those relationships on invention and commercialization performances.  Whereas 
prior studies have found that types of alliances (exploration and exploitation alliances) 
determine the focal firms’ invention and commercialization performances, this present study 
suggests that the findings may not always be straightforward.  The hypotheses indicate that 
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the interaction effects of the orientation of the focal firms and their upstream and downstream 
alliances could moderate the influences of upstream and downstream alliances.   
 In the concluding hypothesis, the relationships between outcomes of invention and 
commercialization activities are examined.  Using several concepts of organizational learning 
and institutional approach throughout the previous hypothesis development, the last 
hypothesis predicts that those focal firms aiming to exploit their interfirm networks to 
generate inventions are unlikely to be successful at commercialization activities.  Conversely, 
the focal firms aiming to draw commercial benefits from their interfirm networks will be less 
successful at invention activities.  In other words, because a particular focal firm’s alliance 
network is particularly structured to achieve either invention performance or 
commercialization performance, the success of one activity is at the expense of the other 
activity.  
  4.2.1 Direct and Indirect Ties 
Powell et al. suggested that “when the knowledge base of an industry is both complex and 
expanding, and the sources of expertise are widely dispersed, the locus of innovation will be 
found in a network of learning, rather than individual firms” (1996: 116)  Regarding the 
importance of the network of learning, Tsai (2001) examined knowledge transfer in 
organizational networks.  The author indicated that a central network position of business 
units works with units’ absorptive capacity to generate innovation and improve business 
performance.  The central network position of business units reflects the external knowledge 
access, while the units’ absorptive capacity facilitates the ability of the units to assimilate 
new external knowledge and the ability to apply such knowledge to commercial ends, and 
thus create the opportunity for profit (Cohen et al., 1990; Tsai, 2001).  Whereas the 
absorptive capacity is a specific characteristic within a focal firm, a central network position 
deals largely with numbers of direct and indirect ties associated with the focal firms.  If the 
 87
central network position could be measured by the number of direct and indirect ties of a 
focal firm, the study of Tsai (2001) should support the argument that the high numbers of ties 
for the focal firm accelerate its innovation activities and performance.   
Several studies indicated the importance of social networks (i.e., direct and indirect ties) 
as sources of knowledge and learning capabilities in firms (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; 
Smith, Collins, & Clark, 2005).  However, Ahuja (2000a) specifically elaborated on the 
contributing benefits of direct and indirect ties toward patentable inventions.  The researcher 
indicated that direct ties bring three main benefits: knowledge sharing among partners, 
complementary skills among partners, and scale economies in research and development 
programs (see further details in Ahuja, 2000a).  A firm’s partners not only bring knowledge, 
experience, assistance, and rare resources to the focal firms, but also transfer additional 
information received by the interactions with other partners to the focal firm, and vice versa.  
Thus, drawing from the prior studies and their arguments on organizational learning 
perspectives, direct and indirect ties reflect linkages to knowledge held by the focal firm’s 
partner and the knowledge held by its partner’s partners (Gulati et al., 1999; Smith et al., 
2005).   
4.2.1.1 Direct and Indirect Ties and Invention Activities  
 Empirically, Ahuja (2000) found that direct and indirect ties of collaborative networks 
among firms in the chemical industry significantly contributed to the invention performance 
of focal firms.  The author indicated that the impact of indirect ties on a firm’s invention 
performance will be moderated by the level of the firm’s direct ties.  Because the relative 
addition to knowledge through indirect ties is less for firms with many direct ties than for 
those with few direct ties, the focal firms with many direct and indirect ties will receive only 
a marginal increment of knowledge to generate inventions from indirect ties.   Additionally, 
if a focal firm’s partners have many connections, the information that reaches the focal firm 
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through the network also reaches the other partners of its partners.  A large number of 
indirect ties mean that there is more competition among the focal firm and its partners’ 
partners.  This competition of knowledge from the common partners produces more 
constraint in a focal firm’s ability to absorb new information or respond to it as effectively as 
a firm with a few direct ties (Ahuja, 2000a).   
 Further, because Ahuja (2000a) asserted that direct ties serve as sources of resources and 
information necessary for invention activities, a focal firm seeking resource-sharing benefits 
to improve its invention activities should prefer direct ties to indirect ties.  Because the 
magnitude of the benefits provided by direct ties is significantly different from those 
provided by indirect ties, focal firms need direct ties to gain resource-sharing benefits rather 
than indirect ties to gain information-spill over benefits.  To illustrate the previous point, a 
biopharmaceutical firm should improve its productive capabilities in terms of invention 
activities if it has many direct ties with universities, research institutes, and chemical-based 
pharmaceutical firms.  With many direct ties, the focal firms no longer need a high number of 
indirect ties because the necessary knowledge and important information have already been 
received from the direct ties.  Thus, the direct ties moderate the contributions of indirect ties 
as sources of information to generate patentable inventions.  
4.2.1.2 Direct and Indirect Ties and Commercialization Activities  
 Regarding benefits of direct and indirect ties on commercialization activities, it is 
reasonable to assume that a focal firm with many direct and indirect marketing and consumer 
networks should perform successfully in the activities.  Specifically, under the institutional 
approach, a successful commercialization depends largely on the acceptance and support of 
constituents or consumers (Hargadon et al., 2001).  Unlike the focal firms, in the case of 
invention activities that seek to acquire benefits from their partners in terms of resource 
sharing (and, to some degree, information spillovers), the focal firms in the case of 
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commercialization activities require direct and indirect partners to communicate and 
introduce their inventions to the market.  Therefore, in addition to receiving important 
information, the focal firms use their ties to send messages about their inventions to the 
public.  
 Rogers (1995) indicated that “critical mass” and “opinion leaders” are very important 
factors determining the successful commercialization activities.  In a successful 
commercialization network, the larger numbers of direct and indirect ties of a focal firm 
represent multiple channels of communication with a plethora of opinion leaders.  These 
critical leaders serve to generate the critical mass, an important referent stage occurring at the 
point in which enough individuals adopt an innovation, resulting in the innovation’s further 
rate of adoption becoming self-sustaining (Rogers, 1995).     
 Spencer (2003), addressing the importance of having a critical mass of competitors on the 
same technology trajectory, extends the understanding of interorganizational linkages to 
alliances in networked industries.  According to Spencer, it is more important that firms 
acquire opinion leaders—externally individual researchers, organizations, and even 
competitors—who will develop evaluation standards that favor the firms’ product design, 
thus building a strong industry infrastructure.  In this regard, firms should focus particular 
attention to all possible direct and indirect knowledge contributors in the broadest 
environment.  Further, the interaction between the direct and indirect should provide positive 
outcomes in terms of commercialization.  Drawing from the previous arguments, this study 
proposes the first set of hypotheses to understand the potential benefits of direct ties, indirect 
ties, and the interaction between direct and indirect ties toward invention and 
commercialization activities.  
 H1a (i): The more direct partners that a focal firm maintains, the greater the firm’s 
 invention performance. 
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 H1b (i): The more indirect partners that a focal firm maintains, the greater the 
 firm’s invention performance. 
 
 H1c (i): The impact of indirect partners on a focal firm’s invention performance  will 
 be moderated by the level of the firm’s direct ties. 
 
      H1d (c): The more direct partners that a focal firm maintains, the greater the 
 firm’s commercialization performance. 
  
 H1e (c): The more indirect partners that a focal firm maintains, the greater the 
 firm’s commercialization performance. 
 
 H1f (c): The greater the number of both direct and indirect partners, the better 
 commercialization performance for the focal firm. 
 
4.2.2 Structural Holes 
 Burt (1997) related his argument of structural holes to define the benefits of a social 
network in terms of the information and control advantages of being the broker in relations 
between people otherwise disconnected in a social structure.  The concepts of structural holes 
differ from those of strength of ties because the concept of strength of ties concerns the ties 
that span the chasm between two social clusters, while the concept of structural ties is about 
the chasm spanned that generates information benefits (Burt, 1992).  For example, a focal 
firm may have a strong-tie network with immediate alliances, but the network may have 
plenty of holes among the members.  On the other hand, another focal firm may have a weak-
tie network with no structural hole at all.   
 Regarding the information benefits of structural holes, Burt (1992) suggested that the 
benefits include access, timing, and referrals.  Access represents the positions from which a 
manager can obtain additionally useful information from his or her network; timing involves 
getting information and acting beyond that information to acquire an advantageous business 
position; referrals are transferring processes which filter information to the manager so that 
the information is direct, concentrated, and legitimate (Burt, 1992).   
 According to Burt (1997), the more holes spanned mean richer information benefits from 
the network for a focal firm, because unconnected members in a network tend to bridge more 
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non-redundant information from more clusters.  Burt suggested that each cluster of contacts 
forms a single source of information, because people connected to one another tend to share 
common backgrounds and information.  Thus, these individuals in a cluster usually know the 
same things at about the same time.  If one can bridge the two clusters, he or she would have 
gained not only the information benefits but the control benefit of structural holes.  The 
position of members in social networks who create structural bridges between disconnected 
cliques determines whose interests are served by the bridge (Burt, 1997).  Therefore, it is a 
social network position that determines who has power to allow the focal actors to get thing 
done and achieve their goals.   
4.2.2.1 Structural Holes and Invention Performance  
 Using the concepts of structural holes to understand the inventions of interorganizational 
networks, Ahuja (2000) found that high magnitudes of disconnections among partners in the 
collaborative networks decreased patentable inventions of focal firms.  Ahuja explained that 
because the context of his study dealt with collaboration and resource sharing among 
networks of competitors, it required the benefits of closed networks.  Thus, a low level of 
structural holes within interorganizational networks helps a focal firm to overcome 
opportunism among competitive members.  The author suggested that for the other 
collaborative context in which the key principle is information brokerage, a high level of 
structural holes among interorganizational networks should help focal firms to bridge 
structural holes between the two unconnected clusters.  For instance, if the focal firm is a 
product-development consulting firm that bridges structural holes between clients in different 
industries, a high level of structural holes should satisfy the demands of the focal firm’s 
customers (Hargadon et al., 1997).  In sum, according to Ahuja: “whether structural holes are 
good, bad, or irrelevant is liable to be a function of the context.  When developing a 
collaborative milieu and overcoming opportunism are essential to success, closed networks 
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are likely to be more beneficial.  When speedy access to diverse information is essential, 
structural holes are likely to be advantageous” (2000: 451).  
 In the context of the biopharmaceutical industry, traditional pharmaceutical firms that 
engage in relationships with isolated biotechnology firms (i.e., a possibly high level of 
structural holes) or disconnected research contract organizations should be more likely to 
generate a lower level of inventions.  It is more likely that the interorganizational relationship 
with a high level of structural holes should prevent the development of trust and effective 
communications among partners.  This effect obviously harms the invention development of 
the focal firms.  In the context of invention activities, Walker, Koput and Shan (1997) 
indicated that biotechnology firms reproduced their network structures according to social 
capital, not structural holes.  They found that biotechnology startups followed the logic of 
social capital to form their strategic alliances, because the relationship in the biotechnology 
network lasts a long time.  In this case, trust and commitment in resource-sharing activities 
received by closed networks are more important for a focal firm and its collaborative 
agreements than non-redundant knowledge and opportunities.  Thus, following concepts of 
Ahuja (2000a) and Walker et al., (1997), this study proposes that a focal firm collaborating in 
a low level structural-holes network should perform well in terms of inventions.    
4.2.2.2 Structural Holes and Commercialization Performance   
 Since innovation is a socially driven phenomenon, an effective position of a focal firm in 
a society should accelerate the speed in which the focal firm can successfully introduce and 
diffuse new products and services.  Hargadon and Sutton (1997) conducted a case study 
analysis of IDEO, a successful product design firm.  In their study, the authors blended the 
concepts of network and organizational memory perspectives (Walsh et al., 1991) in a model 
of technology brokering explaining how IDEO developed and successfully commercialized 
innovative products.  The authors indicated that IDEO, as a successful organization, acquires 
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knowledge from external ties, stores it in the organization’s memory, and retrieves that 
knowledge to generate new innovations.     
 In the context of the biopharmaceutical industry, Walker, Kogut and Shan (1997) 
indicated that the structural holes theory may apply more to networks of market transactions 
than to networks of cooperative relationships.  Several mergers and acquisitions of market-
based pharmaceutical firms reflected attempts of the focal firms to generate structural holes 
and acquire market power in the biopharmaceutical industry.  The Federal Trade Commission 
had to work harder to supervise the transactions because the horizontal mergers and 
acquisitions of these market-based competitors could create a monopoly situation in the 
particular industry.  Since the networks of market transactions require a speedy access to 
diverse information and it is important for biopharmaceutical firms to control clusters with 
non-redundant information, the firms that seek success at commercialization activities tend to 
operate in a network with a high level of structural holes.   
 Whereas several studies in this section did not explicitly mention concepts of learning and 
institutional approaches when explaining the different benefits of high and low levels of 
structural holes in collaborative networks of the biopharmaceutical industry, the following 
arguments are plausible.  Since an environment of interfirm relationships in the low-level 
structural holes facilitates interfirm learning of complex and technical knowledge, a focal 
firm should be successful in receiving and transferring knowledge that promotes its 
invention.  Meanwhile, knowing peers from different and various industries as represented in 
the high-level structural holes, the focal firms better their understanding of the institutional 
framework of the market.  Thus, the focal firms are more likely to be successful in 
commercializing their inventions.  I propose the following hypotheses, using concepts of 
structural holes to predict the outcomes of invention and commercialization activities. 
 H2 (i): The number of structural holes among a focal firm’s direct and indirect 
 partners is negatively associated with the focal firm’s invention performance.  
 94
 
 H2 (c): The number of structural holes among a focal firm’s direct and indirect 
 partners is positively associated with the focal firm’s commercialization 
 performance.  
 
 
4.2.3 Strength of Ties  
 
 Whereas the previous concepts of direct and indirect ties deal with the quantitative 
numbers of direct and indirect ties of a focal firm, the next concept, strength of ties, deals 
with the qualitative aspects of the direct ties for a focal firm.  Actually, the concept of 
strength of ties began when Granovetter (1973) regarded the strength of ties as a construct 
with the following dimensions: amount of time, emotional intensity, intimacy, and reciprocal 
services that characterize the relationships.  Analyzing the multiple dimensions of the 
strength of ties, it seems impossible for any empirical theorists to capture the four dimensions 
of tie strength at once.  Empirically, none of the studies has simultaneously used the four 
dimensions suggested by Granovetter (1973).  Despite the weak methodological concept of 
strength of ties in the early period, several network theorists continued to develop theoretical 
concepts in network research.  The theorists introduced several technical methods to measure 
characteristics of relational variables, including lines, paths, density comparisons, 
connectedness, centrality, cliques, and cluster (Scott, 1991). 
 Regarding the benefits of tie strengths, Granovetter asserted that a major benefit of a 
weak-tie network is the non-redundant information shared by weak-tie members (1973).  
Unlike strong ties that are dense and comprise redundant information in the networks, weak 
ties combine people with arm’s length relationships (Granovetter, 1973).  The arm’s length 
relationships combine people with different backgrounds and non-redundant information.  A 
study in management indicated that one of the special characteristics of weak ties is large-size 
networks (Uhl-Bien, Graen, & Scandura, 2000).  The authors of this study mentioned further 
that because of loose relationships, members in the weak-tie networks maintain relationships 
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with others at relatively lower costs.  Because weak-tie networks have larger internal 
networks and more arm’s length connections, people in these particular networks are more 
likely to benefit from networks in terms of job advancement (Podolny & Baron, 1997).   
 Whereas some scholars are paying attention to weak-tie relationships in a social network, 
others researchers focus their research interest on strong-tie relationships.  Strong ties, dense 
and redundant, foster a) clear and consistent sets of expectations and values among members, 
and b) trust and support from others, allow members to access certain crucial resources and to 
implement strategic initiatives (Podolny et al., 1997).  Hansen (1999) found that a weak-tie 
relationship between sub-units speeds up projects when knowledge is not complex, yet slows 
down projects with highly complex knowledge.  Whereas weak ties may be good channels 
for information transfers, strong ties could be better information channels when information 
is complex, socio-emotional, and technical (Hansen, 1999; Sparrowe, Liden, & Kraimer, 
2001).     
 Hansen (1999) studied the strength of ties that facilitates knowledge transfer between 
teams within an organization, but another study examined the strength of the interfirm 
network that allows firms to survive the competition.  When facing market uncertainty (i.e., 
uncertainty which is outside of a firm’s control and shared across firms), firms reduce the 
uncertainty through interactions with existing and similar (i.e., strong-tie) partners.  By 
solidifying the present network structure, firms feel secure, considering that strong-tie 
partners will deliver important resources and help deal with uncertain market conditions 
including consumer demand, industry-level technology trajectories and standards, and input 
costs (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004).  
4.2.3.1 Strengths of Interfirm Networks and Invention Performance 
 From the literature review, several articles reported a positive relationship between the 
quality of alliance relationships and invention performance (please see Chapter 3).  Silverman 
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and Baum suggested that biotech university scientists whose research efforts have a 
tremendous impact on biotechnology firms’ success rarely transact with more than one firm 
at a time.  Specifically, the authors mentioned that “the relative lack of scale and scope 
economies in an individual research project (i.e., as compared to marketing) imposes stark 
limits on the number of simultaneous alliances to which an upstream research player can 
commit its particular scientific or technological expertise” (2002: 793).   
 Liebeskind et al. (1996) noted the fact that 163 (77%) of 213 “star” researchers in the 
biopharmaceutical industry worked in universities, another 44 (21%) worked in other 
nonprofit research institutes, and only six “stars” (3%) worked in firms.  While that particular 
information was introduced almost a decade ago, it still illustrates the fact that an important 
source of biopharmaceutical technology comes from scientists working at universities.  
Because biotechnology scientists rarely changed careers as professors at universities, this fact 
suggests immobility among intellectual resources and thus the need for biotechnology firms 
to maintain stable and strong interorganizational relationships with universities during the 
technological development period.      
 During the invention activities, biopharmaceutical firms established social capital with 
knowledge-based organizations (i.e., universities, biotechnology firms, and contract research 
organizations).  Walker, Kogut and Shan (1997) examined the formation of network structure 
in the biotechnology industry and found that firms valued long-term benefits of 
interorganizational relationships over short-term benefits of brokering opportunities.  
Rothaermel et al. (2004) indicated that as biopharmaceutical firms grew larger, the firms 
tended to first withdraw from exploitation alliances before withdrawing from exploration 
alliances.  Since exploitation alliances generally exhibited less uncertainty, the alliances 
required fewer resources to maintain than did exploration alliances.  Therefore, focal firms’ 
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relationships with exploration alliances should be stronger than those with exploitation 
alliances.   
 Drawing from perspectives of organizational learning, the focal firms seeking to generate 
invention require strength of ties to facilitate knowledge transfer from interorganizational 
partners.  The established network of biotechnology firms seeking to generate inventions is 
thus relatively based on a strong-tie basis.   
4.2.3.2 Strengths of Interfirm Networks and Commercialization Performance 
 
 As a strong-tie network is hypothesized to produce invention performance, it should not 
generate commercialization performance.  Whereas strong-tie relationships facilitate all 
members to communicate and coordinate with complex and technical information and 
knowledge (Hansen, 1999) relatively, the members do not need strong-tie relationships to 
commercialize inventions.  In fact, a recent study suggested that firms seeking to successfully 
complete new drug development projects should carefully assess alternative partners rather 
than merely turning to partners with whom the firms have had prior alliance experience 
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). 
 Unlike inventing partners, marketing partners do not have to recognize specifically 
technical features associated with inventions in order to commercialize them in the market.  
This argument is in line with Zahra et al. (2002), asserting that by using external marketing-
based partners, firms can improve their competitive advantage through effective and timely 
commercialization of new technology.  Drawing on the concepts of the institutional approach, 
this paper suggests that focal firms need weak-tie alliances to diffuse information and to gain 
acceptance for their inventions that will ultimately displace the existing and established 
similar products.  Because the number of arm’s length partners is larger than the number of 
strong-tie partners (Uhl-Bien et al., 2000), the arm’s length partners should be used as more 
effective channels of production innovation by the focal firms.  Thus, if the focal firms can 
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convince numbers of their weak-tie alliances with arm’s length relationships of product 
innovation, firms are more likely to be successful in terms of convincing and gaining 
acceptance and, thus obtaining support from consumers in the larger society.     
 The trade off between the two benefits of strong-tie and weak-tie alliances in terms of 
invention and commercialization performances should be observable in collaborative 
networks within the biopharmaceutical industry.  Walker, Kogut & Shan (1997) indicated 
that although there is evidence indicating a relationship between interfirm cooperations and 
startups’ patent activities, the network formation of biopharmaceutical firms does not 
necessarily lead to an optimal structure for both invention and commercialization activities.  
Given that other variables are constant, it is more likely on one hand that biopharmaceutical 
firms allocating their resources to establish weak-tie relationships with peers in the same 
industry should perform well in terms of commercialization activities.  On the other hand, the 
firms that concentrate resources on strong-tie relationships with other biopharmaceutical 
firms should do well in terms of invention activities.  This paper submits the following set of 
hypotheses: 
 H3 (i): The strength of a focal firm’s immediate ties within the network is positively 
 associated with the focal firm’s invention performance. 
 
 H3 (c): The strength of a focal firm’s immediate ties within the network is negatively 
 associated with the focal firm’s commercialization performance. 
 
4.2.4 Prominence of Direct Partners  
 The next factor that characterizes ties is the prominence of the direct partners.  Several 
studies in management, specifically using the institutional perspectives, indicate the 
importance of economic status and reputation of individual organizations and 
interorganizational networks as the determinants of innovation outcomes (Baum et al., 2000; 
Christensen et al., 1996; Leblebici et al., 1991; Rothaermel, 2001).  Because of prior 
successes and highly invested costs sunk into existing technologies, the prominent firms are 
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inflexible and uncomfortable with new inventions available on the market.  This inflexibility 
prevents the high-status firms from being able to allocate sufficient resources to develop 
potentially disruptive inventions (Christensen et al., 1996; Leblebici et al., 1991).  In the 
interorganizational context, this inflexibility should also be held for the focal firms 
collaborating with predominantly prestigious partners.  Having high-status or well-known 
partners in their networks limits the possibility of the focal firms to access and acquire radical 
and innovative resources to pursue disruptive technologies.  This should not help the focal 
firms to develop their invention activities.   
 Since prominent firms are preoccupied with exploiting their prior technologies, 
Christensen et al. (1996) and Leblebici et al. (1991) indicated that startup firms alone 
normally introduce disruptive technologies or inventions to compete with existing products 
and services offered by the established firms.  According to institutional perspectives, the 
startup firms do not have or need legitimacy or social supports from their interfirm partners to 
facilitate invention activities (Hargadon et al., 2001; Leblebici et al., 1991).  Whereas the 
focal firms may not need the prominence of alliances in the development of invention, the 
firms may require technical knowledge and fresh perspectives of alliances.  If a focal firm is 
among several startup alliances, it should gain mutual benefits in terms of disruptive 
technologies from its startup peers.  In other words, it should acquire some radical knowledge 
(i.e., new knowledge or technologies that are not yet acceptable to the constituents) from its 
startup partners to develop inventions. 
However, during commercialization activities, a study has shown that a startup firm 
seeks collaboration with high-status alliances so that the alliances may act as endorsements 
by building additional public confidence in the value of the startup focal firm’s organizational 
products and services (Stuart, 2000).  Further, the high-status alliances facilitate capabilities 
of a startup focal firm to attract its customers and other corporate partners.  As some 
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institutional theorists (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Leblebici et al., 1991) noted, although low-
status firms are the first to innovate, the prominence of a firm is important to the initiation of 
change in many organizational fields, particularly where prestige matters (Sherer & Lee, 
2002).  Hence, in the biopharmaceutical industry, it takes a radical knowledge of new and 
less prominent startup alliances to generate inventions, together with the reputations of 
prominent partners, to commercialize the inventions that have not been legitimized in the 
markets.  Drawing from previous arguments on the learning and the institutional perspectives, 
the next hypotheses follow: 
H4 (i): The prominence of a focal firm’s immediate partners is negatively 
associated with the focal firm’s invention performance. 
 
H4 (c): The prominence of a focal firm’s immediate partners is positively 
associated with the focal firm’s commercialization performance. 
 
4.2.5 Exploration vs. Exploitation Oriented Partners 
 Regarding the next dimension, two interfirm networks determine product innovation 
performance of focal firms.  As previously reviewed in Chapter 3, the concepts of exploration 
and exploitation (March, 1991) are respectively comparable to invention and 
commercialization (Rothaermel et al., 2004).  Specifically, drawing on the concepts of 
organizational learning, Rothaermel et al. (2004) indicated that focal firms work with their 
exploration partners to be successful in terms of invention activities.  Additionally, firms 
work with exploitation partners to be successful in terms of commercialization activities.  In 
the context of the biopharmaceutical industry, the exploration-oriented network includes a 
partner majority of that focuses on the upstream activities of the value chain (basic research 
and drug discovery and development), whereas the exploitation-oriented network includes a 
partner majority of that focuses on the downstream activities of the value chain (clinical 
trials, FDA regulatory process, and marketing and sales).   
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  Whereas Rothaermel et al. (2004) successfully conducted a study indicating that a) the 
exploration alliances determine focal firms’ products in development, that b) the products in 
development (as measured by patents and R&D projects) lead to focal firms’ numbers of 
exploitation alliances, and that c) the exploitation alliances suggest the focal firms’ products 
on the market, the authors did not relate specific exploration-exploitation ratios to firm 
performance.  Incorporating the fact that focal firms engage in exploration and exploitation 
activities simultaneously with the fact reported by Powell et al. (1996) that 
interorganizational alliances are empirically stable among biopharmaceutical firms, the focal 
firms with high ratios of exploration alliances may perform better in their invention activities 
than in their commercialization activities.  Conversely, the focal firms will perform relatively 
better in commercialization activities if they have high ratios of exploitation alliances.  This 
paper offers the following hypotheses: 
     H5a (i): Focal firms whose networks have a greater preponderance of exploration-
 oriented relationship will have higher levels of invention performance.  
  
 H5b (i): Focal firms whose networks have a greater preponderance of exploitation-
 oriented relationship will have lower levels of invention performance. 
 
 H5c (c): Focal firms whose networks have a greater preponderance of exploration-
 oriented relationship will have lower levels of commercialization performance. 
 
 H5d (c): Focal firms whose networks have a greater preponderance of exploitation-
 oriented relationship will have higher levels of commercialization performance. 
 
4.2.6 Horizontal and Vertical Networks 
 Empirically, prior studies suggested that exploration- and exploitation-oriented networks 
should help a focal firm to respectively accomplish invention and commercialization 
performances (Beckman et al., 2004; Rothaermel et al., 2004).  However, given several 
conditions, these predicted relationships may not always be straightforward.  Specifically, 
Rothaermel and Deed (2004) found a negative moderating effect of firm size toward the 
networks and performances.  The authors suggested that as firms grow, the firms tend “to 
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withdraw from a product development path to discover, develop, and commercialize 
promising projects through vertical integration” (2004: 201).  It is arguable that as firms 
grow, they move their positions in the value chain of the biotechnology industry from 
inventors to merchandisers (i.e., from exploration to exploitation).  Thus, extending the 
finding of Rothaermel et al.’s, (2004) regarding a focal firm’s size, this paper suggests that 
the focal firm’s position in the product development path should influence the benefits of 
interfirm networks toward product innovation performance.  In other words, whereas the 
previous findings examined types of partners in focal firms’ networks, the findings did not 
acknowledge the types and contributions of focal firms in the networks.  Drawing from the 
previous arguments, this paper examines impact of focal firms’ orientations and 
complementary relationships with partners on subsequent product innovation performance. 
4.2.6.1 Horizontal Alliances  
 Kotabe and Swan (1995) and Silverman and Baum (2002) examined horizontal and 
vertical linkages in the biopharmaceutical industry.  The first study found that horizontal 
alliances involve high risk and high return situations.  The authors reasoned that the 
horizontal alliances are difficult to manage and maintain because the alliances are often 
between direct competitors that consume and compete for similar resources within the same 
industry.  The finding from Kotabe and Swan (1995) aligned with the finding of Silverman 
and Baum (2002), suggesting that horizontal alliances tend to be the most important alliances 
to increase a focal firm’s exit rate.   
 Despite the high risk of the exit rate within the horizontal collaborations, evidence 
suggested that as the biopharmaceutical industry matures, consolidations among biotech 
firms become popular, legally possible, and frequent (Barrett, 2005; Sellers, 2002).  Silver 
and Baum (2002) explained that the vertical alliances tend to be more concerned with cost 
economizing; however, the horizontal alliances collaborate in such activities as R&D 
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consortia, patent swaps, and technology transfer, in an attempt to supplement the internal 
technical base and to improve long-term product technology development.   
 Since the upstream horizontal network does not possess insightful perspectives regarding 
the improvement of commercialization performance, the network should not promote a focal 
firm’s commercialization performance.  Likewise, the focal firm collaborating with a 
downstream horizontal network does not gain special knowledge and additional information 
for invention activities; neither should the focal firm perform well in terms of invention.  
Based on these basic arguments, this paper proposes the next related hypotheses. 
H6a (i): An upstream focal firm collaborating with a greater number of its 
horizontal alliances (i.e., an upstream horizontal network) is positively associated 
with invention performance.   
 
H6b (i): A downstream focal firm collaborating with a greater number of its 
horizontal alliances (i.e., a downstream horizontal network) is negatively 
associated with invention performance.   
 
H6c (c): An upstream focal firm collaborating with a greater number of its 
horizontal alliances (i.e., an upstream horizontal network) is negatively 
associated with commercialization performance.    
 
H6d (c): A downstream focal firm collaborating with a greater number of its 
horizontal alliances (i.e., a downstream horizontal network) is positively 
associated with commercialization performance.   
 
 
4.2.7.2 Vertical Alliances 
 In the context of the vertical networks—an upstream focal firm collaborating with 
downstream partners (an upstream vertical network) and a downstream focal firm 
collaborating with upstream partners (a downstream vertical network)—the objectives of the 
two vertical collaborations are primarily reciprocal, yet obviously different.  For instance, 
whereas a downstream firm initiates collaborations with upstream alliances (i.e., exploration-
oriented networks) to acquire resource-sharing benefits in terms of invention activities, an 
upstream firm starts its collaborations with downstream alliances (i.e., exploitation-oriented 
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networks) to exploit its technologies through commercialization activities (Rothaermel, 2001; 
Rothaermel et al., 2004).   
 In terms of risks in the vertical alliances, Silverman and Baum (2002) indicated that the 
upstream firms dealing with downstream partners face lower mortality rates than the 
downstream firms dealing with upstream alliances.  The authors explained that because 
resources usually flow up, the upstream focal firms dealing with downstream alliances 
receive significant infusions of capital resources (i.e., licensing fees, patent purchases) that 
allow them to survive and continue their invention activities.  On the other hand, because the 
downstream firms inject their significant resources to upstream alliances in exchange for 
licensing agreements or marketing contracts, the downstream firms risk survival by spending 
capital resources in another industry. 
 Rothaermel and Deed (2004) suggested that as long as the upstream firms possess 
proprietary inventions, the upstream firms will be attracted by downstream firms, i.e., the 
exploitation alliances.  The authors further suggested that although the patents were non-
significant in predicting the firms’ products in development, the number of exploitation 
alliances significantly determines the greater number of the firm’s products on the market.  
From previous findings, therefore, upstream firms dealing with a substantial number of 
downstream alliances should perform well in commercialization activities.   
As the upstream firm generates a number of potential inventions and attracts the 
substantial number of exploitation partners, the firm also acquires sufficient resources to 
expand its operation (Rothaermel et al., 2004).  A prior research empirically found that 
successful (full-grown) upstream startups tend to establish footholds in exploitation activities 
(Koza & Lewin, 1998).  At this stage, the full-grown upstream firm rearranges its 
organizational structure by pulling resources from invention activities to infuse in 
commercialization activities.  This process suggests that a full-grown upstream firm usually 
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moves from exploration orientation to exploitation orientation (March, 1991).  Because of the 
trade-off situation in exploration and exploitation activities, the full-grown upstream focal 
firm should perform relatively poorer in its invention activities when compared with its past 
performance.   
 Regarding the downstream vertical network, a downstream firm usually takes an initial 
advantage in commercializing potential inventions generated by upstream alliances.  
Rothaermel and Deed (2004: 218) wrote:  
“While technology start-ups may have been penalized initially because the problem of 
asymmetric information in the market for know-how lowered prices of quality projects, 
larger more successful technology ventures may be able to take advantage of their 
positions by gaining a price premium for lower-quality projects.”   
If the downstream focal firms—usually larger and more successful technology ventures—
could collaborate with the greater number of upstream alliances—usually the technology 
startups—the focal firms should always gain premium and perform successfully in terms of 
commercialization.  Therefore, success of the focal firms in the downstream vertical network 
relies on their capabilities to maintain a great number of technology startups in their 
portfolios.    
 With regard to the invention activities of a downstream vertical network, several studies 
indicate that successful invention activities are generated by “star” researchers who work in 
universities or with particular organizations that have “university-like” environments 
(Liebeskind et al., 1996; Terry, 2004).  Therefore, although the downstream firms could 
obtain a high number of upstream alliances, it is unlikely that the firms possessing substantial 
marketing expertise and operating in the established “business-like” environments would be 
succeeded in the invention activities.  Accordingly, this paper proposes the following set of 
hypotheses. 
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 H6e (i): An upstream focal firm collaborating with a greater number of 
 downstream alliances (i.e., an upstream vertical network) is negatively associated 
 with invention performance. 
 
 H6f (c): An upstream focal firm collaborating with a greater number of 
 downstream alliances (i.e., an upstream vertical network) is positively associated 
 with commercialization performance. 
 
 H6g (i): A downstream focal firm collaborating with a greater number of upstream 
 alliances (i.e., a downstream vertical network) is negatively associated with 
 invention performance.   
 
 H6h (c): A downstream focal firm collaborating with a greater number of upstream 
 alliances (i.e., a downstream vertical network) is positively associated with 
 commercialization performance. 
  
4.2.7 Performance of the Invention and Commercialization Activities 
 Drawing from organizational learning and institutional perspectives, previous hypotheses 
indicated that several interfirm network variables could facilitate and/or hamper 
performances of specific innovation activities.  Table 4.1 reviews all independent variables 
and their hypothetical associations with invention and commercialization performances.  The 
table also supports several studies indicating that different structures or characteristics of 
interfirm networks suggest different benefits and outcomes (Ahuja, 2000a; Liebeskind et al., 
1996).  As several prior studies suggested (Greve, 2003; Rothaermel et al., 2004), the two 
sequential activities of invention and commercialization should be examined and tested in 
tandem to enrich knowledge of product innovation.  This table primarily offers negative 
relationships of several interfirm variables that simultaneously influence invention and 
commercialization performances.   
 As discussed earlier in the literature review section (Chapter 3), concepts of 
interorganizational network inertia (Li et al., 2002) and social capital (Liebeskind et al., 
1996) suggested that focal firms do not or cannot change interfirm networks for short-term or 
brokering benefits.  Specifically, in the biopharmaceutical industry, focal firms tend to 
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maintain long-term relationships and gain social capital benefits with existing and repeated 
interfirm networks (Powell et al., 1996).   









1a (i) and 1d (c)   Direct Ties + + 
1b (i) and 1e (c) Indirect Ties + + 
1c (i) and 1d (c) Direct*Indirect Ties - + 
2 (i) and 2 (c) Structural Holes - + 
3 (i) and 3 (c) Strength of Ties + - 
4 (i) and 4(c) Prominence of Partners - + 
5a (i) and 5c (c) Exploration Partners + - 
5b (i) and 5d (c) Exploitation Partners - + 
6a (i) and 6c (c) Upstream Horizontal Ties + - 
6b (i) and 6d (c) Downstream Horizontal Ties - + 
6e (i) and 6f (c) Upstream Vertical Ties - + 
6g (i) and 6h (c) Downstream Vertical Ties - + 
 
 Following the evidence that focal firms rarely change their interfirm partners, it is 
reasonable to acknowledge that the negative relationship between invention and 
commercialization activities will be prevalent for the focal firms in product innovation 
networks.  Perhaps this rationale explains why focal firms that are successful in terms of 
invention activities have limited success in commercialization activities and vice versa.  
Drawing on the two important theoretical concepts of organizational learning and 
institutional approach, this paper suggests that focal firms with stable interfirm networks will 
be relatively successful at either invention or commercialization activities.  Unless focal firms 
possess special capabilities to simultaneously exploit dynamics for invention and 
commercialization activities, the firms will have to face a trade-off situation in which they 
must choose to perform relatively poorly or successfully in their invention or 
commercialization activities.  Therefore, in this last hypothesis, the paper presents:  
H7: Focal firms will face a trade-off relationship between invention and 
commercialization performance.  
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CHAPTER 5: DATA AND MEASUREMENTS 
5.1 Data and Sample 
 The biopharmaceutical firms are identified by matching a set of firms in the 
pharmaceutical industry and a set of firms involved in biotechnological product activities.  
Rothaermel et al. (2004) posited that BioScan is one of the most comprehensive directories 
covering the global biotechnology industry (please also see more details in Chapter 2).  
Therefore, BioScan is used as the primary source to identify biotechnological firms.  Because 
BioScan has recorded all available biotechnological agreements for the focal firms since the 
1970s, the sets of biotechnological firms include both active and inactive statuses.  This 
approach prevents the potential problem of survival bias among the focal firms in the study.      
 Ahuja and Katila (2001) indicated that examining a single industry over a common period 
controls for industry and period effects.  This study examined the public firms that have 
engaged in biotechnological activities and operated in the pharmaceutical industry 
between1986 and 2003.  The public firms that generate pharmaceuticals and medicines in the 
market are listed in NAICS 3254; the products consist of medicinal and botanicals (NAICS 
325411), pharmaceutical preparations (NAICS 325412), in vitro diagnostic substances 
(NAICS 325413), and biological products (except for diagnostics) (NAICS 325414).  By 
comparing organizations from two sources, one may identify the focal firms that generate and 
commercialize pharmaceutical products and are involved in biotech product research and 
development, commonly specified and depicted by COMPUSTAT and BioScan.  This 
process yielded a population of 262 publicly traded biopharmaceutical firms in the U.S. stock 
market.  
 The focus of this study on publicly traded biopharmaceutical firms is because several 
studies have already examined the relationships of startups and their networks toward 
innovation performances (Baum et al., 2000; Shan et al., 1994).  Yet, according to Baum et 
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al., (2000), one of the primary reasons for nascent firms to associate with established firms 
was to increase their legitimacy in the public.  Therefore, invention and commercialization 
outcomes may not necessarily be the primary objectives of the particular startups in the 
collaborations.  Unlike nascent firms, the publicly traded firms have achieved legitimacy and 
reputation from the public.  Accordingly, the publicly traded firms primarily collaborate with 
their interfirm partners to gain benefits in terms of inventions and commercialization.   
 Because the objective of the study is to examine a focal firm’s product innovation—
invention and commercialization performance—as influenced by the biopharmaceutical 
interfirm network, it is important to include all biotechnological agreements between the 
focal firm and its partners.  BioScan provides coverage information regarding 
biotechnological alliances of the focal firms in its database.  Although BioScan offers 
comprehensive information on all 1,752 biotechnological organizations (February, 2005), the 
database does not offer complete data of many other biotechnological firms appearing in the 
database (i.e., as alliances or shareholders).  For example, BioScan might offer nearly 
complete information on a focal firm’s important strategic alliances, but it does not feature 
profiles of all of the focal firm's partners in the database.   
 This limitation potentially contributes to the bias associated with the data collection and 
analytical process.  From interviews with the database editor, BioScan acquires information 
on a cooperative and available basis.  Thus, to some extent, it does not necessarily update the 
actual data.  Despite the limitation, the BioScan database is still the most comprehensive data 
source, reporting more collaborative agreements than any other data sources (Powell et al., 
1996; Rothaermel et al., 2004; Shan et al., 1994).  
 In addition to BioScan, the study used COMPUSTAT to provide financial data of the 
focal firms and their partners including sales, net incomes, stock prices, R&D expenses, and 
the number of employees during the study period.  The study also obtained information from 
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the United State Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to determine the number of patents 
assigned to focal firms and their partners.  These numbers correspond with their invention 
performances during the study period.  The USPTO patent full-text and image database offers 
reliable and comprehensive information regarding patents from 1976 to present.   
 The next data source to be used in the study is a public database called “Drugs@FDA” 
published by the United States Food and Drug Association (FDA).  Information regarding all 
approved drugs is publicly available to download at the FDA’s website.  The Drugs@FDA 
database contains prescription and over-the-counter human drugs currently approved for sales 
in the United States.  The database not only provides information regarding approved drug 
names, the companies that sponsored applications for approvals, and FDA action dates, but it 
also gives the marketing status (prescription, over-the-counter, or discontinued) of the 
commercial drugs in the U.S.  Regarding the market status of discontinued drugs, the 
database provides information regarding the drugs that have been removed from the market 
in the United States for reasons other than safety or effectiveness.   
 Further, because one drug usually has more than one application if it has different dosage 
forms, the study gathered all relevant information regarding applications and document types 
(i.e., there are more than 50 document types) that require approvals by the FDA.  As a result, 
those successful applications are regarded as important indicators of commercializing 
performances achieved by focal firms.  The last data source used to gather information about 
the status of the focal firms’ alliances is LexisNexis Academic database.  The search engine 
at LexisNexis allowed a search of the frequencies in which the particular partners of the focal 
firms appeared in articles from newspaper, magazines, journals, wires, and transcripts (i.e., 




 5.2 Measures 
 The main research questions in this study consider which dimensions of the interfirm 
network directly contribute to focal firms’ invention and commercialization performance, as 
well as how these multiple dimensions influence the activities.  To answer the questions, the 
study focuses on a group of publicly traded biopharmaceutical firms.  Specifically, the 
dependent variables include a focal firm’s number of successful patents (invention 
performance) and a focal firm’s number of marketed drug applications and revenues 
(commercialization performance).   
 Following Poldony and Page’s (1998) definition of a network form of organizations, a 
network includes a wide array of joint ventures, strategic alliances, business groups, 
franchises, research consortia, relational contracts, and outsourcing agreements.  Further, this 
study examines the characteristics of an overall focal firm’s network, rather than a dyadic 
relationship.  The definition of interfirm network may be assumed from several network 
scholars such as Shan et al., (1994), Ahuja (2000), Wuyts (2004), and Kotabe and Swan 
(1995).  All collaborations (both contractual and non-contractual ones) of a focal firm are 
counted as an interfirm network.  For instance, while direct ties have contractual relationships 
with focal firms, indirect ties have no written contracts with focal firms.  These indirect ties 
link the focal firms through their direct ties (as identified by the written contracts between 
them).   
 Since there are several levels (direct and indirect ties) and aspects (upstream and 
downstream activities, more prominent and less prominent partners) of collaborations, my 
study examines multiple dimensions of the interfirm network in detail (i.e., how each 
dimension contributes to invention and commercialization performance).  The multiple 
dimensions of interfirm networks consist of a) the number of direct and indirect ties, b) the 
level of structural holes, c) the strength of the network, d) the prominence of the network, e) 
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exploration and exploitation networks, and f) upstream and downstream horizontal networks 
and upstream and downstream vertical networks as the predictors.  In the following 
discussion, measurements of all variables along with the control variables are considered. 
5.2.1 Invention Performance of the Focal Firms 
 As Chapter 3 noted in detail, several studies have provided guidelines on the 
measurement of invention performance.  For instance, the number of successful patent 
applications is commonly used to determine the invention performance of a focal firm 
(Ahuja, 2000a; Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Almeida et al., 2004; Darby et al., 2004; Rothaermel et 
al., 2004; Shan et al., 1994).  Patents are a device in which government grants inventors the 
sole right for a limited period to exploit their inventions for commercialization, individual 
and organizational inventors—especially in the biopharmaceutical industry.  Consequently, 
inventors patent inventions to protect their investments (Wittcoff et al., 2004).  In order to 
successfully get a patent, however, the inventors’ inventions must meet several important 
requirements (i.e., novelty, non-obviousness, and utility).   
 The use of patents as a measure of invention performance has some limitations.  Ahuja 
(2000a) reported that for some firms, not all inventions are patentable and still other 
inventions are not patented for strategic reasons.  Further, not only firm-level factors, but also 
several industry-level factors may influence the focal firms’ propensity to differ in patenting 
activity (Cohen & Levin, 1989; Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, & Winter, 1987).  Because the set 
of focal firms in this study is from the biopharmaceutical industry, the variance in patenting 
propensity across industries is controlled and minimized.  However, firms may differ in 
patenting and commercializing propensity within an industry.  Therefore, the study controlled 
the propensity by using dummy variables of NAICS. 
 In this study, the numbers of granted patents for each focal firm are collected during a 
specific period (1986-2003) from the USPTO patent full-text and image database.  To reflect 
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the invention performance associated with the interfirm networks, the study collected the 
number of successful patent applications before and during the period in which the focal 
firms actively engaged in collaborative agreements of the dataset.  Using the successful 
patent application date permits consistency in the treatment of all patents and controls for 
differences in delays that may occur in granting patents after the application is filed (Ahuja et 
al., 2001; Trajenberg, 1990).  Note that the patent count for the dependent variable was based 
on the patents of the focal firms obtained each year from 1986 to 2003.  These patent counts 
are dissimilar from the patent counts used to measure the independent and control variables.  
The independent and control variables, as explained below, were based on the number of 
patents obtained by the focal firms and their direct partners in a specific period (10 years) 
before the year of observation.  
5.2.2 Commercialization Performance of the Focal Firms           
 Commercialization performance suggests a substantial challenge in terms of empirical 
measurement.  In general, commercialization performance should reflect the extent to which 
both the market and consumers accept and respond to inventions (Hargadon et al., 2001).  As 
mentioned previously, scholars have used several measures to capture commercialization 
performance.  For instance, Zahra and Nielson (2002) used four different indicators to reflect 
the meanings of technology commercialization.  The authors mentioned that technology 
commercialization should 1) develop and introduce a large number of product and process 
technologies; 2) create radically new products; 3) expedite the introduction of these new 
products to the market; and 4) create new knowledge.  An analyzation of Zahra and Nielson’s 
(2002) definition finds that the scope of technology commercialization has so many 
dimensions that to some extent, the broadness overlaps the scope of product invention.   
 As discussed earlier, the biopharmaceutical industry is comprised of high-tech 
organizations, collaborating to accomplish invention and commercialization activities.  The 
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commercialization activities include such activities as the application processes at the FDA, 
manufacturing the drugs, quality controls, packaging processes, advertisements, post-clinical 
trials, and managing the image and reputation of drugs on the market.   
This study captured focal firms’ commercialization performance using two main 
dimensions.  The first dimension is the successful drug applications that are still on the 
market.  As did Zahra and Nielson (2002) and Rothaermel et al. (2004), the study 
accumulated the number of drug applications of focal firms that were successfully approved 
by the FDA over seventeen years.  The Drugs@FDA database provides information relating 
to all drugs available in the U.S. market, including several types of successful applications.  
According to the FDA’s website (2005), “the approval history is a chronological list of all 
FDA actions involving one drug having a particular FDA application number (NDA).  There 
are over 50 kinds of approval actions including changes in the labeling, a new route of 
administration, and a new patient population for a drug product.”  The frequencies of these 
successful approval activities should reflect focal firms’ capability to convince the FDA and 
to market their inventions.   
 To make the number of successful drug applications more meaningful in terms of 
commercialization, the study gathered the number of drug applications no longer available in 
the market.  The “market status” of drugs—an important aspect of marketing information 
offered by the Drugs@FDA database—suggests the current portfolio of focal firms’ marketed 
drug applications (prescription, over-the-counter, and discontinued).  The FDA lists the drugs 
that fall into the “discontinued” category due to reasons other than safety and effectiveness of 
the drugs.   
According to FDA’s website (2005), “when the sponsor of the innovator drug product has 
obtained exclusivity or patent protection for a new aspect of product labeling and has 
removed the previous unprotected labeling for reasons other than safety or effectiveness,” the 
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sponsor is required to submit a discontinued label for the listed drug.  In theory, because the 
innovator could delay generic competition by continuing to make minor—but protectable—
changes to the drug and removing unprotected labeling, the FDA’s requirement for the 
sponsor is to report the discontinued labeling for the new drugs in order to make safe and 
effective generic drug products available to the public as promptly as possible when relevant 
market protection has expired.   
 Drug applicant holders are requested (not mandated) to inform the FDA when products 
are no longer marketed.  However, products may also be added to the discontinued section if 
annual reports of the applicant holders indicate that the product is no longer marketed.  While 
there is no empirical study that examines what factors contribute to the discontinued labels, 
one possible explanation for the discontinued labels may be a lack of marketing capabilities.  
If the drugs are successfully commercialized, the sponsor of those drugs rarely removes or 
changes them.  Focal firms can launch many drugs approved by the FDA into the market.  
However, if they must modify the drugs to satisfy the demand in the market, these firms fail 
in commercialization activities.  Thus, the number of discontinued labels may in several ways 
represent unsuccessful commercialization of the active ingredients or even dosages (i.e., 
technologies and inventions).   
 To reflect the overall commercialization performance of the focal firms in terms of 
marketed drug applications, the study subtracted the number of drug applications available in 
the market with a number of particular applications labeled as “discontinued” in a particular 
year.  After the subtraction, the dependent variable to measure commercialization 
performance becomes a number of marketed drug applications—the total products available 
in the market for the focal firms.  Please note again that this number reflects the current 
portfolios of a focal firm’s drugs in the market or its commercialization capability.  
Obviously, if a focal firm has a high number of marketed drug applications, the focal firm 
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should possess a high capability to generate revenue by converting its invention performance 
to commercialization performance. 
   Whereas the number of marketed drug applications is likely to be a good proxy of 
revenue for a focal firm, a focal firm’s revenue may not necessarily reflect that number of 
marketed drug applications.  Therefore, the second dependent variable in this study is the 
focal firms’ annual revenue.  Wuyts et al. suggested that “innovations are often credited for 
generating sales growth and thereby aiding profitability” (2004: 90).  Bergeron and Chan 
(2004) indicated that pharmaceutical firms look forward to their blockbuster drugs every year 
or two.  The blockbuster drug is a drug that can earn $1 billion or more in annual revenue.  
Therefore, if the focal firms successfully commercialize the new blockbuster drugs, revenues 
should substantially increase in the following years.   
 On the contrary, if there are substantial declines in the focal firms’ revenues, one could 
infer that the focal firms are possibly having some troubles with their commercialization 
activities.  Therefore, the sales figures of all focal firms are regarded as a proxy of 
commercialization performance.  It is important to note that the revenues of focal firms will 
be analyzed in tandem with the other dependent variable to interpret the results.  All the 
information regarding the revenues and the successfully marketed drug applications in the 
market are available at COMPUSTAT and Drugs@FDA.  
5.2.3 Direct and Indirect Ties  
 To obtain the number of direct and indirect ties in a focal firm’s network, the study 
primarily used data from BioScan to track the collaborative biotech agreements between the 
focal firm and its direct alliances.  All direct alliances that engage in non-equity agreements 
with the focal firm in BioScan are counted as direct ties for a focal firm.  Since the non-
equity contracts as specified by the BioScan directory include universities, private 
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organizations, and governmental entities, all entities counted as the direct ties of a focal 
firm’s network.  There was no control for the differences in organizational types.   
 The study particularly regarded only non-equity agreements as direct ties, because 
acquisition events will be regarded as the control variable in this study.  For the number of 
indirect ties to a focal firm, I counted the number of direct ties’ partners of each focal firm.  It 
is important to note that whereas BioScan provides comprehensive information of agreements 
between focal firms and their direct alliances, the database does not offer the comprehensive 
information of agreements between the focal firms’ partners and their alliances (i.e., the focal 
firms’ indirect partners).  Therefore, the data might not be complete in providing the total 
picture of the focal firm’s indirect tie networks.  
 To account for the number of active direct and indirect ties, the study accumulated all 
agreements recorded for the focal firms in three-year, seven-year, and ten-year periods prior 
to the observation year.  The study also led the variables for one year to allow the direct and 
indirect ties to generate an impact on each dependent variable.  For instance, the measure of 
direct ties of Firm A in 2000 is included in the regression model to test for the dependent 
variables in 2001.  The number of direct ties is the accumulated number from 1991 to 2000 
(the ten-year period), from 1994 to 2000 (the seven-year period), and from 1997 to 2000 (the 
three-year period).  The reason for using a cumulative number, rather than a yearly number, is 
that once the focal firms begin biotech collaborations with their alliances, the direct ties 
should have been activated and continued.  Thus, the channels of knowledge and information 
flows from the ties should have been established and active for several years (i.e., drug 
development process takes as long as 5 to 10 years).   
 Figure 5.1 illustrates the hypothetical numbers of direct and indirect ties of Elan 
Corporation in 1995 and 1999, based on the real data.  In 1995, Elan Corporation had only 
five direct ties, with no indirect ties.  In 1999, the company increased its direct and indirect 
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ties to 12 and 4 respectively.  Notice that H, G, M, and L were counted as indirect ties, even 
though H and G were already direct ties for Elan in 1999. 
  Further, M was only counted once as an indirect partner of Elan, although it has common 
links with both G and K, the two direct partners.   
      
 Figure 5.1 Hypothetical Number and Positions of Direct and Indirect Ties 
 
Since Ahuja (2000a) found the significant interaction effect between direct and indirect ties 
of the focal firms, the study multiplied direct and indirect ties to generate another 
independent variable to test for the interaction effects of direct and indirect ties on invention 
and commercialization performances. 
5.2.4 Structural Holes  
 To facilitate the collecting and analytical process to distinguish the structural holes, the 
study used the UCINET software to derive several social network measures (Borgatti, 
Everett, & Freeman, 2002; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).  Specifically, a focal firm that shares 
partners with its direct partners should possess a lower level of structural holes compared to 
other focal firms that do not.  By sharing a common partner with its direct partner, a focal 
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direct alliances know one another, one would have “the closure network,” referring to a 
network in which all members are connected in such a manner that no member escapes the 
notice of others (Burt, 2000).  In operational terms, this particular model requires a 
completely dense network.    
 Figure 5.2 illustrates the two scenarios of structural holes.  Cases A and B represent a 
focal firm’s (i.e., Merck) network including a direct partner (i.e., Genentech) and an indirect 
partner (Amgen).  Because Merck does not directly collaborate with Amgen, there is a 
structural hole in Case A.  Unlike Merck in Case A, Merck in Case B directly collaborates 
with both Genentech and Amgen.  Therefore, Merck in Case B has no hole in its relationship 
structure.  In Case B, because Merck shares its indirect partner (Amgen) with its direct 
partner (Genentech), the network of Merck can be recognized as a closure network.   
 On one hand, if the focal firms share indirect partners with direct partners, the focal 
firms’ networks have low levels of structural holes.  On the other hand, if the focal firms do 
not have common partners with direct partners, the focal firms’ networks have high levels of 
structural holes.  Thus, in measuring the levels of structural holes in the focal firm’s network 
of direct and indirect partners, the study could count both the common partners of the focal 
firms and direct partners.  Higher counts reflect lower levels of structural holes in the focal 
firm.  Rather than counting the number of partners, the study gathered two important 
measures from the UCINET to capture the concepts of the structural holes (Borgatti et al., 
2002).   
First, the “Density” measure is “the number of ties divided by the number of pairs.”  
Although the number of ties is an actual relationship, the number of pairs also indicates the 
number of possible directed ties in each ego network.  Therefore, the “Density” measures the 
percentage of all possible ties that are actually present in each ego network (Hanneman et al., 
2005).  From the definition and characteristics of the structural hole, the high density measure 
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should suggest the low level of structural holes for the focal firm’s network, whereas the low 
density measure should suggest otherwise.  
Figure 5.2 Two Scenarios of Structural Hole  
 
For the second characteristic of the structural holes, the “Brokerage” measure is the number 
of pairs in the ego networks that are indirectly connected to one another, or a “broker” ego, 
according to Hanneman et al., (2005): “One item of interest is how much potential for 
brokerage there is for each actor (how many times pairs of neighbors in an ego’s network are 
not directly connected).”  Therefore, a high number of brokerage represents a high level of 
structural holes in the focal firm’s network.   
5.2.5 Strength of Direct Ties  
 To assess the strength of direct ties to the focal firm, the study calculated the average 
tenures of focal firms’ relationship with their alliances.  Some focal firms may frequently add 
new partners, whereas others may maintain their number of partners to be constant.  If this is 
the case, the latter focal firms will achieve higher measures in the average tenure of focal 
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 Based on the perspective of Penrose’s “The Theory of the Growth of the Firm” (1959), a 
focal firm that expands in size frequently and rapidly may face managerial problems.  
Penrose suggested that growth does not take place automatically, but must be planned 
strategically and implemented effectively by internal managers who have firm-specific 
experiences.  Because such managers must be developed within the firm and cannot be hired 
from the outside, firm capacities of internal managers set a limit to expansion projects that a 
firm may undertake in any period of time (Penrose, 1959).  Therefore, the focal firm’s overall 
relationships with direct partners may be harmful if the firm cannot deal with the limitation of 
an increased network complexity.   
Relatively, if a focal firm rarely adds new partners, that particular focal firm should be 
able to strategically and effectively maintain its internally managerial resources to strengthen 
the relationships of existing alliances.  In comparision with a focal firm that frequently adds 
partners; the focal firm that rarely adds new partners should have a stronger alliance network.    
5.2.6 The Prominence of the Focal Firm’s Partners 
 Stuart (2000) suggested that high-status partners could act as endorsements for a focal 
firm by building additional public confidence in terms of the focal firm’s products and 
services.  Several proxies can be used in this study to measure the prominence of the focal 
firm’s partners.  For instance, annual revenues, the number of employees, and the number of 
drugs available in the market may be used as potential indicators of the status of partners.  
Unfortunately, these measures are unobtainable due to the lack of sufficient data in most 
alliances in BioScan.    
 To acquire the data regarding the prominence of the partners, however, the study 
consulted the LexisNexis® search engine to obtain news frequencies regarding the focal 
firms’ partners.  LexisNexis® is an online database providing a wide array of electronic and 
traditional media.  The number of available articles generated by LexisNexis® in the 
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“business news” and the “industry news” sections conveys a measure of the reputation of 
each partner.  Because the reputation of each partner is built over time, the study accumulated 
a number of news articles that mentioned the focal firm for a ten year period prior to the year 
of interest.  Therefore, the prominence proxy used involves a time-varying variable.  Within 
the ten-year span, a partner that did not appear frequently in the news, especially at 
LexisNexis®, should not be as prominent and reputable as others that appeared many times 
on the news.  By counting the news articles for all partners in the period of ten years before 
their collaborations with a particular focal firm, I could measure the overall prominence of 
focal firm’s partners.    
 The prominence measure used reflects only the public attention, without identification of   
the positive and negative events.  Consequently, the measurement of the prominence solely 
reflects the amount of attention a company received.  The measurement does not capture 
potential differences in effect between any positive or negative connotation.  
5.2.7 Exploration and Exploitation Networks     
 In classifying a focal firm’s partners as either exploration- or exploitation-oriented 
networks, the study followed the methodology of Rothaermel et al. (2004) which focused on 
primary activities of the focal firm’s partners.  Accordingly, the study regarded the partners 
by focusing on their activities in basic research, drug discovery, and development, as 
exploration alliances.  The study regarded the partners that addressed activities toward 
commercialization (clinical trials, FDA regulatory process, and marketing and sales) as 
exploitation alliances.  However, because of the limitation in the dataset, I only captured the 
number of issued patents and the number of drug applications approved by the FDA.  To 
determine the propensity of the focal firm’s partners to invent and to commercialize, the 
study accumulated the total number of issued patents and the total number of successful drug 
applications in the past ten years, prior to the collaboration with the focal firm.  Because the 
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drug discovery and development process generally can extend from 5 to 15 years 
(Rothaermel et al., 2004), the use of a ten-year period to capture the exploration and 
exploitation activities of the focal firms’ alliances sufficiently captures the exploration / 
exploitation  propensities.  
 The partners that successfully achieved a high number of patents in the past ten years 
prior to collaboration with a focal firm represent the focal firm’s exploration partners.  On the 
contrary, the partners that successfully achieved a high number of drug applications approved 
by the FDA in the past ten years prior to collaboration with the focal firm represent the focal 
firm’s exploitation partners.  To maintain the valuable information of variables with 
continuous measures, the study did not transform the two variables into dichotomous or 
dummy variables.  Therefore, established firms such as Abbott Laboratories and Pfizer that 
have achieved high numbers of both patents and drug applications each year could constitute 
the organizations that specialize in both invention and commercialization activities.    
5.2.8 Upstream and Downstream Horizontal and Vertical Networks 
 After classifying the exploration- and exploitation-oriented networks in the focal firms’ 
networks, the study identified the focal firms’ positions in the drug development process (i.e., 
exploration or exploitation focal firms), using the same scheme that determines the networks 
of their alliances.  Specifically, the study regarded focal firms that achieved as higher number 
of patents in the past ten years as the upstream focal firms.  The focal firms that achieved a 
higher number of successful drug applications in the past ten years are considered the 
downstream focal firms.  Note that like exploration and exploitation network variables, these 
two additional variables are not categorical variables, yet they are continuous variables by 
representing the degrees of focal firms’ postures toward invention and commercialization.   
 In comparing the focal firms’ degree of activity with those of their partners, the study 
could identify a position of a focal firm in its biopharmaceutical drug development network.  
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Figure 5.3 illustrates four positions of focal firms and their alliances.  It also shows that the 
first two relationships are horizontal networks, and the other two types are vertical networks.  
First, if a focal firm has a high number of patents and also operates in the exploration 
network, the focal firm is regarded as the exploration firm collaborating in the upstream 
horizontal network.  Second, if a focal firm has a high number of successful drug applications 
and collaborates with a high number of exploitation alliances, the focal firm’s network is a 
downstream horizontal network.  Third, if a focal firm is regarded as the exploration focal 
firm and it collaborates with a high number of exploration alliances, the focal firm’s network 
is an upstream vertical network.  Last, if the focal firm is regarded as the exploitation firm 
and it collaborates with a high number of exploration alliances, the focal firm’s network is a 
downstream vertical network.   
 
Figure 5.3 Horizontal and Vertical Collaborations 
 
5.3 Control Variables 
 In order to understand the impact of the multiple dimensions of the interfirm network on 
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might influence the dependent variables.  First, the study controlled for both invention and 
commercialization performances of the focal firms prior to their observed collaborations by 
accumulating the number of patents approved by USPTO, as well as the number of drug 
applications approved by the FDA.  The period of accumulation for each focal firm was ten 
years.  Using the same logic as mentioned earlier, a ten-year span prior to the collaborations 
should provide reasonable time to capture the orientation and performance of the focal firms 
in the biopharmaceutical industry.  Note that these controlled variables are the same as the 
focal firms’ positions at the drug development process (i.e., exploration or exploitation 
postures), suggested in the previous section. 
 It is necessary to control for prior innovation and commercialization performance, yet 
applying for the number of prior invention and commercialization performances creates 
endogeneity problems.  The endogeneity problem arises when the control variables included 
in the model correlate with other independent variables, and all variables influence the 
dependent variable.  The two variables—the number of prior patents and the number of prior 
drugs at the FDA—are included to control for the heterogeneity associated with invention 
and commercialization performance of the focal firms.  However, the two controls (10-year 
accumulation) are also correlated to direct ties (r = .32 and .34; p < .05), indirect ties (r = .48 
and .51; p < .05), and brokerage measures of the structural holes (r = .37 and .46; p < .05).  
This endogeneity problem suggests that by controlling for prior invention and 
commercialization performances of a focal firm, a multicollinearity between the control 
variables and other independent variables occurs and affects the stability of regression 
coefficients (Schwab, 1999).  For hierachical regression analysis, endogeneity implies a 
tendency to underestimate the effect of a variable added at a later time.    
 In addition to the previous performance of the focal firms, the study controlled for the 
equity financing events in the focal firms (Ahuja et al., 2001; Hitt et al., 1996).  Data from 
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BioScan presents the history of a focal firm’s equity events, including acquisitions and 
private placements.  The study counted both the number of acquisition events of a focal firm 
and the number of private placements, a set of biotechnological companies that invested 
significant amounts of capital in a focal firm as shareholders, combining the two numbers to 
generate the number of “equity financing events” for the focal firm.  This control variable 
was not led, because an acquisition may provide a focal firm with instantaneous access to 
acquired firms’ current patenting and commercialization activities.  Leading this control 
variable by one year suggested no significant results, indicating the robustness of the findings 
with regard to this assumption. 
 Private placement was a rare occurrence.  There were only 22 focal firms that raised 
capital in this manner.  When the private placements are separated from the equity financing 
event variable and entered as a separate control, this change does not affect results and does 
not improve model fit for all three dependent variables—patenting rates, marketed drug 
applications, and revenues (Chi2 = .01, .08, and .35; Prob >  Chi2 = 0.9036, 0.5520, and 
0.7758, respectively).  Thus, the study used the combined variable “equity financing events” 
as a control in all models. 
 Next, the study obtained the data from the “Subject Terms” section provided by BioScan 
to control for an individual level of diversification.  The section lists the subject interests and 
areas of concentration relative to the company.  According to BioScan’s user manual, 
 “Subject assignments are based on information taken from the following fields: 
 Agreements, Research and Development, Product in Development, and Products on the 
 Market.  As new disciplines of biotechnology research and development are introduced in 
 the industry, the appropriate new subject titles will be added to this field in BioScan” (See 
 Appendix for full details).   
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Ahuja (2000a) suggested that several arguments have been made for positive and negative 
impacts of diversification on invention performance.  Therefore, following his argument, this 
study included the variable “diversification” to control for influence on dependent variables.   
 Further, COMPUSTAT provides data regarding R&D expenditures, years of public 
status, closing stock prices, employees, and net incomes.  According to several previous 
studies, these factors were the important factors contributing to the invention and 
commercialization performances of the focal firms (Ahuja, 2000a; Ahuja et al., 2001; 
Rothaermel et al., 2004).  Therefore, these control variables are obtained at the time t-1 or 
one year prior to the year of observation (t = 1) in order to take effect on the dependent 
variables.  The one-year leading process of these controlled variables substantially reduced 
the number of observations from 3,501 to 1,879.  This number of observations after the 
leading process, however, is still sufficient for the study. 
 While no study could be found that related R&D expenditures to the commercialization 
performances, several studies confirmed that R&D expenditures are at least a significant 
determinant of invention outputs (Greve, 2003; Hitt et al., 1996).  Thus, this study collected 
the focal firms’ R&D expenditures from COMPUSTAT to control for the focal firms’ 
abilities to invent and to commercialize.  Because about 5% the values for R&D expenditures 
were missing, I imputed the missing values based on available values in both the years before 
and after.  Next, I controlled for the public status or the prestige of the focal firms using two 
control variables—annual closing stock prices and years as public companies.  A focal firm 
with a high public status or a high prestige usually performs well in any stock market, as 
investors are willing to pay a high premium for its stock price.  In fact, the prior research 
reviewed in the previous section suggested a significant relationship between shareholders’ 
value creation (i.e., increased stock prices) and innovation and commercialization stages 
(Kelm et al., 1995).     
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 With regard to the other dimension of the focal firm’s status and prestige, I used the 
tenure of a focal firm as a public organization.  As a publicly traded firm grows, its reputation 
and prestige should improve over time.  Several studies mentioned numerous factors 
contributing to failures of public companies, especially during their initial public offerings 
(IPOs) or the early period of public companies (Certo, Covin, & Dalton, 2001; Fisher & 
Pollock, 2004; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996).   
 Although newly public firms receive a number of benefits from investors during the IPOs, 
they encountered a transformation that brings a number of costs and risks.  Therefore, a 
newly public company will have a lower reputation and status, compared with other 
established or high-tenure public companies, placing the public company in an unfavorable 
position in the eyes of many investors, for any success in invention and commercialization 
activities.  Thus, the study controlled the tenure years in which a focal firm operates as a 
public company. 
 For the next control variable, the study included the focal firm’s net income to control for 
profitability.  If a focal firm is profitable, it is more likely that the focal firm will engage in 
substantial R&D and advertising activities.  Thus, the focal firm will perform well in terms of 
invention and commercialization activities, regardless of its alliances (Ahuja, 2000a).  In 
addition to profitability, a prior study suggested a common method to control for firm-size 
effects in analyses of innovative productivity.  It is also conventional to control for firm-size 
effects in analyses of invention performance (Cohen et al., 1989).  While it is unclear in 
which directions size could influence commercialization activities, prior studies suggested 
significant relationships between firm size and invention outcomes (Damanpour, 1996; Shan 
et al., 1994).  Obtaining data from COMPUSTAT, the study used the number of employees 
as a measurement of size to control for an effect on the dependent variables.    
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 Focal firms are observed in different years.  In a certain year the innovation process of all 
firms in the industry may have been affected by external factors, like speed of patent 
processing.  To control for such year fixed effects, this study included dummy variables for 
every year from 1986 to 2002.  These time dummies improve the model fit of two dependent 
variables: patenting rates and marketed drug applications (Chi2 (10) = 167.18 and 18.93; P 
value > Chi2 = 0.000 and 0.0412, respectively.)  These time dummies, however, do not 
improve the model fit of the revenues (Chi2 (10) = 10.79; P value > Chi2 = 0.3744). 
 This study also added control variables for the four specific businesses within the 
pharmaceutical industry as specified by NAICS.  These four specific businesses—medicinal 
and botanicals, pharmaceutical preparations, in vitro diagnostic substances, and biological 
products (except diagnostic)—should influence the propensity to invent and commercialize.  
“Biological products (except diagnostic)” constituted the omitted category.  (Please see 
Appendix A for the summary of all measurements and data sources of the dependent, 
independent, and control variables in this study.)  The following table summarizes all 
variables and their measurements.  











Table 5.1 All Variables and Their Measurements 
Variables Measurements 
1.  Patents  Observation YR (Time = T1) 
2.  Marketed Drug Apps  All drugs available in the market in the Observation YR, T1 
3.  Sales  Observation YR, T1 
4.  Upstream Horizontal Variable 18 * Variable 8  
5.  Downstream Horizontal  Variable 19 * Variable 9 
6.  Upstream Vertical  Variable 18 * Variable 9 
7.  Downstream Vertical  Variable 19 * Variable 8 
8.  Partner’s Patents  10-YR accumulation of partners’ patents and led 1-YR, T0  
9.  Partners’ Drugs  10-YR accumulation of partners’ drugs and led 1-YR, T0  
10. Partners’ Prominence  10-YR accumulation of partners’ news articles and led 1-YR, T0  
11. Ties’ Average Tenure  Average tenured of all partners and led 1-YR, T0 
12. Brokerages  All direct and indirect ties and led 1-YR, T0  
13. Densities  All direct and indirect ties and led 1-YR, T0  
14. Direct*Indirect 7-YR accumulation and led 1-YR, T0  
15. Direct Ties  7-YR accumulation and led 1-YR, T0  
16. Indirect Ties  7-YR accumulation and led 1-YR, T0  
17. Patents of Focal 10-YR accumulation of a focal firm’s patents and led 1-YR, T0  
18. Drug Apps of Focal   10-YR accumulation of a focal firm’s drugs and led 1-YR, T0 
19. Equity Financing Events  No lead (I will regard it as the control variable), T1 
20. Closed Stock Prices  Led 1-YR, T0 
21. Years as Public Status  Led 1-YR, T0 
22. Diversification  Led 1-YR, T0 
23. Net Income**  Led 1-YR, T0 
24. Employees*  Led 1-YR, T0 
25. R&D Expenses*  Led 1-YR, T0 
1. YR = Year and T = Time;  
2. This study did not lag the dependent variables, but lead the independent variables; 
2. All variables are time varying, except for Diversification and Years as Public Status. 
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CHAPTER 6: ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES AND RESULTS 
6.1 Model Specifications and Estimations  
 Hypotheses of invention and commercialization performance were tested in a panel 
dataset containing annual observations of 262 biopharmaceutical firms during 1986 and 2003.  
When examining such panel dataset or clustered data, scholars generally encounter 
unobservable heterogeneity that leads to inefficiency or bias in estimated effects of measured 
variables.  Fixed-effects or random-effects models present alternative approaches to account 
for unobserved heterogeneity (Teachman, Duncan, Yeung, & Levy, 2001).  While there are 
no definitive criteria for choosing between random- and fixed-effects models (Greene, 1993; 
Johnston & DiNardo, 1997), the choice of fixed-effects versus random-effects models is not 
without consequences.   
 6.1.1 Fixed-Effects versus Random-Effects Models 
 Firm fixed-effects controls account for stable differences between firms.  The firm fixed-
effects model transforms both dependent and independent variables for a given year into 
deviations from the organization’s mean across the entire years.  This effectively removes all 
between-firm variances and error terms from the data.  Consequently, the regression analysis 
for independent variables depends only on the within-firm variation.       
 In contrast to fixed-effects models, random-effects models treat the organizational-
specific effects as random disturbances (Teachman et al., 2001).  If unknown variables should 
randomly affect all observations, the random-effects models then allow researchers to 
evaluate effects of the independent variables based on both within- and between-organization 
variances (Greene, 1993).  Under this circumstance, a simple generalized least square (GLS) 
estimator provides appropriate estimates of the coefficients and their standard errors.  In this 
study, the random-effects GLS regression is used to test for one of the dependent variables—
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the revenues of the focal firm.  However, the more restrictive fixed-effects model will be 
used to evaluate the robustness of the results. 
6.1.2 The Panel Negative Binomial Regression 
 The two other dependent variables—the number of patents and the number of drug 
applications—are non-negative count measures.  The characteristics of the non-negative 
count dependent variables violate assumptions of linear regression models, including 
homoskedasticity (i.e., the variance of error terms appears constant over a range of predictor 
variables) and normally distributed errors (i.e., purely theoretical continuous probability that 
has the bell-shaped, or normal curve) (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998).   
 Poisson’s regression or negative binomial regression deal appropriately with dependent 
variables that are count and non-negative integers (Ahuja, 2000a; Ahuja et al., 2001; 
Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984; Henderson & Cockburn, 1996; Stuart, 2000).  However, 
Poisson’s model requires that the mean and variance of a dependent variable are equal.  
When a dependent variable has variance that is greater than its mean (so-called over-
dispersion), negative binomial regression models are appropriate (Arregle, Amburgey, & 
Dacin, 1997).  The panel negative binomial model (Benner & Tushman, 2002) could be 
represented by the following equation:      
E(Pit/Xit-1) = exp(Xit-1β + αεi + µi ) 
where Pit is the observed count for firm i at time t; Xit-1 is a vector of characteristics of firm i 
at time t-1; α is an estimated correction for over-dispersion (i.e., for mean not equal to 
variance) for all firm i; and µi   is a time-invariant firm i effect, which can be treated as either 
fixed or random.  Because the Poisson model is nested within the negative binomial model, 
when the estimated parameter alpha (α) is zero, the conditional mean is equal to the 
conditional variance and the negative binomial model reduces to the Poisson model 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 1998; Long, 1997).   
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  6.1.3 The Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Regression for Panel Data   
 Based on its robust properties, the panel negative binomial model is a tentative 
specification and estimation model to test for the two dependent variables.  However, prior 
scholars mentioned that unobserved heterogeneity that causes over-dispersion can also cause 
“excess zeros” (Cameron et al., 1998; Long, 1997).  Based on these considerations, a 
negative binomial model, a zero-inflated Poisson, or a zero-inflated negative binomial 
model—are viable candidates for the intended hypothesis testing in the study.  The 
preliminary evaluations of non-negative count dependent variables—the number of patents 
and the number of marketed drug applications—indicate not only over-dispersion, but also 
“excess zeros.”   
 Table 6.1a shows that the unconditional variances of the two dependent count variables 
are much larger than their corresponding means, suggesting over-dispersion.  These results 
indicate that the Poisson model is not appropriate for the intended analyses.  To confirm the 
preliminary evaluations from Table 6.1a, several regression analyses are used to check the 
over-dispersion in the two models.  Under the panel Poisson regression model, the extreme 
significances of the goodness-of-fit Chi2 in both models indicate that the Poisson distribution 
is inappropriate for the two dependent variables—the number of patents and the number of 
successfully marketed drug applications—(Goodness-of-fit Chi2  = 13026.17 and 6044.834; p 
< 0.000, respectively).  Second, after running the negative binomial regressions on the two 
variables (marketed drug applications and patents), a likelihood-ratio tests supported this 
visual assessment (Chi2 = 1117.74 and 3666.81; alpha = 2.2690 and 2.2610; p = 0.000, 
respectively).  These tests confirm the over-dispersion for the two dependent variables.    
Table 6.1a Evidence of Over-dispersion in Dependent Variables 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
# of Patents 9.9564 35.8610 
# of Drug Apps 5.8473 24.0067 
*All observation (N = 1,879) 
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 Table 6.1b shows that the two dependent variables contain high percentages of zeros.  
According to Min and Agresti (2005), the characteristics of over-dispersed and zero-inflated 
data are common in many social science applications, especially when many subjects have 
zero observations, yet many also have much larger observations so that the overall mean need 
not be near zero.  In the event of a zero-inflated situation, a study in political science 
compared King’s “hurdle” event count model and Greene’s “zero-inflated” model (Zorn, 
1996).  The hurdle model is a two-part model for count data—one part is a binary model for 
whether the response outcome is zero or positive, while the other part uses a truncated model 
that modifies an ordinary distribution by conditioning on positive outcomes (Min & Agresti, 
2005).   
Table 6.1b Evidence of Zero-inflation 
Variables Obs = 0 Percent 
# of Patents 899 47.84
# of Drug Apps** 1,446 76.96
* All observations (N = 1,879); ** Potential variables with the Zero-inflation symptom 
 The zero-inflated model recognizes that two types of zeros can occur: one comes from the 
zero state and the other from the ordinary count model, such as the Poisson or negative 
binomial, with one that is degenerated at zero (Lambert, 1992).  From the two perspectives, 
the latter model confers a more effective specification than that of the former one, because it 
separates the population of subjects that will have only a zero response from other subjects 
that may have a zero response, such as the number of successful marketed drug applications 
from the Drug@FDA database. 
 Recently, drawing on the benefits of the zero inflated specification, Min and Agresti 
(2005) proposed the “random-effects models for repeated measures of zero-inflated count 
data” to account for the between-and-within heterogeneities that could impact the dependent 
variables.   
 For the number of successful marketed drug applications in the current year, some focal 
firms may have many zero-value observations because of chance, whereas others may have 
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zero-value observations due to the fact that the focal firms generated drug products that are 
not compatible with the requirements of Drug@FDA database.  Please note that while the 
Drug@FDA database contains the majority of prescriptions and over-the-counter human 
drugs currently approved for sale in the United States since 1911, it does not record all 
biologic therapeutic products.  (Please see the Appendix for further details on what drug 
products are not in Drug@FDA).  Additionally, there are many biopharmaceutical firms that 
do not aim to generate the number of drug applications, because they are involved in 
upstream activities such as R&D, clinical trials, and/or licensing technologies.  These 
upstream firms do not intend to apply for the drug applications at the FDA.  Thus, in the case 
of the number of marketed drug applications, these zero-value observations are potentially 
inflated and warrant control.   
 Regarding the zero-value observations of focal firms’ patents in the biopharmaceutical 
industry, the tendency to engage in interorganizational collaborations causes focal firms 
generally to submit applications for patents as soon as the firms generate potential intellectual 
outputs.  This process does not preclude many focal firms that may engage in 
commercialization activities.  Therefore, it is unlikely that the focal firms will neglect the 
patenting process.  Thus, zero value should potentially reflect the inability to generate 
invention, not the unavailability of the data.  From the above arguments, the number of 
marketed drug applications is susceptible to zero-inflation, which needs to be taken into 
account for hypothesis testing.   
Taking into account the propensity of focal firms to invent and to commercialize, control 
for zero-inflations of both invention and commercialization dependent variables.  Therefore, 
focal firms with propensity to generate invention are less likely to consider applying for drugs 
applications at the FDA.  In regard to the specification and estimation models, the study 
deployed 1) the negative binomial model for the number of patenting rates controlling for the 
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firm’s fixed-effects, 2) the zero-inflated negative binomial model controlling for the firm’s 
organizational fixed-effects, and 3) the random-effects GLS regression model with a fixed-
effects model for robustness check.  Additionally, the analysis of the same set of predictors 
was used on each dependent measure: patenting rates, marketed drug application rates, and 
revenues of the focal firms. 
6.2 Results and Basic Information 
 The final number of focal firms in the result section is 262.  The study period spans 
seventeen years (from 1986 to 2003).  Several independent and control variables (i.e., net 
incomes, employees, R&D expenses) were led for one year, using a seven-year period prior 
to the year of observation to measure direct and indirect ties.  To prevent left censoring, the 
study ran models for observations after 1992 (please see Table 5.1 for more details).   
The study did not include the collaborations prior to 1986 because: 1) according to a prior 
study, the biotechnological collaborations were rare until the early 1980s (Hoang et al., 2005) 
and thus the number of collaborations should not be significant to analysis, and 2) the 
seventeen-year observation period (from 1986 to 2003) is theoretically adequate to capture 
the drug development process, which normally takes about 5 to 15 years.   
Table 6.2 provides the complete list of 262 focal firms and their observation periods in 
the dataset between 1986 and 2003.  In the dataset, only ten firms have one-year observation 
periods while seven firms have their eighteen-year observation periods.  The majority of 
firms (65%) have between 3 and 9 years in the observation periods.  Due to the following 
reasons, many focal firms did not appear across the observation period (1986-2003).  First, 
the focal firms may have have been acquired by competitors.  Second, firms may have 
changed their publicly traded status to private status.  Last, the focal firms may have gone out 
of business, changed names, and/or ceased operations in biotechnology.  For instance, 
Warner-Lambert was acquired by Pfizer in 2000 for $90 billion in stock; this acquisition 
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created the largest US drug maker, the second largest in the world.  This should explain why 
the data for Warner-Lambert is unavailable in 2000.  The previous study results suggested 
that there were a significant number of acquisition and merger activities among  
Table 6.2: List of All Focal Firms and their Observation Period  
No Names From Until  No Names From Until 
1 3-Dimensional Pharm. 1998 2001  50 Celgene  1993 2003 
2 Aastrom Biosciences 1996 2003  51 Cell Genesys 1998 2002 
3 Abbott Laboratories 1998 2003  52 Cell Pathways 1997 2002 
4 ACADIA Pharmaceuticals 2002 2003  53 Cell Therapeutics 1995 2003 
5 Acambis plc. 1999 2003  54 Cellegy Pharmaceuticals 2000 2003 
6 Adherex Technologies 1999 2003  55 CEL-SCI  1986 1997 
7 Advanced Magnetics 1991 1993  56 Centocor 1991 1998 
8 Affymax 1991 1993  57 Cephalon 1997 2003 
9 Agouron Pharmaceuticals 1996 1998  58 Cerus  1996 2003 
10 Alexion Pharmaceuticals 1995 2003  59 Chiron  1994 2003 
11 Alfacell  1991 2003  60 Coley Pharmaceutical  2003 2003 
12 Alkermes 1990 2003  61 CollaGenex Pharm. 1995 2003 
13 Alliance Pharmaceutical  1991 2003  62 Columbia Laboratories 1996 2003 
14 Alteon Inc. 1991 2000  63 Connetics  1998 2003 
15 ALZA Corporation 1999 2000  64 Corautus Genetics 2000 2003 
16 AMDL 1999 2003  65 Corgenix 2000 2003 
17 Amgen 1992 2003  66 Corixa  1995 2003 
18 Angiotech Pharmaceuticals 1998 2003  67 Cortex Pharmaceuticals 2001 2003 
19 Anika Therapeutics  1992 2000  68 Crucell N.V. 1999 2003 
20 AntexBiologics 2000 2001  69 Cubist Pharmaceuticals 1998 2003 
21 Antigenics 1998 2003  70 CuraGen Corporation 2000 2003 
22 Aphton  2000 2003  71 Curis 1998 2003 
23 Argonaut Technologies 1998 2003  72 Cyanotech  1991 2003 
24 Ariad  Pharmaceuticals 1996 2003  73 Cygnus 1989 2003 
25 ArQule 2001 2003  74 Cypress Bioscience 1986 2003 
26 Astralis  2000 2003  75 CYTOGEN  1986 2003 
27 AstraZeneca Group  2000 2003  76 Dendreon  1998 2003 
28 AtheroGenics 1998 2003  77 DepoMed 1996 1997 
29 Atrix Laboratories 1993 2003  78 Derma Sciences 1996 2002 
30 AutoImmune  1991 2003  79 diaDexus, LLC 1998 1999 
31 AVANIR Pharmaceuticals 1989 2003  80 Diagnostic Products  1996 1998 
32 Avant Immunotherapeutics 1989 2003  81 Diatide  1996 1998 
33 Aventis S.A. 1997 2003  82 Digene  1995 2003 
34 AVI Biopharma  2003 2003  83 Discovery Laboratories  1995 2003 
35 Axcan Pharma  1999 2003  84 DOR BioPharma 1989 1989 
36 BACHEM AG 1999 2003  85 Draxis Health  2000 2003 
37 BioMarin Pharmaceutical  2003 2003  86 Dynavax Technologies  2001 2003 
38 Biomira  2001 2003  87 Elan Corporation,  1986 2003 
39 BioSante Pharmaceuticals 2000 2003  88 Eli Lilly and Co. 1989 2003 
40 Biosite Diagnostics 1995 2003  89 Emisphere Technologies 1994 2003 
41 Biosource International  1991 2003  90 Encysive Pharmaceuticals 2001 2003 
42 BioSpecifics Technologies 1992 2003  91 Endovasc  2001 2003 
43 BioTime  1995 2002  92 EntreMed 1995 2003 
44 Biovail Corporation 1993 1996  93 Enzon 1991 1994 
45 BioWhittaker  1990 1996  94 EPIX Medical 1995 2003 
46 Bristol-Myers Squibb  1996 2003  95 Epoch Biosciences 1996 2002 
47 Calypte Biomedical  1995 2003  96 Essential Therapeutics 1995 2002 
48 Cambrex 2003 2003  97 eXegenics  1996 2002 
49 Cardiome Pharma  1999 2003  98 Flamel Technologies SA 2001 2002 
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Table 6.2 (Continued)  
No Names From Until  No Names From Until 
99 Gamma Biologicals 1995 1997  153 Matritech 1996 2003 
100 GelTex Pharmaceuticals 1994 1999  154 Maxim Pharmaceuticals 1995 2003 
101 Genaera Corporation 1997 2003  155 Medarex  1990 2003 
102 Gene Logic  1995 2003  156 Medicure 2000 2003 
103 Genelabs Technologies 2000 2003  157 Memory Pharmaceuticals  2002 2003 
104 Genencor International 1998 2003  158 Merck & Co. 1986 2002 
105 Genentech 1999 2003  159 Metabasis Therapeutics 2002 2003 
106 Generex Biotechnology  1999 2003  160 MGI PHARMA 1996 2003 
107 GENTA Incorporated 2000 2003  161 Millennium Pharm. 1995 2003 
108 GenVec 2003 2003  162 Myogen 2001 2003 
109 Genzyme Molecular Onco. 1997 2002  163 Myriad Genetics  1995 2003 
110 Geron  1995 2003  164 Nabi Biopharmaceuticals 1994 2003 
111 Gilead Sciences  1990 2002  165 Nektar Therapeutics 1993 2003 
112 GlaxoSmithKline plc 1995 2001  166 Neogen  1996 2003 
113 Gliatech  1996 2001  167 NeoPharm  1994 2003 
114 GlycoGenesys 1996 2003  168 NeoRx  1994 2003 
115 Guilford Pharmaceuticals  1998 2000  169 Neurobiological Tech. 1996 2003 
116 Harvard Bioscience 1998 2000  170 Neurocrine Biosciences 1995 2003 
117 Helix BioPharma  1998 2003  171 Neurogen  1998 2003 
118 Hemagen Diagnostics 1995 2003  172 NitroMed 2001 2003 
119 Hemosol  1998 2003  173 Novartis AG 1996 2003 
120 Heska Corporation 1995 2003  174 Novavax 1995 2003 
121 Human Genome Sciences 1996 2003  175 Noven Pharmaceuticals 1987 2003 
122 Hybridon 1994 2003  176 Novo Nordisk A/S 1994 2003 
123 Icagen 2002 2003  177 NPS Pharmaceuticals 1993 2003 
124 ICOS  1994 1996  178 Nutrition 21 1996 2003 
125 ID Biomedical  1992 2003  179 ONYX Pharmaceuticals 2000 2001 
126 IDEXX Laboratories 1997 2003  180 OraPharma 1998 2001 
127 ILEX Oncology 1996 2002  181 Organogenesis 1994 2001 
128 IMI  1999 2003  182 Orphan Medical 1996 2003 
129 IMMTECH International  1997 2003  183 Ortec International 1994 2003 
130 ImmuCell  1986 2003  184 OSI Pharmaceuticals 1995 2002 
131 Immunicon  2002 2003  185 OSTEX International 1993 2002 
132 ImmunoGen 1989 2003  186 OXiGENE 1992 2003 
133 Immunomedics 1990 2003  187 OXIS International 2000 2003 
134 Inhibitex 2002 2003  188 Pain Therapeutics 1999 2003 
135 InKine Pharmaceutical Co. 1994 2003  189 Palatin Technologies,   1992 2002 
136 InSite Vision  2000 2003  190 Pfizer  1986 2002 
137 Inspire Pharmaceuticals 1998 2002  191 Pharmacopeia 2002 2003 
138 Interferon Sciences 1998 1999  192 Pharmacyclics 1995 2003 
139 IntraBiotics Pharmaceuticals 2000 2003  193 Pharmos  1986 2002 
140 Introgen Therapeutics 1999 2003  194 Polydex Pharmaceuticals  2000 2003 
141 ISIS Pharmaceuticals 2003 2003  195 PRAECIS Pharmaceuticals  1998 2003 
142 Isolagen 2000 2003  196 ProCyte  2000 2002 
143 Johnson & Johnson 2000 2003  197 Progen Industries Limited 1997 2003 
144 Kosan Biosciences 1998 2003  198 Progenics Pharmaceuticals 1995 2003 
145 La Jolla Pharmaceutical Co. 2000 2003  199 Protein Design Labs 1993 2003 
146 Large Scale Biology  2000 2003  200 Provalis  1992 2003 
147 Life Sciences 1992 1992  201 QLT  1992 2003 
148 Ligand Pharmaceuticals 1992 1996  202 Questcor Pharmaceuticals 1992 2003 
149 Lorus Therapeutics 1997 2003  203 QUIDEL  1986 2001 
150 Lynx Therapeutics 1995 2003  204 RegeneRx Biopharm. 1986 2003 
151 MacroChem  1995 2003  205 Repligen Corporation 2000 2003 





Table 6.2 (Continued)  
No Names From Until  No Names From Until 
207 Samaritan Pharmaceuticals 2002 2002  241 Vasogen 1999 2003 
208 SangStat Medical  1995 1996  242 VaxGen 1998 2002 
209 Sanofi, S.A. 2000 2003  243 Vernalis  1991 2003 
210 Savient Pharmaceuticals 1986 2003  244 ViaCell 2002 2003 
211 Schering-Plough Corporation 1992 2003  245 Vical  2000 2003 
212 SciClone Pharmaceuticals  2001 2003  246 Vicuron Pharmaceuticals 1998 2003 
213 Seattle Genetics, Inc 1999 2003  247 Vion Pharmaceuticals  1995 2003 
214 SeraCare Life Sciences 2000 2003  248 Viragen  1996 2003 
215 Serologicals Corporation 2000 2003  249 ViroPharma 1995 2003 
216 Serono International S.A. 1998 2000  250 VIVUS 1996 2000 
217 Shaman Pharmaceuticals 1998 2000  251 Vyrex  1998 2000 
218 Shire Pharmaceuticals  1996 2002  252 Vysis  1995 1999 
219 SICOR 2002 2002  253 Warner-Lambert  1986 1999 
220 Sigma-Aldrich  1998 2003  254 Wyeth 1994 2002 
221 SkyePharma  1996 2003  255 Xechem International  1996 2000 
222 SONUS Pharmaceuticals 1994 1997  256 Xenometrix 1995 2000 
223 Spectral Diagnostics  1996 2002  257 Xenova Group  1993 2003 
224 Spectrum Pharmaceuticals 1995 2003  258 XOMA  1988 2003 
225 Synaptic Pharmaceutical  1994 2001  259 Xtrana 1987 1996 
226 Synbiotics  2000 2003  260 Zaxis International 1992 2001 
227 Tanox 1998 2003  261 Zila 1993 2003 
228 Targeted Genetics  2000 2003  262 Zonagen 1997 2001 
229 Tercica 2002 2003      
230 Teva Pharm. 1986 2003      
231 Theragenics  1992 1997      
232 TolerRx 2001 2002      
233 Transgene 1997 2003      
234 Transkaryotic Therapies 1997 2003      
235 Trimeris 1995 2003      
236 Trinity Biotech U.S.A. 1999 2003      
237 Tularik  1998 2003      
238 Unigene Laboratories  1986 1997      
239 Unimed Pharmaceuticals 1986 1998      
240 Valeant Pharm. Intl’  1997 2003      
 
firms in the biopharmaceutical industry (Hoang et al., 2005).     
After the acquisitions and mergers, an acquired firm typically became one of several 
business units of an acquiring firm (i.e., Warner-Lambert, Upjohn, and Pharmacia became 
divisions under Pfizer in 2000).  These acquired units carried interfirm agreements and 
interpersonal relationships with other firms for several years.  In analysis, therefore, the study 
regarded the number of disappeared firms as still-active entities, contributing to such 
interfirm variables as direct ties, indirect ties, structural holes, and strength of ties (in the next 
seven year periods at most).   
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Table 6.3 presents several important indicators of 262 biopharmaceutical firms over the 
study period and on an annual basis.  The value of most variables increased over time and 
peaked between 1996 and 1998.  Later, most indicators obviously dropped; if not, the 
indicators increased at decreasing rates.     
                  Table 6.3 Important Analytical Data of the Focal Firms 












1986 15 378 5 10 11,878.16 3 
1987 17 396 2 27 13,617.1 1 
1988 18 387 0 6 15,500.9 1 
1989 24 477 4 23 20,965.57 8 
1990 27 545 3 9 24,438.75 4 
1991 37 564 6 11 26,980.16 10 
1992 52 686 5 35 34,653.15 9 
1993 60 680 6 22 36,955.24 15 
1994 73 958 6 18 54,587.64 24 
1995 106 1539 15 46 76,512.19 58 
1996 136 992 40 79 129,484.5 72 
1997 144 1,549 21 54 150,843.1 54 
1998 171 1,773 27 68 164,646.6 69 
1999 180 1,975 20 44 193,326.8 36 
2000 207 2,055 35 57 277,344.1 49 
2001 208 2,020 34 53 296,703.4 23 
2002 205 1,295 19 57 289,772.7 21 
2003 199 439 21 45 228,595.1 26 
Total 1,879 18,708 269 664 2,046,805.16 483 
 
The drops of the total patents in 2002 and 2003 might display the effect of the lengthy 
patenting process at the USPTO that normally takes around two or three years after the 
application dates.  To ensure that the drops of the total patents in 2003 did not affect results, 
the study compared the findings from the models with and without the data in 2003.  The 
significant results and the directions of all variables in these models are very comparable.  
Further, the declines in other indicators, such as the total approved drug applications, total 
approved drugs, total sales, and total number of collaborations of focal firms and their 
alliances indicated downward trends of the biopharmaceutical industry.  The observed 
declines are consistent with arguments that the biopharmaceutical industry is reaching its 
carrying-capacity and approaching the mature stage (Wittcoff et al., 2004).   
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 Table 6.4 provides basic descriptive statistics for the network measures overtime.  The 
table suggests that the mean number of direct ties grew steadily over the period of the study, 
reaching its peak in 2001, and declining afterward.  Like the means of direct ties, the means 
of indirect, density, and brokerage initially increased and later decreased.   
          Table 6.4 Basic Descriptive Statistics on the Linkages Network 













1986 0.20 0.41 0 1 0.00 0.00% 0.00 
1987 0.41 0.51 0 1 0.00 0.00% 0.00 
1988 0.78 1.06 0 3 0.00 0.00% 0.44 
1989 0.96 1.57 0 6 0.00 0.00% 1.17 
1990 1.52 2.49 0 8 0.00 0.00% 3.37 
1991 2.19 3.95 0 18 0.05 0.02% 8.86 
1992 2.48 4.34 0 19 0.04 0.01% 11.04 
1993 2.78 4.65 0 20 0.03 0.01% 13.08 
1994 3.44 5.84 0 22 0.08 0.02% 20.99 
1995 4.23 6.57 0 30 0.15 0.07% 28.12 
1996 5.40 7.92 0 41 0.38 0.55% 42.85 
1997 7.78 11.43 0 70 1.83 0.87% 90.29 
1998 8.72 13.47 0 88 3.20 2.40% 122.26 
1999 8.81 13.58 0 88 3.68 2.49% 124.18 
2000 8.62 13.03 0 88 3.86 2.62% 115.42 
2001 8.85 13.42 0 89 4.04 2.69% 122.32 
2002 8.54 12.58 0 66 4.12 2.91% 108.85 
2003 8.47 12.14 0 68 3.88 2.87% 103.03 
 
 As a focal firm engaged with a higher number of collaborations, its partners also 
established their own networks, leading to an increased number of indirect partners, density, 
and brokerage.  The overall density of the network indicates the proportion of potential 
network ties that are actually realized, whereas the overall brokerage of the network 
represents the two nodes of the focal firm’s network that do not link.  The differences 
between years also indicate the need to control for year fixed effects.  Table 6.5 provides 
descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables, except year dummies (see the 
Appendix for the correlations of the year dummies).   
The sample represents the prominent publicly traded firms in the industry.  There is 
considerable variance on all the key dependent variables, such as patents, marketed drug 
applications, and total sales across organizations and across years.  With regard to their 
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correlations, the three dependent variables are positively correlated.  Patents and marketed 
drug applications are only moderately correlated (r = .37; p < .000).  Sales, however, 
correlates with both (r = .53 and .64).  As expected, the previous patents and previous drug 
applications of focal firms measured in the ten-year period prior to collaborations are 
correlated with the three dependent variables.  Especially, the number of patents in the 
observation year is highly correlated with the number of drugs approved by the FDA ten 
years prior to the collaborations (r = .89).  Additionally, the number of marketed drugs 
applications in the observation year is highly correlated with the number of patents acquired 
ten years prior to the collaborations (r = .97).  Further, Direct and indirect ties are positively 
correlated (r = .46; p < .000).  The last sets of highly correlated variables are net incomes, the 
number of employees, and R&D expenses (r = .79, .81, and .85).   
 Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 depict the visual relationships among the dependent variables.  
Specifically, Figure 6.1 shows the relationships between low patenting rates and low 
revenues.  Focal firms that generate more patents also obtain greater revenues.  Figure 6.2 
also suggests the positve correlation between marketed drug applications and annual 
revenues.  The higher number of marketed drug applications should indicate that the firms 
have more sources to commercialize their products to customers.   Notice that there were also 
a few focal firms that generate the high number of marketed drug applications, but they had 
very little revenue.   
 Last, Figure 6.3 depicts the relationships between the number of marketed drug 
applications and patenting rates.  Most of the plots locate along the vertical and horizontal 
axes (L-shape) indicating a tendency for the focal firms to perform well in terms of either the 
marketed drug application activities or the patenting activities.  For instance, there are few 
firms that simultaneously acquired a high level of patents and a high level of marketed drugs  
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      Table 6.5: Descriptive Statistic and Correlation Matrix 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1.  Number of Patents  9.96 35.86            
2.  Number of Marketable Drug Apps 5.85 24.01 .37           
3.  Sales**  1,089.31 4,412.66 .64 .53          
4.  Upstream Horizontal* 15.84 229.60 .26 .06 .09         
5.  Downstream Horizontal  6.53 74.68 .07 .26 .19 .05        
6.  Upstream Vertical  95.64 868.55 .19 .09 .13 .40 .41       
7.  Downstream Vertical  632.64 9,142.69 .07 .22 .21 .21 .40 .11      
8.  Partner’s Patents  106.63 478.21 .08 .06 .09 .39 .18 .27 .46     
9.  Partners’ Drugs  1.89 9.24 .01 .01 .01 .04 .29 .37 .07 .36    
10. Partners’ Prominence  191.62 516.25 .11 .09 .11 .14 .30 .30 .26 .63 .47   
11. Ties’ Average Tenure  3.45 2.85 .03 .01 .09 -.05 -.01 -.03 .00 -.04 -.01 -.05  
12. Brokerages  85.45 322.82 .38 .46 .65 .03 .19 .14 .14 .06 .06 .18 .10 
13. Densities  1.78 8.70 .00 -.02 -.01 -.01 .03 .01 -.01 .01 .08 .04 .08 
14. Direct*Indirect 98.03 466.16 .24 .36 .45 .00 .09 .03 .07 .02 .01 .08 .09 
15. Direct Ties  4.94 8.54 .27 .34 .44 .02 .16 .13 .12 .08 .09 .19 .14 
16. Indirect Ties  3.12 6.58 .10 .13 .20 -.00 .05 .02 .04 .05 .02 .07 .12 
17. Patents of Focal 3.03 13.29 .28 .97 .41 .05 .24 .08 .19 .05 .01 .08 -.02 
18. Drug Apps of Focal   76.91 299.95 .89 .36 .70 .25 .03 .16 .05 .05 -.02 .06 .01 
19. Equity Financing Events  0.26 0.62 .02 .01 -.00 .02 .08 .07 .02 .09 .13 .17 -.05 
20. Closed Stock Prices  15.46 20.73 .09 .00 .02 .05 .00 .03 -.02 .02 .05 .02 .04 
21. Years as Public Status  9.15 6.50 .34 .31 .43 .07 .11 .11 .07 .00 .00 .05 .12 
22. Diversification  9.20 8.28 .53 .28 .51 .12 .13 .19 .12 .11 .08 .17 -.01 
23. Net Income**  131.28 730.29 .02 -.02 .00 .03 -.01 .01 -.01 .01 .01 -.03 .12 
24. Employees*  4.29 15.25 .08 .00 .05 .06 -.01 .04 -.01 .02 .03 -.02 .12 




  TABLE 6.5 (Continued) 
Variable 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
13. Densities  -.01             
14. Direct*Indirect .70 .04            
15. Direct Ties  .83 .01 .79           
16. Indirect Ties  .29 .19 .69 .46          
17. Patents of Focal  .37 -.02 .29 .28 .10         
18. Drug Apps of Focal  .46 -.00 .28 .30 .11 .26        
19. Equity Financing Events .03 -.03 -.02 .03 -.00 .02 -.01       
20. Closed Stock Prices  .03 .03 -.00 .06 .00 -.01 .09 .03      
21. Years as Public Status  .42 .03 .31 .43 .22 .26 .42 .04 .03     
22. Diversification  .45 .01 .37 .47 .21 .21 .53 .05 .11 .41    
23. Net Income**  -.01 -.01 -.04 -.01 -.05 -.02 .02 .02 .40 -.01 .01   
24. Employees*  .00 -.01 -.04 -.01 .00 -.01 .09 .03 .53 .05 .07 .79  
25. R&D Expenses*  .01 -.01 -.03 .01 -.00 -.01 .04 .03 .43 .04 .02 .81 .85 
           Notes: All correlations with absolute values above .045 are statistically significant at p < 0.05; N = 1879; Correlations of all NAICS and years from STATA are available at the Appendix.  
























Figure 6.1 Relationships of Patents and Annual Revenues 
 
 

























Figure 6.3 Relationships of Marketed Drug Applications and Patents 
 
 














(e.g., in 2001, only Novartis AG achieved 106 marketed drug applications and 94 new patents). 
 Tables 6.6a, b, and c, report the results of the regression analyses using the panel negative 
binomial, the panel zero-inflated negative binomial, and the random-effects GLS models.   
Model 1 presents the base model with the control variables.  Several of the control variable 
results are significant for all three tables.  First, a focal firm’s posture in terms of exploitation (a 
focal firm’s propensity to generate a large number of drug applications) is positive and 
significant for all models.  The focal firm with a high number of previous drug applications 
performs well in patenting rates, the number of marketed drug applications, and revenues.  The 
number of equity financing events generates significantly positive outcomes for a focal firm’s 
patenting rate and revenue.     
Unlike a focal firm’s posture in exploitation activities, a focal firm’s posture in exploration 
activities (a propensity to generate patents) contributes to future patents and revenues.  There is 
no significant effect of the the focal firm’s posture in exploration activities on the subsequent 
number of marketed drug applications.  Interestingly, the closing stock price of the previous year 
is the negative factor for the future revenue.  The level of diversification—the extent that a focal 
firm engaged in several biopharmaceutical technologies—suggests the high number of patents, 
marketed drug applications, and revenue.  Further, a long tenure as a publicly traded company 
decreases the focal firm’s patenting rate.  These results support a prior study using institutional 
perspectives to explain that established firms normally fail the disruptive technologies 
(Christensen et al., 1996), whereas startups were more likely to generate invention (Baum et al., 
2000).  For the last significant control variable, net income of a focal firm in the previous year 
only suggests the negative association with its revenue.  Model 2 adds the three variables—direct 
ties, indirect ties, and their interaction—to the specification.   
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Table 6.6a: The Panel Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of Patenting  
Predictors Model #1 Model #2 Model #3 Model #4 Model #5 Model #6 Model #7 
Constant  -.6488 ** -.6842 *** -.7269 *** -.2191 -.1711  -.2096  -.2104  
Upstream Horizontal        1.05e-08   
       (9.43e-08)   
Downstream  Horizontal        -.0002   
       .0002   
Upstream Vertical       -3.39e-06   
       (1.7e-05)   
Downstream Vertical       -7.38e-06 * -8.40e-06 ** 
       (3.27e-06)  (3.23e-06)  
Partner’s Patents     -.0001 * -1.76e-05  -1.91e-06  
     (4.34e-05)  (7.07e-05)  (4.78e-05)  
Partners’ Drugs     -.0058 * -.0054  -.0067 * 
     (.0030)  (.0035)  (.0030)  
Partners’ Prominence    -5.17e-05  3.31e-05  2.98e-05  2.74e-05  
    (4.50e-05)  (5.1e-05)  (5.04e-05)  (4.93e-05)  
Ties’ Average Tenure    -.0692 ** -.0687 ** -.0656 ** -.0660 ** 
    (.0246)  (.0244)  (.0242)  (.0242)  
Brokerages   -.0006 ** -.0005 ** -.0005 *** -.0005 *** -.0005 ***
   (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0001)  (.0001)  
Densities   .0073 * .0074 * .0078 * .0078 * .0079 * 
   (.0037)  (.0037)  (.0037)  (.0037)  (.0037)  
Direct*Indirect  -.0005 * -.0006 ** -.0006 ** -.0005 * -.0006 ** -.0006 ** 
  (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0002)  
Direct Ties  .0130 ** .0267 ** .0236 *** .0203 *** .0211 *** .0206 ***
  (.0049)  (.0060)  (.0059)  (.0058)  (.0055)  (.0055)  
Indirect Ties  -.0026  -.0010  .0009  .0003  .0023  .0020  
  (.0070)  (.0070)  (.0072)  (.0072)  (.0071)  (.0071)  
Selected control variables for all models are reported next page. 
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      Table 6.6a (Continued)  
Control Variables Model #1 Model #2 Model #3 Model #4 Model #5 Model #6 Model #7 
Year Dummies1  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
NAICS Dummies1  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Drug Apps of Focal .0046  .0041  .0047  .0057  .0068 * .0095 * .0087 * 
 (.0038)  (.0038)  (.0038)  (.0040)  (.0040)  (.0043)  (.0042)  
Patents of Focal .0005 *** .0005 *** .0010 *** .0011 *** .0011 *** .0010 *** .0010 ***
 (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0002)  
Equity Financing Events .0584 † .0560 † .0633 † .0701 * .0862 ** .0821 ** .0805 ** 
 (.0329)  (.0326)  (.0325)  (.0322)  (.0328)  (.0324)  (.0323)  
Closed Stock Prices .0019  .0022  .0019  .0020  .0017  .0014  .0013  
 (.0014)  (.0014)  (.0014)  (.0013)  (.0013)  (.0013)  (.0013)  
Years as Public Status -.0206  -.0187  -.0181  -.0222 * -.0310 ** -.0366 ** -.0352 ** 
 (.0117)  (.0117)  (.0114)  (.0117)  (.0124)  (.0127)  (.0125)  
Diversification  .0286 ** .0244 ** .0203 * .0252 ** .0334 *** .0430 *** .0421 ***
 (.0087)  (.0092)  (.0089)  (.0093)  (.0103)  .0108  (.0108)  
Net Income** -3.75e-05  -1.58e-05  -3.01e-05  -2.8e-05  -3.99e-05  -3.62e-05  -3.93e-05  
 (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  
Employees* .0083  .0063  .0042  .0059  .0071  .0061  .0062  
 (.0062)  (.0061)  (.0058)  (.0059)  (.0058)  (.0058)  (.0058)  
R&D Expenses* .0001  .0001  .0001  .0001  .0001  .0001  .0001  
 (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  
Log likelihood -3108.34  -3104.52  -3097.04  -3092.50  -3087.37  -3082.04  -3082.52  
∆ Chi2 N/A  8.42 * 15.79 *** 12.97 ** 9.40 ** 8.64 † N/A  
Degree of Freedom 22  25  27  29  31  35  32  
Wald Chi2 344.15  366.24  403.69  421.16  452.59  483.12  477.33  
N 1689  1689  1689  1689  1689  1689  1689  
                       † = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001;  significance tests are two-tailed for control variables and one-tailed for hypothesized effects. 
1. Because of large numbers of additional predictors NAICS Dummies and Year Dummies are not reported in this Table (please see Appendix for complete outputs from STATA)  
2. Because of seven-year period of accumulations in several variables (i.e., direct and indirect ties), the analysis is for all observations occurred after 1992. 
3. Model#7 drops non-significant interaction variables.  This is the model that I use to test all hypotheses. 
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  Table 6.6b: The Panel Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of Marketed Drug Applications  
Predictors Model #1 Model #2 Model #3 Model #4 Model #5 Model #6 Model #7 
Constant  -.3032  -.5714  -.5966  -.2882  -.2918  -.2252  -.3694  
Upstream Horizontal        2.08e-07   
       (2.02e-07)   
Downstream  Horizontal         .0005   
        (.0003)   
Upstream Vertical        -3.47e-05 * -2.16e-05  
        (1.77e-05)  (1.8e-05)  
Downstream Vertical        7.63e-06 * 7.14e-06 * 
        (4.19e-06)  (3.29e-06)  
Partner’s Patents       -.2.43e-05  -.0003 * -.0003 ** 
       (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  
Partners’ Drugs       -.0065  -.0059 * -.0025  
       (.0051)  (.0035)  (.0045)  
Partners’ Prominence     .0003 ** .0003 ** .0003 ** .0003 ** 
     (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  
Ties’ Average Tenure     -.0329  -.0335  -.0360  -.0320  
     (.0476)  (.0477)  (.0482)  (.0476)  
Brokerages    .0004 † .0004  .0004  .0004  .0004  
    (.0003)  (.0003)  (.0003)  (.0003)  (.0003)  
Densities    -.0120 *** -.0121 *** -.0114 *** -.0116 *** -.0124 ***
    (.0036)  (.0033)  (.0036)  (.0035)  (.0037)  
Direct*Indirect   .0004  .0001  .0006  .0006  .0008   
   (.0008)  (.0008)  (.0008)  (.0008)  (.0009)   
Direct Ties  -.0102  -.0246 * -.0294 * -.0295 * -.0310 * -.0235 * 
  (.0155)  (.0141)  (.0141)  (.0143)  (.0144)  (.0107)  
Indirect Ties  .0132  .0299 † .0203  .0192  .0172  .0319 ** 
  (.0155)  (.0155)  (.0149)  (.0151)  (.0154)  (.0120)  






   Table 6.6b (Continued) 
Control Variables Model #1 Model #2 Model #3 Model #4 Model #5 Model #6 Model #7 
Year Dummies1  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
NAICS Dummies1  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drug Apps of Focal .0403 *** .0414 ** .0388 *** .0380 *** .0380 *** .0367 *** 0.373 ***
 (.0101)  (.0124)  (.0099)  (.0083)  (.0082)  (.0069)  (.0073)  
Patents of Focal .0001  .0001  -5.38e-05  -1.01e-05  -2.42e-05  -2.09e-05  3.07e-06  
 (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0002)  
Equity Financing Events -.1084 -.1072 -.1281 † -.1257 * -.1178 * -.1031  -.1133  
 (.0782) (.0669) (.0698) (.0683)  (.0675)  (.0720)  (.0778)  
Closed Stock Prices -.0064 * -.0053 † -.0033 * -.0037  -.0037 † -.0033  -.0033  
 (.0031)  (.0029)  (.0026)  (.0025)  (.0024)  (.0024)  (.0025)  
Years as Public Status .0140  .0151  .0143  .0106  .0103  .0087  .0092  
 (.0163)  (.0178)  (.0184)  (.0187)  (.0186)  (.0205)  (.0184)  
Diversification  .0535 *** .0562 *** .0570 *** .0564 *** .0572 *** .0587 *** .0566 ***
 (.0105)  (.0122)  (.0118)  (.0121)  (.0120)  (.0127)  (.0112)  
Net Income** .0002 † .0001  .0001  7.32e-10  8.12e-05  6.17e-05  .0001  
 (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  
Employees* -.0175  -.0202  -.0195  -.0162  -.0162  -.0145  -.0137  
 (.0147)  (.0151)  (.0157)  (.0161)  (.0157)  (.0160)  (.0160)  
R&D Expenses* .0004  .0005 † .0005 † .0006 † .0006 † .0006 † .0005  
 (.0003)  (.0003)  (.0003)  (.0003)  (.0003)  (.0003)  (.0003)  
Log Pseudo-likelihood -1179.82  -1386.49  -1374.58  -1365.16  -1363.75  -1358.66  -1362.16  
∆ Chi2  2.9  12.53 ** 10.64 ** 2.19  12.31 * N/A  
Degree of Freedom 22  25  27  29  31  35  32  
Wald Chi2 1729.25  2964.23  2006.76  2359.67  2560.79  6034.79  3150.26  
N 1689  1689  1689  1689  1689  1689  1689  
         † = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001;  significance tests are two-tailed for control variables and one-tailed for hypothesized effects. 
1. Because of large numbers of additional predictors NAICS Dummies and Year Dummies are not reported in this Table (please see Appendix for complete outputs from STATA)  
2. Because of seven years accumulative lags in several variables (i.e., direct and indirect ties), the analysis is for all observations occurred after 1992. 
3. Model#7 drops non-significant interaction variables.  I use all results in this model to test for all hypotheses.  





            Table 6.6c: The Panel Regression Estimates of Total Annual Sales   
        
Predictors Model #1 Model #2 Model #3 Model #4 Model #5 Model #6 
Model 
(Fixed) #7 
Constant  130.3243  78.7958  -128.2834  -590.8986  -588.0686  -577.0613  -6130.564  
Upstream Horizontal       -.0014 *** -.0014 ***
      (.0003)  (.0003)  
Downstream  Horizontal        -1.7076 *** -1.7603 ***
       (.5035)  (.4942)  
Upstream Vertical       .1353 ** .1313 ** 
       (.0474)  (.0467)  
Downstream Vertical       .0243 *** .0234 ***
       (.0047)  (.0048)  
Partner’s Patents      .4248 *** .3370 *** .3437 ***
      (.0848)  (.0993)  (.0973)  
Partners’ Drugs      3.2991 * 4.0455  3.4233  
      (3.7102)  (3.9225)  (3.8449)  
Partners’ Prominence     -.1088  -.3674 *** -.3571 *** -.3111 ***
     (.0710)  (.0880)  (.0883)  (.0869)  
Ties’ Average Tenure     68.024 * 68.8925 * 68.6065 * 57.9035 † 
     (32.6314)  (32.4226)  (31.8606)  (36.1958)  
Brokerages    4.4837 *** 4.5355 *** 4.7438 *** 5.3149 *** 4.3373 ***
    (.3319)  (.3338)  (.3338)  (.3409)  (.3631)  
Densities    -4.2936  -4.2167  -3.9617  -3.2596  -4.5902  
    (5.3483)  (5.3459)  (5.3212)  (5.2471)  (5.2698)  
Direct*Indirect   -.1442  -2.2048 *** -2.3951 *** -2.3856 *** -2.2605 *** -2.1784 ** 
   (.6671)  (.6560)  (.6619)  (.6595)  (.6822)  (.7027)  
Direct Ties  34.3910 ** -65.9707 ** -67.5208 *** -70.1489 *** -77.6504 *** -62.8015 ***
  (12.8566)  (14.3213)  (14.3397)  (14.2853)  (14.2201)  (14.8294)  
Indirect Ties  -20.8585 * 17.6121  18.5499 * 19.8435 * 17.6211  13.4454  
  (11.2032)  (11.1216)  (11.1144)  (11.0722)  (11.0687)  (11.3249)  
Selected control variables for all models are reported next page.  
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     Table 6.6c (Continued)  
 Control Variables Model #1 Model #2 Model #3 Model #4 Model #5 Model #6 Model (Fixed) #7 
Year Dummies1  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Year
NAICS Dummies1  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Dropped
Drug Apps of Focal 147.4105 *** 138.423 *** 103.3026 *** 102.9821 *** 104.4588 *** 103.9359 *** 220.8077 ***
 (14.0915)  (13.9716)  (13.2332)  (13.2073)  (13.1669)  (12.8576)  (25.0458)  
Patents of Focal 13.8958 *** 13.3903 *** 10.5171 *** 10.3995 *** 10.2827 *** 9.9110 *** 12.6972 ***
 (.5157)  (.5348)  (.5418)  (.5428)  (.5405)  (.5341)  (.7163)  
Equity Financing Events 112.9404 † 121.0456 * 91.7278 92.5070 * 98.2841 * 116.3305 * 135.1334 ** 
 (57.6315) (57.8095) (55.3488) (55.3928)  (55.0527)  (54.4288)  (53.4871)  
Closed Stock Prices -9.4200 ** -9.4057 ** -8.4651 ** -8.4658 ** -8.5565 ** -6.9179 ** -5.3540 * 
 (2.8461)  (2.8494)  (2.7222)  (2.7209)  (2.6991)  (2.6723)  (2.7211)  
Years as Public Status -44.3976  -45.0160  -22.9100  -19.1206  -18.9036  -18.2673  389.1471  
 (29.1408)  (28.4935)  (26.2879)  (26.2682)  (26.2183)  (25.4480)  (995.1599)  
Diversification  29.6431  28.3299  54.9107 * 56.1624 * 54.5925 * 51.7061 * Dropped  
 (27.1981)  (26.6196)  (24.5939)  (24.5873)  (24.5401)  (23.8489)   
Net Income** -.2797 * -.2843 ** -.2167 * -.2091 * -.1994 * -.1921 * -.1926 † 
 (.1135)  (.1135)  (.1084)  (.1084)  (.1075)  (.1059)  (.1095)  
Employees* 19.0826  19.2193  16.1514  14.0315  12.8751  14.3923  20.0806  
 (12.2325)  (12.1844)  (11.5264)  (11.5525)  (11.4827)  (11.2849)  (13.4840)  
R&D Expenses* .1623  .1565  .1341  .1557  .1513  .1278  .0953  
 (.1460)  (.1461)  (.1394)  (.1395)  (.1384)  (.1365)  (.1429)  
Overall R-sq .5878  .5952  .6527  .6539  .6573  0.6667  0.5747  
∆ Chi-sq  14.19 ** 183.42 *** 6.46 * 26.82 *** 58.77 ***  
Degree of Freedom 22  24  27  29  31  35  31  
Wald Chi2 1256.88  1284.92  1618.57  1629.94  1978.37  1799.73   
N 1689  1689  1689  1689  1689  1689  1689  
     † = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001;  significance tests are two-tailed for control variables and one-tailed for hypothesized effects. 
1. Because of large numbers of additional predictors NAICS Dummies and Year Dummies are not reported in this Table (please see Appendix for complete outputs from STATA)  
2. Because of seven years accumulative lags in several variables (i.e., direct and indirect ties), the analysis is for all observations occurred after 1992. 
3. Since all interaction variables are significant, I use Model#6 to test all hypotheses.  




Model 3 adds the two measures (brokerages and density) of structural holes variables.  Model 
4 includes two other network measures: Ties’ average tenure and partners’ prominence to test for 
the impact of tie-strength and reputation of partners.  The next two variables—number of 
partners’ patents (exploration partners) and number of partners’ successful drug applications 
(exploitation partners)—are added in Model 5.  Model 6 adds four variables: upstream horizontal 
ties, downstream horizontal ties, upstream vertical ties, and downstream vertical ties.  While 
these four variables complete the specification for Model 6, Model 7 drops non-significant 
network measures for hypothesis testing.  
Table 6.6c shows results of panel regression analysis for total sales.  Since the interaction 
predictors are significant in Model 6, this particular model tests the hypotheses.  Model 7 in 
Table 6.6c reports the findings of the fixed-effects model, to check for the robustness of the 
findings from the random-effects GLS regression model.   
The first set of hypotheses predicted that the number of direct ties and indirect ties should 
have positive impacts on firm invention and commercialization outputs.  A prediction was also 
presented that the impact of interaction between direct ties and indirect ties would be negatively 
associated with invention, but positively associated with commercialization.  The coefficient of 
direct ties in the patents model is significant and supported the hypothesis.  The coefficients of 
direct ties for the marketed drug applications and sales are also significant, but suggest negative 
associations.  These results do not support the hypotheses in the study.  The coefficient of 
indirect ties is only significant in the marketed drug applications model in Table 6.6b.  However, 
because the coefficient suggests a negative relationship, the hypothesis is not supported.  Next, 
the interaction variable of direct and indirect ties is significant in Model 7, Table 6.6a (patenting 
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rates), but not significant for marketed drug applications in Model 6, Table 6.6b and for revenue 
in Model 6, Table 6.6c.   
 Hierachical analyses indicate that adding interaction terms significantly improves model fit.  
The study tested the change of log likelihood and the change of overall R-squared after inclusive 
of the interaction terms in the two models.  The results show that by including the interaction 
term for direct and indirect ties in the patents model (Table 6.6a) and the sales model (Table 
6.6c), the log likihood changed significantly in Model 7, Table 6.6a (∆ Log-Likelihood = 4.74; p 
= 0.0294); however, the change in R-squared is not significant in the revenue Model 6, Table 
6.6c (∆ overall R-squared = .011; ∆ chi2 (1) = 0.05; p > 0.8289).     
 Since the model to predict the number of market drug applications has no significant 
interaction effect (thus, the rejection of H1f (c)), the effects of direct ties and indirect ties are 
significant (B = -0.235 and .0319; p < .05 and .01, respectively).  However, as the direction of 
the coefficient for direct ties is opposite of the earlier prediction, the study rejects H1d (c) and 
accepts H1e (c).  To interpret the effects of the main predictors (i.e., direct and indirect ties) in a 
model containing a significant interaction effect (direct ties*indirect ties), conditional analyses 
are needed (Aiken & West, 1991).  The conditional analyses take into account that the significant 
interaction term (i.e., XZ) indicates that the regression of the dependent variable (Y) on the first 
predictor (X) depends upon the specific value of the second predictor (Z), at which the slope of 
Y on X is measured.  Because the interaction is symmetrical, the presence of the interaction 
means that the effect of the second predictor (Z) is also conditional on the first predictor (X): 
there is a different regression coefficient of Y on Z at each value of X.   
 Aiken & West (1991) suggested calculating simple slopes for the variable of interest 
conditional on reasonable value of the moderator.  They suggested that reasonable moderator 
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values are the mean, the mean minus one standard deviation, and the mean plus one standard 
deviation.  Because the number of direct and indirect ties cannot be negative (i.e., they are count 
and non-negative integers), these analyses offer the value “zero” of direct and indirect ties to 
illustrate the significant contributions of the two predictors at the lowest possible value.  To 
determine whether the simple slope is significantly different from zero requires the calculation of 
the standard errors.  T-tests for the significance of the simple slopes were computed (Aiken et al., 
1991).  These conditional analyses led to the following results:  
 [∂ Patenting Rates/∂ Direct Ties | Indirect Ties = 0.00]     = .0206*** (.0055) 
 [∂ Patenting Rates/∂ Direct Ties | Indirect Ties = 3.12]     = .0187*** (.0052) 
 [∂ Patenting Rates/∂ Direct Ties | Indirect Ties = 9.70]     = .0148**   (.0049) 
 
 [∂ Patenting Rates/∂ Indirect | Direct = 0.00]     = .0020 (.0071) 
 [∂ Patenting Rates/∂ indirect | Direct = 4.94]     = -.0010 (.0052) 
 [∂ Patenting Rates/∂ indirect | Direct = 13.48]   = -.0062 (.0049). 
 
 The conditional analyses reveal that direct ties have a significantly positive effect on the 
number of patents across reasonable values, supporting H1a.  However, indirect ties have no 
significant effect on patenting rates at any level of direct ties.  From the conditional analysis, the 
coefficient of direct ties is positive and significant on the patenting rates of the focal firms, 
supporting H1a (i); (B = .0206; p < 0.001).  With regard to the interaction effect of direct and 
indirect ties, I found that the negative coefficient of the interaction variable is significant (B = -
.0006; p < .01).  The finding supports H1c (i), predicting the negative moderator in the model.      
In the case of sales model (Table 6.6c), the significant interaction term requires a conditional 
analyses: 
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  [∂ Sales/∂ Direct Ties | Indirect Ties = 0.00]     = -77.65*** (14.22) 
 [∂ Sales/∂ Direct Ties | Indirect Ties = 3.12]     = -84.71*** (13.39) 
 [∂ Sales/∂ Direct Ties | Indirect Ties = 9.70]     = -99.59*** (12.69) 
 
 [∂ Sales/∂ Indirect | Direct = 0.00]     = 17.62† (11.07) 
 [∂ Sales/∂ Indirect | Direct = 4.94]     = 6.45 (9.35) 
 [∂ Sales/∂ Indirect | Direct = 13.48]   = -12.84 (8.95). 
 
The coefficients of direct ties are negative and significant across all three reasonable levels of 
indirect ties.  This suggests the negative contributions of direct ties to sales.  Thus, the study 
rejects H1d (c).  With regard to the interaction effect on commercialization performance, the 
final model from Table 6.6c suggests that the interaction of direct and indirect ties reduces sales 
(B = -2.2605; p < .01).  Therefore, the outcome rejects H1f (c), because the hypothesis predicted 
the opposite direction.  
To further probe the impact of direct and indirect ties on the three dependent variables, some 
quantitative indication of the interaction effect could illustrate the impact of the variables on both 
invention and commercialization.  Suppose that a firm is at the mean levels of direct ties (5) and 
indirect ties (3).  For this firm, direct ties increase the patenting rate by a multiplier of 1.099 
(=exp [.0206*5 - .0006*5*3]).  The other firm has the same number of indirect ties, but with a 
higher number of direct ties (a mean + a standard deviation).  For this firm, direct ties increase 
the patenting rate by a multiplier of 1.301 (= exp [.0206*14 - .0006*14*3]).  From the results, 
while a focal firm could generate 11 (= 1.099*9.96) patents on an average, adding the number of 
direct partners by one standard deviation (9) greatly improves the number of patents by 2 [= 
(1.301*9.96)-(1.099*9.96)].     
With regard to the second set of hypotheses, the impact of the number of structural holes 
among direct and indirect ties of a focal firm will have a negative effect on invention 
performance and positive effect on commercialization performance.  In my study, density and 
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brokerage are the two dimensions that theoretically capture the characteristics of a focal firm’s 
level of structural holes.  The density measure is the number of ties divided by the number of 
pairs, whereas the brokerage measure is the number of pairs in the ego network that are not 
directly connected to each other.  As both measures capture structural holes, the measures should 
be highly negative correlated.  The correlation coefficient of these two indicators turned out to be 
an insignificant level (r = -.01; p = .6483), however.   
 Figure 6.1 depicts two scenarios using the two measures—density and brokerage—to capture 
the characteristics of structural holes.  Whereas the two networks are different, the density 
measures are the same at 50%.  In either Situation A or B, if the actual relationship is half of the 
possible relationships, the density is always at 50%.  The brokerage numbers in Situation A and 
B, however, are obviously different as they indicate the unconnected direct partners in the two 
different networks.  Depending on the size of the networks, the low measures of density might 
not necessarily represent the high level of brokerage.   
    
 Figure 6.4 Two Scenarios of Density and Brokerage Measures  
 
The regression coefficients of density and brokerage for the number of patents in Table 6.6a 






Density = 50% 






Density = 50% 
Brokerage = 3 
3
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low level of structural holes, whereas a high brokerage suggests a high level of structural holes.  
Therefore, the significant findings in this model support H2 (i).  On average (when a focal firm 
has a density and a brokerage measure at mean levels), the incident rates of density and of 
brokerage to generate the number of patents are the multipliers of 1.014 = exp (.0079*1.78) and 
0.958 = exp (-.0005*85).  However, additional increases in density and brokerage by one 
standard deviations (8.7 and 323) change the multipliers to 1.086 = exp (.0079*10.48) and to 
0.8509 = exp (-.0005*323), respectively. 
Next, the coefficient of density for the number of marketed drug applications in Table 6.6b is 
negative and significant (B = -.0124; p < .001).  The incident rate in this case is .9782 = exp (-
.0124*1.78).  Additionally, in Table 6.6c, the coefficient of brokerage is positive and significant 
(B = 4.3373; p < .001).  On average, one unit increased in a brokerage measure generates 
revenue by $4.3373 MM.  From the results, the significant findings for the density in the 
marketed drug applications model and the brokerage in the sales model supported H2 (c).     
From the patents model (Table 6.6a) and the sales model (Table 6.6c), the coefficients of the 
tie strength, as measured by the average length of ties, are significant (B = -.0660; p < .01 and 
68.6065; p < .05).  Interestingly, whereas H3 (i) predicts that the strength of ties should increase 
the number of patents generated and H3 (c) predicts that the strength of ties should decrease the 
commercialization output, both findings indicate opposite effects.  From both models, the 
coefficients of the tie strength suggest a negative association with the focal firm’s patenting rate 
and a positive association with the focal firm’s revenue.  The coefficient of tie strength for the 
marketed drug application is negative, but non-significant.  These results suggest a lack of 
support for the hypothesized effects of strength of ties on invention and commercialization.   
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Next, the alliances’ prominence—as measured by the frequencies of direct partners’ news 
articles in the past ten years—is predicted to deteriorate the focal firm’s invention while 
facilitating its commercialization performance, yet the coefficient of the partners’ prominence 
has no significant effect on the number of patents.  However, the coefficients are positive for the 
number of marketed drug applications (B = .0003; p < .01 and negative for the revenues of the 
focal firms (B = -.3571; p < .001).  Therefore, these first findings provide a support for H4 (c) 
with regard to the marketed drug applications, but not with regard to sales.  To calculate for the 
incident rate ratio of partners’ prominence, the multiplier on the marketed drug applications is 
1.059 = exp (.0003*192) when a focal firm has its partners’ prominence at the mean level (192).  
An additional increase by one standard deviation in its partners’ prominence helps improve the 
incident rate ratio by 1.237 = exp (.0003*(192+516)). 
With regard to the focal firm’s network orientations, exploration and exploitation networks—
as measured by the two corresponding proxies of the number of partners’ patents and the number 
of partners’ successful drug applications in the past ten years prior to the collaboration—there is 
no significant effect on invention outcomes in Model 6 (Table 6.6a).  However, in Model 7, the 
model that includes only one significant interaction variable—a downstream vertical network—
the number of partners’ drugs has a negative coefficient (B = -.0067), which is significant at p < 
.05.  Since the exploitation network, as measured by the number of partners’ drugs, is not a main 
predictor for any interaction variable in the model, the study uses the available coefficient to 
accept H 5b (i); predicting that a greater preponderance of exploitation-oriented relationships 
will reduce the patenting performance of the focal firm.  To test the incident rate of the variable, 
the exploitation network, as captured by the number of partners’ drugs on an average (2), will 
deteriorate the number of patents of a focal firm by the multiplier of 0.987 = exp (-.0067*2).  An 
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additional increase by one standard deviation in the exploitation network reduces the multiplier 
to 0.929 = exp (-.0067*(2+9)).  
To evaluate the significance of the exploration-oriented partners as measured by the number 
of patents acquired by a focal firm’s partners, the study conducted the conditional analysis.  
Because the downstream vertical network which is the interaction term (the propensity of the 
focal firm to obtain the drug applications at the FDA * Exploration-oriented partners) is included 
in the model, the conditional analysis is needed to evaluate the contribution of an exploration-
oriented partner at different reasonable levels of the focal firm’s drug applications.   
 [∂ Patenting Rates/∂ Explor Partners | Focal Drug = 0.00]     = .0000 (.0050) 
 [∂ Patenting Rates/∂ Explor Partners | Focal Drug = 3.03]     = .0000 (.0027) 
 [∂ Patenting Rates/∂ Explor Partners | Focal Drug = 16.32]   = -.0001 (.0063) 
 
 From the conditional analyses, exploration partners have no significant effect on patenting 
across reasonable levels of a focal firm’s propensity to issue drugs at the FDA.  Therefore, 
downstream vertical networks, indicating collaboration between an exploitation focal firm and its 
exploration partners, have no significant effect on the number of patents. Thus, H5a (i) is 
rejected.  Next, the coefficient of exploration partners is negative and significant for the number 
of marketed drug applications (B = -.0003; p < .01).  In this particular model, the downstream 
vertical network is significant and included in the regression equation; therefore, the conditional 
analysis is required to evaluate the contributions of exploration partners to the dependent 
variable across reasonable levels of a focal firm’s propensity to obtain the drug applications at 
the FDA.   
[∂ Mkt Drug Apps /∂ Explor Partners | Focal Drug = 0.00]     = -.0003** (.0001) 
[∂ Mkt Drug Apps /∂ Explor Partners | Focal Drug = 3.03]     = -.0002** (.0001) 
[∂ Mkt Drug Apps /∂ Explor Partners | Focal Drug = 16.32]   = -.0002*   (.0001) 
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 From the conditional analyses, the effects of exploration partners on the number of marketed 
drug applications are all negative and significant at the three reasonable levels of the moderator 
variable.  The exploration partners deteriorate the number of marketed drug applications of a 
focal firm.  Thus, H5c (c) is supported.  To report the incident rate ratio of the average number of 
exploration partners on the number of marketed drug applications, the study calculates the 
following multiplier, exp (-.0003*107 - 7.14e-06*107*77) = 0.913.  Adding additional 
exploration partners by one standard deviation reduces the multipler to = exp (-.0003*(107+478) 
- 7.14e-06*(107+478)*77) = 0.6083.  On average, adding exploration partners at the mean level 
vastly deteriorates a focal firm’s number of marketed drug applications from 5 = (6*0.913) 
applications to about 4 = (6*0.608) applications, or 20% fewer.  With regard to the exploitation 
partners, the marketed drug applications model (Table 6.6b) indicates non-significant results.  
Thus, H5d (c) is rejected.   
In Table 6.6c, the interpretation of impacts of the exploration and exploitation partners on 
sales becomes more complicated as the four interaction variables—upstream horizontal, 
downstream horizontal, upstream vertical, and downstream vertical networks—are all significant 
and thus used for hypothesis testing (Model 7).  To understand the contributions of exploration 
and exploitation partners to sales, the two-way interaction conditional analyses are needed.  For 
instance, the interpretation of the main predictor—exploration partners—requires the point 
estimations of the other two main predictors—the focal firms’ propensity to invention and its 
propensity to commercialization.  This is because the three predictors together generate the 
upstream horizontal and downstream vertical networks (the two significant interaction variables 
in the regression equation).  Therefore, to understand the contributions of the exploration 
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partners on sales, the reasonable values from the associated two main predictors are substituted 
(Aiken & West, 1991).   
[∂ Sales /∂ Explor Partners | Focal Drugs = 0.00, Focal Patents = 0.00]  = 0.3370***     (0.0993) 
[∂ Sales /∂ Explor Partners | Focal Drugs = 0.00, Focal Patents = 76.91] = 0.2299***    (0.0941) 
[∂ Sales /∂ Explor Partners | Focal Drugs = 0.00, Focal Patents = 376.86] = -0.1876       (0.1217) 
 
[∂ Sales /∂ Explor Partners | Focal Drugs = 3.03, Focal Patents = 0.00]    = 0.4108***  (0.0094) 
[∂ Sales /∂ Explor Partners | Focal Drugs = 3.03, Focal Patents = 76.91]   = 0.3038*** (0.0887) 
[∂ Sales /∂ Explor Partners | Focal Drugs = 3.03, Focal Patents = 376.86] = -0.1137      (0.1190) 
 
[∂ Sales /∂ Explor Partners | Focal Drugs = 16.32, Focal Patents = 0.00]   = 0.7344*** (0.0943) 
[∂ Sales /∂ Explor Partners | Focal Drugs = 16.32, Focal Patents = 76.91] = 0.6273*** (0.0913) 
[∂ Sales /∂ Explor Partners | Focal Drugs = 16.32, Focal Patents = 376.86]  = 0.2100†   (0.1271) 
 Interestingly, the exploration partners contribute significantly and positively to sales if the 
focal firm’s patenting rates are low and moderate (at zero and at its mean).  When the number of 
the focal firm’s patents is high (at mean plus one standard deviation), the exploration partners 
contribute immaterially to sales.  Therefore, the two interaction conditional analyses support the 
hypothesized effects of exploration partners on sales, H5c (c), at firms with previous patents 
below 107 (a mean level).  Next, the study offers a nine point estimation to test for the significant 
contributions of the exploitation partners to sales.   
[∂ Sales /∂ Exploit Partners | Focal Drugs = 0.00, Focal Patents = 0.00]    = 4.0455        (3.9225) 
[∂ Sales /∂ Exploit Partners | Focal Drugs = 0.00, Focal Patents = 76.91]   = 14.4599*** (4.6530) 
[∂ Sales /∂ Exploit Partners | Focal Drugs = 0.00, Focal Patents = 376.86] = 5.0261*** (17.3312) 
 
[∂ Sales /∂ Exploit Partners | Focal Drugs = 3.03, Focal Patents = 0.00]    = -1.134      (4.0076)  
[∂ Sales /∂ Exploit Partners | Focal Drugs = 3.03, Focal Patents = 76.91]   = 9.27*       (4.70)  
[∂ Sales /∂ Exploit Partners | Focal Drugs = 3.03, Focal Patents = 376.86] = 49.84*** (17.31) 
 
[∂ Sales /∂ Exploit Partners | Focal Drugs = 16.32, Focal Patents = 0.00] = -23.8286*** (8.6029)  
[∂ Sales /∂ Exploit Partners | Focal Drugs = 16.32, Focal Patents = 76.91] = -13.42†        (8.88) 
[∂ Sales /∂ Exploit Partners | Focal Drugs = 16.32, Focal Patents = 376.86]  = 27.15†      (18.76) 
 The two-way interaction conditional analysis indicates that of the five significant regression 
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coefficients, four are positive.  These findings offer support for H5d (C), except for firms with 
low levels of previous patents and high levels of previous drug applications.  Without the 
aforementioned exception, exploitation partners have a positive effect on sales.     
 The last set of hypotheses deals with four interaction variables—upstream horizontal 
network, downstream horizontal network, upstream vertical network, and downstream vertical 
network.  The upstream horizontal network measure was generated by multiplying the propensity 
of a focal firm’s patenting rates with the exploration network measure from a previous set of 
hypotheses.  The downstream horizontal network measure is also a product of the propensity of a 
focal firm’s drug applications and the exploitation network measure from a previous set of 
hypotheses.  Further, the upstream and downstream vertical networks are a product of the 
propensity of a focal firm’s patenting rates and its exploitation network measure and a product of 
the propensity of a focal firm’s prior drug applications and its exploration network measure, 
respectively.   
In the upstream and downstream horizontal networks effects on patents (Model 6, Table 6.6a), 
there is no statistical support for H6a (i) and b (i) (B = 1.05e-08; p > 0.911 and B = .0002; p > 
0.347).  Likewise, the upstream and downstream horizontal networks contribute non-significant 
results to the number of drug applications (Model 6, Table 6.6b) (B = 2.08e-07; p > 0.303 and B 
= .0005; p > 0.138).  Therefore, the study does not include these network variables in the final 
model of patents (Table 6.6a) and in the marketed drug applications model (Table 6.6b).   
With regard to the revenue model (Table 6.6c), the study tested for the improvement of model 
fit and found that the inclusions of upstream and downstream horizontal network variables on the 
revenue model do not improve the overall R-squared at all.  These findings raise concerns of 
multicollinearity in the variables and cautiously flag the interpretation of the results.  With regard 
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to the coefficients, however, the effects of upstream and downstream horizontal networks on 
revenue are negative and significant (B = -.0014 and -1.7076; p < .001, respectively) (Model 6, 
Table 6.6c).  The former finding supports H6c (c), whereas the latter finding rejects H6d (c).   
As for the tests to understand the impact of upstream and downstream vertical networks on 
patents, only the downstream vertical network yields a negative and significant coefficient in 
Model 7, Table 6.6a (B = -8.40e-06; p < .01).  This result supports H6g (i), predicting a negative 
relationship of the downstream vertical network on invention performance.  Due to the non-
significant finding for the effect of upstream vertical networks on patents (Model 6, Table 6.6a), 
H6e (i) was rejected.  The study tested for the improvement of model fit after adding a 
downstream vertical network.  The results suggest that the interaction variable improves the 
model fit (∆ Log-Likelihood = 9.70; p = 0.0018). 
With regard to the model of marketed drug applications (Table 6.6b), only the downstream 
vertical network positively influences the number of marketed drug applications in Model 7, 
Table 6.6b (B = 7.14e-06; p < .05).  This finding supports H6h (c).  Adding the downstream 
vertical network variable also improves the model fit (∆ Log-Likelihood = 2; p < 0.05).  For the 
focal firm’s revenue, the coefficients of the upstream and downstream vertical networks in Table 
6.6c are both positive and significant in Model 7, Table 6.6c (B = .1353 and .0243; p <.01 and 
.001).  To test for the improvement of model fit after the inclusions of each interaction variable 
for the revenue model, hierachical analyses are used.  After omitting each variable from Model 7 
(Table 6.6c), the overall R-squared does not reduce.  These findings raise concerns of 
multicollinearity in the variables and cautiously flag the interpretation of the results.  However, 
the significant coefficients indicate that H6f (c) and H6h (c) are supported.  
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The following example illustrates the supplementary moderating effect of downstream 
vertical networks on the number of marketed drug applications.  Adding one standard deviation 
of the partners’ patents, a focal firm’s multiplier of the number of marketed drug applications—
as generated by its own patents—increases significantly.  Suppose a focal firm has three 
biotechnological drugs (at the mean level), generated in the past ten years.  The firm deals with 
the exploration alliances that possess 107 patents altogether (the mean level).  For this firm, the 
multiplier of marketed drug applications is 1.001 [= exp (-.0003*(3) + 7.14-e06*(3)*(107))].  For 
the other firm, which shares everything in common with the previous firm, the number of 
partners’ patents is greater by one standard deviation.  The multiplier of marketed drug 
applications is increased to 1.012 [=exp (-.0003*(3) + 7.14-e06 *(3)*(107+478))].   
 As for the last hypothesis, which predicted that most predictors should have a positive or 
negative effect on the dependent variables, the findings are mixed.  Table 6.7 summarizes effects 
of the different independent variables for invention and commercialization, with 24 of 39 effects 
shown as statistically significant.  Of the 24 significant effects, 6 were not in the hypothesized 
direction.  Therefore, based on the limited significant findings, only six predictors are potential 
candidates for identification as to whether the last hypothesis is supported or not.   
 However, this study will not include the two significant interaction variables—direct*indirect 
ties and downstream vertical networks in determining the trade-off position between invention 
and commercialization.  Although the coefficients of interaction variables could suggest positive 
or negative directions, the variables do not influence the dependent variables directly.  
Specifically, the interaction variables work through the main predictors, displaying substitutional 
or supplementary effects on the dependent variables.  Therefore, the final five main predictors 
are used for testing Hypothesis 7.  First, in regard t o the impact of the number of direct partners 
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on patents, marketed drug applications and revenues, the directions of the coefficients of direct 
partners are opposite and significant between invention and commercialization activities.  
Therefore, the number of direct ties is the first predictor that supports H7.   















Direct Ties  + + + (-) (-) Yes 
Indirect Ties  + + N/S + N/S N/S 
Direct*Indirect Ties  - + - N/S (-) Excluded 
Structural Holes 
(Density) + - + - - Yes 
Structural Holes 
(Brokerage) - + - N/S + Yes 
Strength of Ties + - (-) N/S (+) Yes 
Prominence of Ties - + N/S + (-) N/S 
Exploration Ties + - N/S - N/S N/S 
Exploitation Ties - + - N/S N/S N/S 
Upstream Horizontal  + - N/S N/S - N/S 
Downstream Horizontal  - + N/S N/S - N/S 
Upstream Vertical  - + N/S N/S + N/S 
Downstream Vertical  - + - + + Excluded 
 1. The bold predictors provide results that support H7.      
 2. The signs in the parentheses indicate significant findings that are not consistent with the hypotheses. 
 3. N/S is a Non-significant finding; only results that significant at p <.05 are included. 
 
 Second, it is clear that the two measures of structural holes—density and brokerage—suggest 
a trade-off position between invention and commercialization outcome.  Therefore, these 
measures are the second and third predictors that support H7.  Third, although the significant 
findings in terms of strength of ties are inconsistent with the hypotheses, the findings suggest 
opposite directions between invention and commercialization outcomes.  Thus, these findings 
indicate that strength of ties is the fourth predictor supporting the argument of H7.  Therefore, all 
four significant main predictors in the study suggest that interfirm networks could provide a 
trade-off position between invention and commercialization outcomes.   
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 Although prior studies argued that the interfirm network contributes toward innovation 
(Ahuja, 2000a; Baum et al., 2000), these studies did not recognize or take into account the 
critical fact that the innovation process is a lengthy and complex process, comprising, at least, 
invention and commercialization activities.  Greve (2003) claimed that innovation research will 
be enriched if more studies take into account the difference between developing (inventing) and 
launching (commercializing) innovation.  He argued that firms could generate inventions, the 
vast majority of which are little worth; however, some inventions are extremely important and 
valuable.  Therefore, if scholars pay attention to only one activity at a time, knowledge regarding 
the innovation process as a whole will never be complete or moving forward.      
 Schumpter (1939) posited that the making of the invention and the carrying out of the 
corresponding commercialization comprise two entirely different processes, economically and 
sociologically.  This study confirms that invention and commercialization react differently upon 
the same set of interfirm variables.  In an examination of these interfirm variables, the study 
frames why some firms generate a substantial numbers of patents that are worth little to the 
firms, and why other firms generate only a few patents, yet these patents are successfully 
commercial.   
 Consistent with prior studies, the study indicates that a focal firm’s direct ties and a low level 
of structural holes contribute to its invention performance (Ahuja, 2000a).  Additionally, the 
prominence of a focal firm’s partners improves the number of new products, together with 
product marketability status (Stuart, 2000).  In addition to these consistent results, the study 
examines several other relationships between interfirm variables and product innovation 
outcomes.  Table 7.1 illustrates the potential contributions of this study in the areas that have not 
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yet been empirically examined (the shade areas in the first three columns).  The shade areas in 
the last three columns indicate the currently empirical findings that potentially contribute to the 
product innovation literature.   













Direct Ties  + + + + (-) (-) 
Indirect Ties  + + + N/S + N/S 
Direct*Indirect Ties  - + + - N/S (-) 
Structural Holes (Density) + - - + - - 
Structural Holes (Brokerage) - + + - N/S + 
Strength of Ties + - - (-) N/S (+) 
Prominence of Ties - + + N/S + (-) 
Exploration Ties + - - N/S - N/S 
Exploitation Ties - + + - N/S N/S 
Upstream Horizontal  + - - N/S N/S - 
Downstream Horizontal  - + + N/S N/S - 
Upstream Vertical  - + + N/S N/S + 
Downstream Vertical  - + + - + + 
 
Potential Contributions  
& Hypotheses 
Empirical Contributions  
from this Study  
    N/S is Non-Significant.   
      ( ) is Opposite Direction of the Hypothesis. 
      Density represents a low level of structural holes; brokerage represents a high level of structural holes. 
 
Although 4 out of 16 findings in the study are opposite directions, compared to the hypothesized 
directions, these findings provide important clues for future research to examine the effects of 
direct, indirect ties, and strength of ties upon the product innovation performance.  With regard 
to 12 significant findings that are consistent with my hypotheses, I found that exploitation 
partners and downstream vertical networks are associated with reduced invention performance.  
Indirect partners and structural holes are associated with commercialization performance.  In 
addition, horizontal networks are associated with detrimental commercialization, whereas 
vertical networks are associated with beneficial commercialization.   
 The study extends the concept of commercialization by probing the two commercialization 
performances—the number of marketed drug applications and revenues.  Interestingly, I found 
that the number of marketed drug applications may not be the only indicator to measure 
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commercialization performance.  Several firms such as ISIS Pharmaceuticals and Amgen during 
1986 and 2003 could generate substantial revenues, but these firms rarely possessed the FDA’s 
marketed drug applications.  The fact that these firms engaged in upstream positions of the drug 
development process, licensed their technologies to the downstream partners, and significantly 
enhanced their revenues, indicates that commercialization is a complex and lengthy activity.  
Accordingly, at least two measurements are proven to capture commercialization performance.    
The integrated framework of invention and commercialization actitvities extends the 
understanding of these several dimensions of the interfirm network beyond invention or 
commercialization outcomes.  Importantly, scholars or practitioners may not recognize that these 
dimensions could either facilitate or harm invention and commercialization activities.  Using the 
integrated framework to understand the impact of interfirm networks on product innovation 
process provides fuller perspectives for both strategic management scholars and practitioners by 
enhancing the performance of the organization.     
7.1 Revisited Significant Predictors 
7.1.1 Direct and Indirect Ties 
 This study offers results that confirm the importance of direct and indirect ties toward 
invention outcomes (Ahuja, 2000a).  However, while Ahuja (2000a) found that both direct and 
indirect ties contribute to invention outcomes, my study found no significant contribution of 
indirect ties to invention outcomes.  As mentioned earlier, this study’s count of the number of 
indirect ties reflects only the limited number of firms listed in the BioScan directory.  
Accordingly, the study showed less than the actual number of indirect ties of focal firms.  
Therefore the limited information may undervalue the effects of indirect ties on invention 
outcomes.   
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Despite the indirect ties being a non-significant factor, the interaction effect of direct and 
indirect ties indicates the involvement of indirect ties as a critical moderator.  Ahuja wrote:  
 In many networks, indirect ties simultaneously play two different roles vis-à-vis the focal 
 actor.  On the one hand, they are resources that extend the actor’s reach in the network and 
 improve his or her access to information.  On the other hand, in many networks, such indirect 
 ties are also competitors of the focal actor in terms of using such information (2000: 449).  
The higher number of indirect ties implies a higher number of potential competitors who share 
the limited resources of focal firms’ direct partners.  Once the limited resources necessary to 
generate invention activities are shared and split among the focal firms and their indirect ties, the 
focal firms’ capability to generate invention is reduced.  Accordingly, the negative interaction 
effect of direct and indirect ties on patenting rates is consistent with Ahuja (2000a).     
 Interestingly, direct ties contribute negatively to both revenue and the number of marketed 
drug applications.  Further, the interaction effect between the direct and indirect ties suggests a 
substitutional influence upon the revenue.  The negative effects of direct ties and the interaction 
variable on commercialization performance are unexpected.  Previously, the study assumed that 
a focal firm regards both direct and indirect ties as opinion leaders that could effectively and 
quickly build the critical mass for its commercialization (Rogers, 1995).  However, the findings 
show that there is little reason that direct ties would assist the focal firm’s commercialization 
activities without reducing the focal firm’s revenue and opportunities to generate the marketed 
drug applications.   
The positive effects of indirect ties upon the focal firm’s marketed drug applications support 
the study’s hypothesis.  Because a firm’s indirect ties can serve as a channel for knowledge spill-
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over, Ahuja (2000a) argued that indirect ties contribute positively and significantly to the focal 
firm’s abilities to introduce and to maintain the marketable status of new products in the market.  
7.1.2 Structural Holes (Density and Brokerage) 
 According to several prior studies, the impact of structural holes upon organizational 
outcomes is proven and wide-ranging.  Burt (1997) specified information and control advantages 
as two important benefits of structural holes, whereas Ahuja (2000a) found that high magnitudes 
of disconnections among partners (a high level of structural holes) would decrease the number of 
patents in firms operating in the chemical industry.  Using the institutional perspectives, 
Hargadon and Sutton (1997) argued that a high level of structural holes allows the product 
development firm—called IDEO—to be successful in terms of meeting and satisfying its diverse 
customers’ demands.      
 The results of my study confirm the findings of Hargadon and Sutton (1997) and Ahuja 
(2000a), regarding the empirical relationships between the two measures of structural holes (e.g., 
the ego network’s density and brokerage) and invention and commercialization.  It appears that 
high density and low brokerage positions offer the benefits by increasing trust, by developing 
and improving collaboration routines, and by reducing opportunism.  In the context of invention 
outcomes, these benefits outweigh the disadvantages of lacking any new information provided 
by low density and high brokerage positions in a firm’s network.  The arguments are supported 
by Walker, Kogut and Shan’s (1997) suggestion that the formation of network structure in the 
biotechnology industry empirically aims for the long-term benefits of interfirm collaboration 
over the short-term benefits of brokering opportunities.  Apparently, the focal firm’s brokerage 
opportunities and low density network reduce the special relationships and trust that are used to 
generate increased patents within alliances.   
 172
With regard to the impact of the density measure and the brokerage measure on 
commercialization outcomes, the study finds that a high density in the focal firm’s network 
decreases the number of marketed drug applications.  As Ahuja (2000a) averred, the impact of 
different network attributes and positions may only be understood relative to a particular context.  
For the number of marketed drug applications, a high density-alliance network reduces a focal 
firm’s capability to obtain the FDA’s approvals and to maintain the marketable status of its drug 
applications on the market.  The redundant information among partners does not permit the focal 
firm to discover unique marketing opportunities and attain success in commercialization 
activities within a dense network. 
According to the findings, a focal firm should rely on a low density network position to 
generate marketed drug applications.  By collaborating with isolated partners (and thus building 
a low density network), the focal firm receives non-redundant information about its business 
opportunities to enhance its capabilities to meet demands of customers and in so doing, maintain 
the marketable status of its products.  This argument is consistent with Hargadon and Sutton’s 
(1997) suggestions that low density levels among partners help a focal firm to effectively offer 
the products and to understand the unique demands of the consumers in a greater number of 
market segments (Hargadon et al., 1997).   
Further, a high brokerage level, coupled with a low density in a focal firm’s network, proved 
to be useful to the focal firm’s revenue.  This finding is consistent with a recent study, suggesting 
that brokers between disconnected partners normally benefit from their positions, yet the 
brokerage benefits primarily rely on the number of resourceful partners in the network (Bae & 
Gargiulo, 2004).  At the stage when generating revenue is a primary objective, the bridge 
positions are significantly beneficial to a focal firm.  Due to the costs associated with securing 
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cooperative ties with resourceful partners (i.e., isolated partners with potential technologies) in 
the biopharmaceutical industry, focal firms, acting to maximize revenues, rely on as many 
bridges as firms can possibly establish between the small number of resourceful partners and the 
large number of other downstream partners.   
7.1.3 Strength of Ties 
Theoretically, a strong tie is better than a weak tie in conveying technical knowledge 
between organizational units (Hansen, 1999).  Among biopharmaceutical firms, Silverman and 
Buam (2002) found that successful biotech university scientists, whose research efforts have a 
tremendous impact on biotechnology firms’ success, rarely interacted or associated with more 
than one firm at a time.  Shan et al., (1994) also found that 85% of the biopharmaceutical 
alliances from the early 1970s were maintained through 1989.  Apparently, firms in the 
biopharmaceutical industry established strong relationships with their partners.  Using the 
average length of interfirm network, the study hypothesized that a focal firm’s strong-tie network 
should contribute to its invention performance and that a focal firm’s weak-tie network should 
correspond to its commercialization performance.   
Unfortunately, the empirical findings of the study suggest that the average relationship 
length between a focal firm and its direct partners not only contributes negatively to the 
invention outcome, but it also significantly improves commercialization as measured by 
increased revenue.  These unexpected findings suggest that the measurements of tie-strength may 
be limited or flawed.  Accordingly, this study will speculate upon measurements of these 
variables and their impacts upon invention and commercialization.  
 Using a key insight from organizational learning literature, the study regards focal firms that 
engage in multiple projects with many new partners in a short time frame as exploration firms; 
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additionally, the focal firms that maintain and continuously exploit relationships with existing 
partners are recognized as exploitation firms.  Exploitation, or the ongoing use of a firm’s 
knowledge base (existing network), helps an organization to refine current routines in marketing, 
logistics, and sales.  Exploration, in contrast, enables a focal firm to renew and generate 
knowledge base (potential network), but in this case, the process is costly (March, 1991; 
Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001).     
 By maintaining and exploiting its existing partners, a focal firm simultaneously consumes 
and burns knowledge resources in order to win in marketing competition.  This process generates 
revenues, yet it reduces the chance to accumulate and establish a new knowledge base—the 
number of patents.  In contrast, by searching and collaborating with new partners, a focal firm is 
exploring and attempting to establish new knowledge and relevant technologies.  Thus, this firm 
learns substantially from its alliances in terms of technologies and increases its patenting rates.  
However, because learning is always costly, the particular firm sacrifices the opportunity to 
generate future revenue. 
7.1.4 The Prominence of Partners 
 While the effect of prominent partners upon a focal firm’s patenting capability is 
insignificant, the prominence of partners delivers significant effects in influencing the focal 
firm’s number of marketed drug applications and revenues.  In this study, the prominence of the 
focal firm’s partners was derived by the counts of direct partners’ news articles that appeared in 
LexisNexis in a ten-year period prior to the observation.  Such well-known and reputable firms 
as Merck, Pfizer, Johnson and Johnson, and Abbott Laboratories appeared in more than 1,000 
news articles, whereas relatively new and less well-known firms such as Affymax and Aphton, in 
the early years, may have appeared in only 5 to 10 news articles (or none).  Therefore, partners 
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that appeared frequently in news articles are prominent, while others that rarely appeared in news 
articles are less prominent. 
 Collaborating with high-status and reputable alliances gives the focal firm legitimate 
endorsement (Stuart, 2000), building additional confidence in drug application processes.  
Additionally, experiences gained from collaborating with prominent partners improve 
capabilities in FDA drug approval processes.  Accordingly, the prominent network positively 
contributes to a number of marketed drug applications granted by the FDA. 
 With regard to revenue, a focal firm with a network of prominent partners performs relatively 
poorly.  This finding is unexpected and inconsistent with Stuart’s (2000) finding that high-status 
partners help lower-status partners to attract more customers and to improve revenue growth.  It 
is suspected that because focal firms in the study are publicly traded companies, the benefits and 
outcomes gained from working with the high-status partners are dissimilar.  Additionally, while 
the study used the partners’ number of news articles, Stuart (2000) used several measurements 
(i.e., sales of partners, age of partners, and innovativeness of partners) to assess the status of 
partners.  Obviously, the dimension of partners’ prominence captured in this study differs from 
Stuart’s (2000) alliance status.  Accordingly, the partners’ prominence in the study conveys 
different meanings and thus different empirical results.   
7.1.5 Exploration and Exploitation Partners 
 This study used two measurements that directly captured the impact of the focal firms’ 
exploration and exploitation partners on invention and commercialization performances.  The 
exploration and exploitation partners are necessary to focal firms, because most focal firms 
simultaneously engage in differing stages of several projects involving exploration and 
exploitation activities.   
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Rothaermel and Deed (2004) found that exploration partners contribute to invention 
activities, while exploitation partners contribute to commercialization activities.  However, the 
authors found no relationship between exploitation partners and invention activities or a 
relationship between exploration partners and commercialization activities.  This study extends 
Rothaermel and Deed’s (2004) framework to examine the roles of exploitation and exploration 
partners in the product development process.  As expected, the study detects a negative influence 
on patenting rates of a focal firm’s exploitation network.  Additionally, a focal firm with a 
prominent exploration network is negatively associated with the number of marketed drug 
applications.   
 If a focal firm collaborates with exploration partners that seek to generate the patents, the 
focal firm gains no benefit for its exploitation activities.  Instead, the focal firm may pull 
resources to deal with its partners’ exploration activities.  Should the focal firm rearrange 
internal resources to deal with the new knowledge, its capability to generate more marketed drug 
applications is weakened.  Similarly, if a focal firm collaborates with exploitation partners, it 
gains nothing from the collaboration to facilitate exploration activities.  Instead, the focal firm 
refocuses its attention to exploitation activities.  Therefore, the exploitation partners negatively 
influence a focal firm’s invention performance.  Since the contributions of exploration and 
exploitation partners depend largely on the position of a focal firm in the drug development 
process, this study discusses their contributions in detail in the next sections (the horizontal and 
vertical networks).  
7.1.6 Upstream and Downstream Horizontal Networks 
Results indicate that upstream and downstream horizontal networks contribute immaterially 
to a focal firm’s patents and to marketed drug applications.  However, the upstream and 
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downstream horizontal networks significantly decrease the revenue of the focal firm.  Basically, 
the horizontal networks have two main effects.  For the upstream horizontal network, the main 
effect relates to a focal firm and its partners’ propensities to generate patents.  For the 
downstream horizontal network, the main effect pivots upon a focal firm and its partners’ 
propensities to generate drugs with FDA approved.  The negative interaction variables for the 
two networks represent moderating effects.   
Kotabe and Swan (1995) suggested that downstream horizontal alliances commonly focus 
on long-term product development.  Due to U.S. anti-trust law, downstream horizontal alliances 
that seek concentrated commercial activities are prohibited.  Therefore, the establishment of a 
downstream horizontal network in the U.S. is likely to involve R&D or exploration activities 
(Kotabe et al., 1995).  However, exactly because the downstream horizontal alliances involve 
working closely with direct competitors, these collaborations represent the least successful form 
(Silverman et al., 2002).  Accordingly, a downstream horizontal network reduces the revenue of 
a focal firm. 
 With regard to an upstream horizontal network, the contribution of a focal firm’s patents 
toward its focal firm’s revenue is moderated by an additional exploration partner.  In regard to 
the two-way interaction conditional analysis, results confirm that exploration partners contribute 
positively to the focal firms’ revenues only when the focal firm’s propensity to generate patents 
is at the lowest or moderate levels (i.e., at zero or mean).  By collaborating with exploration 
partners, the focal firm with an already high propensity to generate patents receives redundant 
knowledge and overlapped capabilities.  Should the upstream focal firm require patents 
possessed by exploration partners to supplement its internal capability to invent, the upstream 
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horizontal network suggests complementary effects between the external capability and the 
internal capability on a focal firm’s revenue.      
7.1.7 Upstream and Downstream Vertical Networks 
As expected, empirical findings indicate that having an upstream vertical network will have 
a favorable effect on the focal firm’s revenue.  In generating revenues, the upstream focal firm 
exploits its patents through downstream alliances, suggesting commercialization benefits.  This 
result corresponds to Silverman and Baum’s (2002) finding that upstream focal firms tend to 
survive the competition because the firms receive a significant infusion of capital resources from 
downstream alliances.  Providing that an upstream focal firm can generate its technologies 
(invention), the upstream vertical network is in a favorable position to generate revenue.     
Next, the downstream vertical network represents alliances that decrease the number of a 
focal firm’s patents, yet will simultaneously facilitate the number of marketed drug applications 
and help to increase revenue.  In this particular network, a focal firm represents an exploitation 
entity, collaborating with exploration alliances.  Findings indicate that partners’ patents do not 
help a downstream focal firm to improve its capabilities in generating patents.  Liebeskind and 
his associates (1996) suggested that the downstream focal firm lacks a university-like 
environment to encourage its patenting rates.  As a result, despite intensive collaborations with 
exploration partners, the firm finds it difficult to become successful in generating novel 
technologies.   
Further, with regard to the commercialization outcomes, a downstream focal firm acquires 
disruptive technologies from its upstream alliances (i.e., their patents), transforming the 
technologies into marketed drug applications and revenues.  Interestingly, the upstream and 
downstream vertical networks may increase the focal firms’ revenues by means of 
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complementary effects between upstream and downstream firms in the vertical collaborations.  
Yet, in terms of patenting rates and the number of marketed drug applications, the 
complementary effects of the vertical networks remain statistically questionable. 
7.2 Internal and External Validity 
In this section, the study discusses internal and external validy.  Internal validity addresses 
the "true" causes of the outcomes observed in the study.  Strong internal validity means that not 
only does the study presents reliable measures of independent and dependent variables, but also a 
strong justification causally links the independent variables to the dependent variables (Shadish, 
Cook, & Campbell, 2002).  At the same time, this study utilizes internal validity to rule out 
extraneous variables for the dependent variables. Thus, internal validity refers to the clear and 
relevant assignment of causes to effects.  External validity addresses the ability to generalize the 
study to other organizations and other situations.  To have strong external validity, a sample of 
subjects or respondents, drawn by using "chance methods" presents a clearly defined population.  
In this study, the subjects represent publicly traded biopharmaceutical firms in the U.S. in the 
period between 1986 and 2003.  When a strong external validity is present, one may generalize 
the empirical findings to other settings and situations with confidence. 
To support the evidence of internal validity (i.e., A causes B), the researcher must show the 
following three aspects in their studies: 1) “A” precedes “B”, 2) “A” is co-related with “B”, and 
3) there is no plausible alternative explanation of “B”.  The characteristics of my dataset—a 
cross-sectional time-series analysis or longitudinal analysis with panel data—strengthen the first 
aspect of the internal validity.  The statistical results of the three models also suggest that several 
independents measured at prior periods are significantly correlated with the dependent variables.  
These results provide the second aspect of the internal validity.  In my study, the only threat of 
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internal validity falls primarily in the third aspect: the plausible alternative explanation.  In other 
words, there might be other independent variables that determine the invention and 
commercialization outcomes of the focal firms during the observation period.  Shadish et al., 
(2002) termed these variables, or threats, as “history.”   
 In laboratory research, history may be controlled by separating the respondents from outside 
events, but in the field research, it is difficult to separate outside events from the observations.  In 
this dissertation, the 262 focal firms are publicly traded companies from the biopharmaceutical 
industry.  Consequently, encountering the same external environment during the same period 
reduces the threats of history.  To further minimize the threats to internal validity, the study 
controls for the effects of year and industry differences.  Additionally, numerous organizational 
characteristics including a) size, b) age, c) year as publicly traded status, e) diversification level, 
R&D expenditure, f) profitability, and d) propensity to invent and to commercialize, are 
controlled to make sure that the contribution of most independent variables is isolated.  Given the 
attempts to control for the threats to internal validity, the study will address one potential 
threat—the potential reversed causality—in the limitation section.     
 External validity concerns inferences about the extent to which a causal relationship holds 
over variations in persons, settings, treatments, and outcomes.  Several researchers argue that 
most external validity questions involve persons, settings, treatments, and outcomes not studied 
in the experiment (Shadish et al., 2002).  In this study, the drug development process in the 
biopharmaceutical industry is a unique testing ground for the study of innovation process.  The 
exclusive characteristics of the drug development process increase the threats to external 
validity.  Because the setting is unique, it is questionable that the findings in this particular 
setting are applicable to different settings or industries.  
 181
 To some extent, however, the results may be externalized.  In general, the setting of this 
study comprises those focal firms that determine to explore and exploit interfirm networks to 
generate invention and commercialization performance.  These settings hold true in most 
industries, especially in the high-tech industries such as the chemical and electronics industries, 
in which invention and commercialization are critical.  The USPTO database provides numerous 
assignees from almost every industry.  These assignees choose to acquire a number of patents, to 
protect intellectual properties, and to seek for legal protection during exploitation activities.  
While some firms may decide to keep their inventions within the organizations, treating the 
inventions as secret sources of competitive advantages most firms turn their inventions in 
product development processes into successful commercialization, thus generating revenues.   
 With regard to treatments, multiple dimensions of the interfirm network are prevalent not 
only in the biopharmaceutical industry, but also in other industries.  Accordingly, the multiple 
dimensions of the interfirm network—direct ties, indirect ties, structural holes, and horizontal 
and vertical networks—hold true among interfirm collaborations across industries.  For instance, 
in the software industry, established companies such as Microsoft and Google collaborate with 
many nascent partners for R&D activities.  From the perspectives of these nascent partners, 
collaborating with downstream partners allows an exploitation of disruptive technologies.  
Therefore, the multiple dimensions of the interfirm network in the biopharmaceutical industry 
may be compared to others in different industries.     
With regard to outcomes, the dynamics of the interfirm network result primarily in invention 
and/or commercialization for all industries, with outcomes not limited to the biopharmaceutical 
industry.  The measurements of invention and commercialization performance across industries, 
however, may differ due to the characteristics of the market-cycle.  For the fast-cycle industries, 
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firms may ignore a lengthy process of patenting because the primary concern is rapidly 
developing technology.  These firms collaborate to speed the innovation process (i.e., from the 
beginning of invention to the end of commercialization).  In this particular market-cycle, 
patenting rates may not reflect invention performance.  However, the number of marketed 
products and revenues of the focal firms in this market-cycle should reflect the 
commercialization performance.   
In slow-cycle industries (i.e., industries that rely heavily on the legal protection of their 
inventions), the invention performance of the collaborations may be measured by the number of 
patents generated each year.  The biopharmaceutical industry may be deemed a slow-cycle 
market, due to a heavy reliance on the legal protection process.  Therefore, firms operating in the 
slow-cycle industries are comparable to the biopharmaceutical firms in both invention and 
commercialization outcomes.  Given understanding and some adjustments due to industry 
differences, comprehension of how multiple dimensions of interfirm network influence product 
innovation may prove useful and applicable across different settings, treatments, and outcomes.   
7.3 Managerial Implications 
The theoretical frameworks—organizational learning and institutional perspectives—
suggest that six dimensions of the interfirm network play important roles in the product 
innovation process.  While firms generally rely on strategic alliances to generate invention and 
commercialization, some are not as successful as others.  Interestingly, some alliances may not 
only delay, but concurrently also harm the patenting capability, the marketed drug activities, and 
the revenues of the firms.  The findings of this study draw managers’ attention to several 
paradoxical findings in the multiple dimensions of an interfirm network on product innovation 
outcomes.   
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The combined invention and commercialization perspective in this study offers a realistic 
framework for managers and managerial actions.  As Rothaermel and Deed (2004) averred that 
realistically, most firms engage in both exploration and exploitation activities simultaneously, 
because the firms manage several projects that seek to generate invention and commercialization.  
To achieve exploration activities, firms associate with potential dimensions of the interfirm 
network to generate invention performance.  Unfortunately, these particular dimensions may not 
be the best engine to entrust commercialization activities.  The scenario holds true for those firms 
associating with dimensions of interfirm network for the purpose of promoting 
commercialization, yet the dimensions may not be the optimal choice for their inventions.  With 
this integrated framework, management may recognize a trade-off situation in the interfirm 
network toward generating either invention or commercialization.  Therefore, an integrated 
framework facilitates management to maximize the value of product innovation through leverage 
of the interfirm network.      
Therefore, the purpose of this section is to provide some critical information of the strategic 
alliances.  Prior research and the current study underscored that the benefits of interfirm 
collaborations depend largely on the objectives of the focal firm (Ahuja, 2000a).  Therefore, it 
becomes critical for a firm to clarify its objective before selecting its partners, engaging in 
appropriate collaborations, and building the effective interfirm network.  According to the 
perspective of scholars in organizational learning, firms that are involved in both exploration and 
exploitation activities must importantly strike a balance between exploration and exploitation 
(March, 1991; Vermeulen et al., 2001).  Further, a firm must be precise about how, when and 
what it means to achieve from interfirm network.  In so doing, the firm should understand not 
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only its capabilities in the drug development process, but also the responding capabilities of 
partners in the collaborative network. 
In most industries, a firm will examine the patents and/or the number of innovative products 
generated over a specific period to understand its propensity toward invention.  Additionally, the 
firm may count the number of successful products in the market and/or the amount of revenue 
generated over a specific period to understand its propensity toward commercialization.  
Deploying similar analyses to understand partners’ propensities is the next important step.  By 
incorporating the information of the focal firms and that of their partners, managements 
understand the focal firms’ postures and the types of the collaborative networks (i.e., horizontal 
or vertical networks).    
When a firm wants to achieve exploration performance, it may want to select the interfirm 
network that promotes its knowledge base and invention activities.  The firm may increase its 
direct partners and decrease its indirect partners (i.e., by collaborating with isolated direct 
partners) to generate invention.  Similarly, because low levels of structural holes (e.g., a high 
density network and low brokerage positions) contribute to invention outcomes, a dense network 
of direct partners would be desired to generate invention.  Finally, the downstream firm may 
choose never to rely on its upstream partners in generating its inventions (e.g., patents).  It is 
shown in this study that the upstream vertical network is ineffective in this regard.  
When a firm makes a decision to establish its presence with new products, it may follow the 
findings from the marketed drug applications model.  The number of marketed drug applications 
generally reflects a portfolio of successful inventions available for commercialization.  To 
achieve the successful portfolio of inventions, the focal firm may want to collaborate within a 
low density network—a high level of structural holes.  A sparse network provides non-redundant 
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information and diverse knowledge, allowing the firm to bridge disparate technologies and to 
satisfy more customer segments (Hargadon et al., 1997).  Next, the focal firm may want to 
collaborate with prominent partners to obtain and maintain legitimacy and acceptance of its 
innovative products.  Finally, working with upstream partners, the downstream focal firm could 
bring additional innovative products to the market.   
A company that aims to increase its revenue in general, may need to be cautious with the 
recommendation given above in achieving a portfolio of successful inventions.  To generate 
revenue, the firm can commercialize both proprietary technologies and its portfolio of innovative 
products in market.  The findings suggest that the firm with a low density network and/or a high 
brokerage network generates more revenue.  Further, the firm should establish its vertical 
networks.  It is proven that the complementary effects obtained from the vertical networks are a 
key implication for the focal firm to maximize revenues. 
7.4 Research Implications 
 This study assessed the multiple impacts of interfirm networks on the patents, marketed drug 
applications, and revenues of each focal firm.  However, the study did not completely capture the 
entire outcomes of product innovation.  Rothaermel and Deed (2004) found the series of casual 
relationships among the following constructs: exploration alliances, product in development, 
exploitation alliances, and product on market.  My study added to their findings by examining 
the set of interfirm predictors that could simultaneously affect invention and commercialization 
activities.  Future research may want to integrate the significant relationships between 
independent and dependent variables from previous studies to better capture the working 
concepts of the product innovation process.   
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Specifically, the number of marketed drug applications may be used to capture another 
aspect of a focal firm’s commercialization performance; this measurement, however, represents 
only one of several performances in the commercialization activities.  Future research may want 
to examine other commercialization activities, such as the licensing fees, service fees for clinical 
trials, and several other incomes from marketing and sales.  These activities do not link directly 
to the number of successful drug applications available on market, but they certainly determine 
the amount of revenues in commercialization. 
Like revenue, the number of patents represents only one of several invention outcomes.  In 
the biopharmaceutical industry, the firms generally acquire patents as soon as possible. At a later 
date, the focal firms normally share proprietary technologies from these patents with downstream 
partners in the drug development process.  In other industries, companies may want to keep new 
technologies or inventions internal as trade secrets.  If this is the case, researchers must propose a 
new scheme of measurements that effectively reflects the focal firms’ invention performance and 
propensity to invent.           
7.5 Limitations 
 This study encountered some methodological limitations.  The unique characteristics of the 
three dependent variables required three analytical models to accommodate the statistical 
specifications and estimations of the results.  Prior studies used a traditional analytical model—
the panel Poisson regression—to specify and estimate the count, non-negative integer, dependent 
variables (Ahuja, 2000a; Ahuja et al., 2001; Baum et al., 2000).  Because the characteristics of 
the dataset challenged Poisson’s assumptions, this study used differing statistical methods to 
correct the violations and that were more suitable with the variables.  To replace the panel 
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Poisson regression model, the study instead used the panel negative binomial regression model 
and the zero-inflated negative binomial regression model to obtain results.     
 While it is common in social science research to find that the data is over-dispersed (Min et 
al., 2005), scholars should examine carefully the sources of this over-dispersion.  One important 
reason for over-dispersion is the fact that measurements contain excessive zero values in the 
observations (Long, 1997).  In my study, both patents and marketed drug applications have high 
levels of zero value in their observations.  However, because the study justified the high level of 
zero value in the patents, I did not use the zero-inflated models to control for the excessive zero.     
In the case of marketed drug applications, the zero value of the applications may be inflated, 
because the Drug@FDA database does not provide all information about drugs.  Additionally, 
several firms might obtain their drug applications approved and listed elsewhere (e.g., FDA’s 
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research), instead of the Drug@FDA database, and further, 
some firms might sell drug products internationally bypassing drug applications with the FDA.  
As a result, the excessive zero-value observations would not reflect the meaning of the variable 
occurred.  Additionally, there was no detection of dissolution with strategic alliances during a 
seven-year accumulative period of direct and indirect ties, providing another reason for 
increasing excessive zero-value observations in the study. 
The zero-inflated negative binomial regression accounted for excessive zeros in the 
marketed drug applications model.  To account for excessive zeros, the two control variables—a 
focal firm’s propensity to invent and a focal firm’s propensity to commercialize—were used to 
identify the excessive zero observations.  While the two control variables could control for 
potential factors that generate zero-inflated symptoms, the variables could not control for other 
sources of excessive zeros.  For instance, the two variables could not control for the zero-value 
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observations that occurred due to unidentifiable dissolutions.  Future research may discover a 
better methodology for zero-inflated observations in the marketed drug applications.   
The next limitation is the robustness of the models.  The study could only use the fixed-
effects model to estimate the focal firms’ revenue.  A comparison between the results of the 
random-effects and fixed-effects models in the focal firm’s revenue model suggests quite 
comparable results.  Unfortunately, in the panel negative binomial regression model—patenting 
capability—the study could not achieve the convergence of the results in the fixed-effects model.  
After controlling for the number of iterations at 100, the results of the conditional fixed-effects 
negative binomial regression revealed that most coefficients, except for upstream horizontal 
network, downstream vertical network, exploitation network, and the alliances’ prominence, 
were significant.  These rudimentary results are inconsistent with those results from the random-
effects model.  Because the results in the random-effects model are obtained completely with 
convergence and the results of the fixed-effects model are obviously incomplete and lack 
reliability, this study will not compare the results from the random-effects models with the 
rudimentary results of the fixed-effects model.    
Like the panel negative binomial model, the zero-inflated negative binomial regression 
model does not have the fixed effect command to test for the fixed-effects results.  Although 
generated dummy codes for all focal firms in the dataset are tested for the fixed-effects of the 
zero-inflated model, this study could not achieve the convergence of the results.  Due to the 
limitation in the fixed-effects results, future research may attempt to find out other statistical 
approaches to achieve the complete robustness tests of the findings. 
The last limitation includes the potential reversed causality.  Although the study used the 
longitudinal and panel data analytical technique to account for causality between independent 
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and dependent variables, the potential reversed causality remains questionable.  Specifically, 
both control variables—the propensities to invent and to commercialize—are generated by the 
number of patents and the number of FDA approved drugs that acquired in the ten-year period 
prior to the observation.  While the two control variables control for some unobservable 
heterogeneity that influences the number of future patents and drugs, the prior performances of 
patents and drugs might influence the effects of other independent variables to influence the 
dependent variables.   
For instance, Company “X” produced a high number of patents in the past decade (from 
1986 to 1995).  The number of prior patents attracted other partners to collaborate with X in 
invention activities.  The attractiveness caused by the number of its prior patents also increased 
the number of direct and indirect ties, as well as the main independent variables of invention and 
commercialization performances.  Since the prior patents simultaneously influenced independent 
and dependent variables (in 1995), the sources of the patenting rate and the number of marketed 
drug applications of X in 1996 remain unclear.   
Although the study attempted to control for organizational specific effects such as a focal 
firm’s profitability, R&D expense, and years as a publicly traded organization, these variables 
may correlate with other independent variables (i.e., dimensions of the interfirm network) and 
produce noises for the study.  Therefore, the network structures that the study measured are not 
the sole cause of invention and commercialization success.  Further, the previous success may 
enable certain network structures, as well as determine the invention and commercialization 








 Success in both invention and commercialization creates product innovation.  Several 
dimensions of the interfirm network generate invention outcomes, yet these dimensions may also 
carry a negative impact to commercialization outcomes.  Likewise, some dimensions of the 
interfirm network are appropriate for exploiation activities; however, the dimensions 
simultaneously hinder exploration activities.  For instance, some focal firms are strengthened by 
having prominent partners to endorse commercialization in the market, but in a cautionary note, 
prominent partners are also associated with lower revenues.  The integrated framework in this 
study proffers empirical findings useful to both scholars and practitioners.  The framework 
subsequently motivates a focal firm toward accruing the right allies at the right time and for the 
right reasons.   
 In this study, six potential aspects of interfirm networks are tested.  The multiple dimensions 
of the interfirm networks are significantly the critical sources of product innovation, specifically 
among the public firms in the biopharmaceutical industry.  While this study provides insights 
into an understanding of product innovation, there are missing parts of the lengthy and complex 
process that remain unsolved.  By means of varying contexts, other activities and measurements 
carry the potential to extend an effective capture of firm invention and commercialization.  The 
question remains as to whether these activities will behave as consistently as the findings of this 
study.  Nevertheless, more expansive investigation into further activities and measurements 
improve the likelihood of successful product innovation as a warrant and challenge for 
scholaristic endeavors in the future.  
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MEASUREMENTS AND DATA SOURCES 
 
DV ==> for Focal Firms Measurements Data Sources 
Invention Performance 1. # of Patent applications   USPTO 
Commercialization Performance 1. # of Marketed drug applications approved by FDA Drugs@FDA 
  3. Revenues of the focal firms COMPUSTAT 
IVs Structures of Focal Firm's Network    
Direct Ties  1. # of Nodes that one-step out neighbors of ego BioScan, UCINET 
Indirect Ties  1. # of Connections among all the nodes in the ego network BioScan, UCINET  
Structural Holes  
1. Levels of Density=# of Ties divided by the number of pairs 
2. # of Brokerage=Numbers of pairs not directly connected BioScan, UCINET  
Strength of Direct Ties 1. Avg # of lengths of focal firm’s collaborations each year BioScan  
IVs Characteristics of Alliances   
Prominence of Ties 1. Frequencies of appearances at news 10 Yrs prior  LexisNexis® 
IVs Orientations of Alliances   
Exploration Networks 1. # of Alliances' patents in the past 10 Yr prior USPTO 
Exploitation Networks 1. # of Alliances' drug applications in the past 10 yr prior  Drugs@FDA 
Upstream Horizontal Networks 1. Prior Invention*Exploration Networks  USPTO and Drug@FDA 
Downstream Horizontal Networks 1. Prior Commercialization*Exploitation Networks USPTO and Drug@FDA 
Upstream Vertical Networks 1. Prior Invention*Exploitation Networks USPTO and Drug@FDA 
Downstream Vertical Networks 1. Prior Commercialization*Exploration Networks USPTO and Drug@FDA 
CV ==> for Focal Firms Focal Firms' Individual Characteristics   
Prior  Invention   1. # of Issued Patent Applications 10 yrs Prior (Exploration) USPTO 
Prior Commercialization  1. # of Successful Drug applications 10 yr Prior (Exploitation) Drugs@FDA 
Equity Financing Events 1.# of Acquired firms by the focal firms BioScan  
  2. # of Private placements in the focal Firms BioScan  
Focal Firm’s Status or Prestige 
1. Years since IPO 
2.  Closed stock prices COMPUSTAT 
Diversification Level 1. Technological areas of Interest and action BioScan 
Profitability Level 1. Net Income COMPUSTAT 
Sizes 1. # of Employees COMPUSTAT 
Innovativeness Level 1. R&D Expenses COMPUSTAT 
Year Differences 1986-2002, 2003 omitted COMPUSTAT 




CORRELATION OF ALL VARIABLES AND RESULTS 
 
             | pat_ap~1 succmk~n sales_~2 Uphori~2 DNhori~n UPvert~2 DNvert~n 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
pat_app_yr~1 |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
succmktapp_n |   0.3691   1.0000  
             |   0.0000 
             | 
 sales_12_D2 |   0.6423   0.5326   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
Uphorizont~2 |   0.2597   0.0633   0.0865   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0060   0.0002 
             | 
DNhorizont~n |   0.0663   0.2568   0.1902   0.0506   1.0000  
             |   0.0041   0.0000   0.0000   0.0281 
             | 
UPvertical~2 |   0.1942   0.0907   0.1280   0.4026   0.4149   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0001   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
DNvertical_n |   0.0706   0.2152   0.2105   0.2137   0.3970   0.1148   1.0000  
             |   0.0022   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
  tot_prtpat |   0.0822   0.0603   0.0851   0.3894   0.1760   0.2685   0.4628  
             |   0.0004   0.0089   0.0002   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
     prtcomm |   0.0066   0.0070   0.0053   0.0433   0.2854   0.3705   0.0685  
             |   0.7751   0.7623   0.8176   0.0608   0.0000   0.0000   0.0030 
             | 
partnersta~s |   0.1137   0.0936   0.1110   0.1351   0.3036   0.2968   0.2572  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
lead1YRavg~l |  -0.0263   0.0051   0.0934  -0.0488  -0.0061  -0.0272  -0.0032  
             |   0.2553   0.8261   0.0000   0.0345   0.7928   0.2382   0.8897 
             | 
 brok_fixmis |   0.3787   0.4553   0.6498   0.0301   0.1915   0.1415   0.1352  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.1919   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
 dens_fixmis |  -0.0014  -0.0232  -0.0130  -0.0079   0.0280   0.0113  -0.0070  
             |   0.9517   0.3145   0.5730   0.7314   0.2252   0.6236   0.7627 
             | 
InterDirec~7 |   0.2390   0.3571   0.4486   0.0027   0.0928   0.0332   0.0654  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.9073   0.0001   0.1506   0.0046 
             | 
  direct_t_7 |   0.2716   0.3408   0.4395   0.0203   0.1573   0.1252   0.1234  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.3792   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
     ind_t_7 |   0.0983   0.1340   0.1999  -0.0035   0.0484   0.0160   0.0423  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.8801   0.0359   0.4884   0.0670 
             | 
    _10yrapp |   0.2785   0.9700   0.4147   0.0492   0.2419   0.0780   0.1863  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0330   0.0000   0.0007   0.0000 
             | 
 _10yrpatapp |   0.8913   0.3560   0.6974   0.2507   0.0307   0.1575   0.0545  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.1831   0.0000   0.0181 
             | 
 EquityEvents|  0.0247   0.0064  -0.0013   0.0227   0.0833   0.0691   0.0224  
             |   0.2853   0.7810   0.9561   0.3255   0.0003   0.0027   0.3308 
             | 
lead1YRs~24_ |   0.0852  -0.0021   0.0202   0.0505  -0.0015   0.0301  -0.0202  
             |   0.0002   0.9276   0.3820   0.0285   0.9487   0.1924   0.3808 
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             | 
  yrcompst_C |   0.3425   0.3091   0.4349   0.0743   0.1095   0.1066   0.0692  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0013   0.0000   0.0000   0.0027 
             | 
diversific~C |   0.5284   0.2848   0.5134   0.1220   0.1271   0.1871   0.1163  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
lead1YRnet~C |   0.0150  -0.0220  -0.0037   0.0299  -0.0100   0.0058  -0.0118  
             |   0.5168   0.3414   0.8716   0.1949   0.6664   0.8019   0.6090 
             | 
lead1YRe~29_ |   0.0841  -0.0027   0.0465   0.0647  -0.0115   0.0404  -0.0136  
             |   0.0003   0.9083   0.0439   0.0050   0.6191   0.0800   0.5560 
             | 
lead1YRr~46_ |   0.0387  -0.0070   0.0349   0.0208  -0.0108   0.0104  -0.0116  
             |   0.0932   0.7611   0.1302   0.3684   0.6402   0.6538   0.6163 
             | 
      ydum01 |   0.0381   0.0153  -0.0060   0.0798  -0.0075  -0.0099   0.0158  
             |   0.0984   0.5082   0.7933   0.0005   0.7445   0.6686   0.4947 
             | 
      ydum02 |   0.0355   0.0179  -0.0062  -0.0065  -0.0084  -0.0105  -0.0066  
             |   0.1235   0.4371   0.7868   0.7798   0.7174   0.6485   0.7745 
             | 
      ydum03 |   0.0317   0.0175  -0.0051  -0.0065   0.0024   0.0349  -0.0068  
             |   0.1700   0.4491   0.8256   0.7794   0.9180   0.1303   0.7699 
             | 
      ydum04 |   0.0315   0.0167  -0.0056   0.1384  -0.0026   0.0347   0.0407  
             |   0.1727   0.4689   0.8096   0.0000   0.9087   0.1325   0.0780 
             | 
      ydum05 |   0.0344   0.0142  -0.0050   0.0655  -0.0092   0.0408  -0.0080  
             |   0.1355   0.5389   0.8272   0.0045   0.6908   0.0774   0.7276 
             | 
      ydum06 |   0.0209   0.0043  -0.0116   0.0038  -0.0124  -0.0156  -0.0073  
             |   0.3652   0.8538   0.6162   0.8696   0.5913   0.4989   0.7518 
             | 
      ydum07 |   0.0152   0.0031  -0.0162  -0.0114  -0.0016  -0.0125  -0.0111  
             |   0.5095   0.8931   0.4835   0.6224   0.9452   0.5889   0.6302 
             | 
      ydum08 |   0.0070   0.0007  -0.0195  -0.0096  -0.0150  -0.0119  -0.0112  
             |   0.7625   0.9775   0.3985   0.6779   0.5149   0.6068   0.6286 
             | 
      ydum09 |   0.0178  -0.0027  -0.0156  -0.0008  -0.0118  -0.0014  -0.0065  
             |   0.4417   0.9056   0.5001   0.9724   0.6095   0.9523   0.7790 
             | 
      ydum10 |   0.0311  -0.0076  -0.0204   0.0355  -0.0027   0.0208   0.0062  
             |   0.1776   0.7428   0.3775   0.1243   0.9083   0.3667   0.7890 
             | 
      ydum12 |  -0.0207  -0.0038  -0.0087  -0.0100   0.0513   0.0041   0.1016  
             |   0.3688   0.8698   0.7066   0.6654   0.0261   0.8607   0.0000 
             | 
      ydum13 |   0.0064   0.0010  -0.0027  -0.0002   0.1155   0.0953   0.0263  
             |   0.7805   0.9655   0.9059   0.9915   0.0000   0.0000   0.2538 
             | 
      ydum14 |   0.0036  -0.0042  -0.0091  -0.0058  -0.0054  -0.0032  -0.0052  
             |   0.8748   0.8572   0.6944   0.8032   0.8162   0.8886   0.8208 
             | 
      ydum15 |   0.0092  -0.0009  -0.0011  -0.0188  -0.0164  -0.0064  -0.0197  
             |   0.6895   0.9700   0.9611   0.4153   0.4780   0.7804   0.3925 
             | 
      ydum16 |  -0.0003  -0.0022   0.0200  -0.0121  -0.0101  -0.0110  -0.0146  
             |   0.9902   0.9257   0.3867   0.5990   0.6618   0.6352   0.5268 
             | 
      ydum17 |  -0.0024  -0.0003   0.0270  -0.0212  -0.0295  -0.0325  -0.0229  
             |   0.9169   0.9897   0.2427   0.3589   0.2010   0.1588   0.3206 
             | 
      ydum18 |  -0.0355  -0.0015   0.0257  -0.0220  -0.0188  -0.0242  -0.0201  
             |   0.1237   0.9492   0.2652   0.3405   0.4164   0.2940   0.3845 
             | 
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 naics325411 |  -0.0319  -0.0289  -0.0287  -0.0082  -0.0104  -0.0130  -0.0082  
             |   0.1672   0.2112   0.2133   0.7236   0.6536   0.5719   0.7225 
             | 
 naics325412 |   0.1919   0.2445   0.2387   0.0578   0.0841   0.0698   0.0691  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0123   0.0003   0.0025   0.0027 
             | 
 naics325413 |  -0.0665  -0.1110  -0.1105  -0.0189  -0.0382  -0.0188  -0.0304  
             |   0.0039   0.0000   0.0000   0.4124   0.0978   0.4163   0.1877 
             | 
 
             | tot_pr~t  prtcomm partne~s lea~rcol brok_f~s dens_f~s InterD~7 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
  tot_prtpat |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
     prtcomm |   0.3559   1.0000  
             |   0.0000 
             | 
partnersta~s |   0.6258   0.4693   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
lead1YRavg~l |  -0.0418  -0.0141  -0.0507   1.0000  
             |   0.0701   0.5411   0.0280 
             | 
 brok_fixmis |   0.0553   0.0625   0.1814   0.1042   1.0000  
             |   0.0165   0.0068   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
 dens_fixmis |   0.0099   0.0765   0.0354   0.0752  -0.0105   1.0000  
             |   0.6666   0.0009   0.1251   0.0011   0.6483 
             | 
InterDirec~7 |   0.0234   0.0059   0.0753   0.1197   0.6977   0.0439   1.0000  
             |   0.3107   0.7983   0.0011   0.0000   0.0000   0.0573 
             | 
  direct_t_7 |   0.0838   0.0866   0.1886   0.0922   0.8291   0.0159   0.7856  
             |   0.0003   0.0002   0.0000   0.0001   0.0000   0.4904   0.0000 
             | 
     ind_t_7 |   0.0510   0.0236   0.0687   0.1445   0.2866   0.1943   0.6926  
             |   0.0270   0.3070   0.0029   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
    _10yrapp |   0.0487   0.0065   0.0764  -0.0236   0.3738  -0.0155   0.2880  
             |   0.0348   0.7793   0.0009   0.3075   0.0000   0.5031   0.0000 
             | 
 _10yrpatapp |   0.0533  -0.0180   0.0611   0.0063   0.4597  -0.0028   0.2772  
             |   0.0209   0.4361   0.0081   0.7860   0.0000   0.9031   0.0000 
             | 
 EquityEvents|  0.0944   0.1340   0.1696  -0.0505   0.0254  -0.0268  -0.0200  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0287   0.2719   0.2453   0.3873 
             | 
lead1YRs~24_ |   0.0184   0.0454   0.0169   0.0443   0.0320   0.0349  -0.0012  
             |   0.4247   0.0492   0.4643   0.0549   0.1662   0.1309   0.9589 
             | 
  yrcompst_C |   0.0037  -0.0007   0.0479   0.1178   0.4177   0.0331   0.3132  
             |   0.8731   0.9775   0.0378   0.0000   0.0000   0.1512   0.0000 
             | 
diversific~C |   0.1072   0.0841   0.1694  -0.0122   0.4523   0.0079   0.3663  
             |   0.0000   0.0003   0.0000   0.5958   0.0000   0.7317   0.0000 
             | 
lead1YRnet~C |   0.0096   0.0121  -0.0251   0.1244  -0.0138  -0.0134  -0.0417  
             |   0.6785   0.5997   0.2762   0.0000   0.5509   0.5620   0.0710 
             | 
lead1YRe~29_ |   0.0213   0.0293  -0.0241   0.1163  -0.0031  -0.0131  -0.0355  
             |   0.3564   0.2036   0.2965   0.0000   0.8931   0.5703   0.1235 
             | 
lead1YRr~46_ |   0.0035   0.0209  -0.0241   0.1798   0.0126  -0.0089  -0.0260  
             |   0.8786   0.3660   0.2960   0.0000   0.5850   0.7000   0.2593 
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             | 
      ydum01 |   0.0081  -0.0158  -0.0253  -0.1023  -0.0238  -0.0183  -0.0262  
             |   0.7244   0.4944   0.2739   0.0000   0.3034   0.4270   0.2561 
             | 
      ydum02 |  -0.0212  -0.0196  -0.0354  -0.1047  -0.0253  -0.0195  -0.0279  
             |   0.3580   0.3968   0.1246   0.0000   0.2730   0.3975   0.2264 
             | 
      ydum03 |  -0.0215  -0.0142  -0.0352  -0.1032  -0.0259  -0.0201  -0.0287  
             |   0.3506   0.5380   0.1273   0.0000   0.2617   0.3838   0.2131 
             | 
      ydum04 |   0.0159  -0.0207  -0.0269  -0.1107  -0.0297  -0.0233  -0.0331  
             |   0.4920   0.3694   0.2431   0.0000   0.1981   0.3138   0.1510 
             | 
      ydum05 |   0.0225  -0.0194  -0.0286  -0.1124  -0.0307  -0.0247  -0.0350  
             |   0.3305   0.4009   0.2150   0.0000   0.1833   0.2849   0.1290 
             | 
      ydum06 |  -0.0201  -0.0290  -0.0440  -0.1253  -0.0336  -0.0287  -0.0389  
             |   0.3845   0.2088   0.0567   0.0000   0.1450   0.2139   0.0922 
             | 
      ydum07 |  -0.0273   0.0048  -0.0435  -0.1288  -0.0389  -0.0343  -0.0452  
             |   0.2364   0.8352   0.0593   0.0000   0.0918   0.1376   0.0501 
             | 
      ydum08 |   0.0074  -0.0316  -0.0351  -0.1330  -0.0407  -0.0369  -0.0475  
             |   0.7480   0.1709   0.1286   0.0000   0.0776   0.1094   0.0395 
             | 
      ydum09 |   0.0179  -0.0045  -0.0175  -0.1242  -0.0402  -0.0405  -0.0515  
             |   0.4391   0.8460   0.4483   0.0000   0.0818   0.0789   0.0255 
             | 
      ydum10 |   0.0031   0.0151   0.0355  -0.1292  -0.0434  -0.0480  -0.0622  
             |   0.8928   0.5124   0.1238   0.0000   0.0598   0.0374   0.0070 
             | 
      ydum12 |   0.0961   0.0689   0.1097  -0.1241  -0.0369  -0.0394  -0.0639  
             |   0.0000   0.0028   0.0000   0.0000   0.1100   0.0878   0.0056 
             | 
      ydum13 |   0.1149   0.1069   0.2518  -0.1069   0.0043  -0.0299  -0.0510  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.8516   0.1948   0.0272 
             | 
      ydum14 |   0.0278   0.0256   0.1288  -0.0691   0.0361   0.0228   0.0265  
             |   0.2277   0.2679   0.0000   0.0027   0.1179   0.3232   0.2505 
             | 
      ydum15 |  -0.0323   0.0375  -0.0406   0.0032   0.0391   0.0265   0.0840  
             |   0.1610   0.1040   0.0783   0.8893   0.0905   0.2502   0.0003 
             | 
      ydum16 |  -0.0179   0.0088  -0.0460   0.0627   0.0327   0.0340   0.0662  
             |   0.4385   0.7045   0.0463   0.0066   0.1569   0.1403   0.0041 
             | 
      ydum17 |  -0.0447  -0.0621  -0.0736   0.1541   0.0403   0.0369   0.0672  
             |   0.0530   0.0071   0.0014   0.0000   0.0807   0.1101   0.0035 
             | 
      ydum18 |  -0.0684  -0.0650  -0.1008   0.2462   0.0254   0.0456   0.0394  
             |   0.0030   0.0048   0.0000   0.0000   0.2717   0.0480   0.0874 
             | 
 naics325411 |  -0.0244  -0.0242  -0.0334   0.0455  -0.0311  -0.0242  -0.0346  
             |   0.2901   0.2935   0.1482   0.0485   0.1783   0.2942   0.1336 
             | 
 naics325412 |   0.0117   0.0110   0.0155  -0.0619   0.1711   0.0643   0.1002  
             |   0.6112   0.6350   0.5017   0.0073   0.0000   0.0053   0.0000 
             | 
 naics325413 |  -0.0071  -0.0251  -0.0037   0.0007  -0.0940  -0.0336  -0.0609  
             |   0.7598   0.2764   0.8731   0.9757   0.0000   0.1452   0.0083 
             | 
 
             | direct~7  ind_t_7 _10yrapp _10yrp~p equity~R lead~24_ yrcomp~C 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
  direct_t_7 |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
     ind_t_7 |   0.4673   1.0000  
             |   0.0000 
             | 
    _10yrapp |   0.2785   0.1021   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
 _10yrpatapp |   0.2963   0.1077   0.2626   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
 EquityEvents|  0.0258  -0.0008   0.0217  -0.0194   1.0000  
             |   0.2636   0.9713   0.3465   0.4019 
             | 
lead1YRs~24_ |   0.0578   0.0028  -0.0101   0.0944   0.0334   1.0000  
             |   0.0122   0.9021   0.6605   0.0000   0.1473 
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             | 
  yrcompst_C |   0.4275   0.2195   0.2607   0.4173   0.0370   0.0300   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.1091   0.1937 
             | 
diversific~C |   0.4692   0.2077   0.2076   0.5283   0.0535   0.1121   0.4101  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0203   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
lead1YRnet~C |  -0.0144  -0.0524  -0.0207   0.0202   0.0248   0.4036  -0.0067  
             |   0.5323   0.0231   0.3702   0.3813   0.2826   0.0000   0.7722 
             | 
lead1YRe~29_ |  -0.0095   0.0013  -0.0145   0.0901   0.0278   0.5332   0.0503  
             |   0.6803   0.9539   0.5293   0.0001   0.2283   0.0000   0.0293 
             | 
lead1YRr~46_ |   0.0110  -0.0009  -0.0136   0.0387   0.0263   0.4338   0.0437  
             |   0.6348   0.9690   0.5556   0.0932   0.2548   0.0000   0.0581 
             | 
      ydum01 |  -0.0519  -0.0425   0.0173   0.0393  -0.0083   0.0528  -0.0526  
             |   0.0243   0.0653   0.4527   0.0889   0.7196   0.0222   0.0225 
             | 
      ydum02 |  -0.0540  -0.0453   0.0146   0.0352  -0.0307   0.0310  -0.0506  
             |   0.0192   0.0496   0.5279   0.1271   0.1839   0.1791   0.0283 
             | 
      ydum03 |  -0.0544  -0.0466   0.0232   0.0334  -0.0321   0.0322  -0.0392  
             |   0.0184   0.0433   0.3149   0.1477   0.1645   0.1628   0.0892 
             | 
      ydum04 |  -0.0598  -0.0532   0.0254   0.0374   0.0140   0.0407  -0.0412  
             |   0.0096   0.0211   0.2711   0.1050   0.5428   0.0775   0.0739 
             | 
      ydum05 |  -0.0605  -0.0559   0.0253   0.0329  -0.0213   0.0222  -0.0406  
             |   0.0087   0.0154   0.2734   0.1545   0.3564   0.3364   0.0785 
             | 
      ydum06 |  -0.0583  -0.0596   0.0118   0.0210   0.0030   0.0799  -0.0410  
             |   0.0115   0.0097   0.6105   0.3628   0.8955   0.0005   0.0760 
             | 
      ydum07 |  -0.0684  -0.0706   0.0072   0.0080  -0.0229   0.0283  -0.0403  
             |   0.0030   0.0022   0.7567   0.7299   0.3204   0.2197   0.0808 
             | 
      ydum08 |  -0.0647  -0.0709   0.0073   0.0045  -0.0021   0.0109  -0.0442  
             |   0.0050   0.0021   0.7520   0.8470   0.9284   0.6358   0.0554 
             | 
      ydum09 |  -0.0680  -0.0773   0.0072  -0.0001   0.0233  -0.0372  -0.0326  
             |   0.0032   0.0008   0.7561   0.9951   0.3119   0.1067   0.1583 
             | 
      ydum10 |  -0.0675  -0.0925  -0.0008  -0.0159   0.1148   0.0028  -0.0748  
             |   0.0034   0.0001   0.9730   0.4916   0.0000   0.9021   0.0012 
             | 
      ydum12 |  -0.0472  -0.0803  -0.0041  -0.0179   0.1232  -0.0014  -0.0633  
             |   0.0409   0.0005   0.8592   0.4390   0.0000   0.9522   0.0061 
             | 
      ydum13 |  -0.0097  -0.0579   0.0006  -0.0177   0.0550  -0.0011  -0.0284  
             |   0.6734   0.0121   0.9779   0.4426   0.0171   0.9628   0.2177 
             | 
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      ydum14 |   0.0495   0.0409  -0.0076  -0.0138   0.0750  -0.0433  -0.0428  
             |   0.0320   0.0766   0.7416   0.5508   0.0011   0.0607   0.0635 
             | 
      ydum15 |   0.0853   0.0907   0.0000  -0.0046  -0.0301   0.0302  -0.0102  
             |   0.0002   0.0001   0.9997   0.8430   0.1927   0.1904   0.6573 
             | 
      ydum16 |   0.0761   0.0816  -0.0074  -0.0064  -0.0116   0.0507   0.0283  
             |   0.0010   0.0004   0.7486   0.7807   0.6158   0.0278   0.2206 
             | 
      ydum17 |   0.0730   0.0832  -0.0067  -0.0020  -0.0837  -0.0082   0.0697  
             |   0.0015   0.0003   0.7700   0.9313   0.0003   0.7221   0.0025 
             | 
      ydum18 |   0.0408   0.0672  -0.0082   0.0047  -0.0876  -0.0970   0.0988  
             |   0.0768   0.0035   0.7227   0.8384   0.0001   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
 naics325411 |  -0.0622  -0.0562  -0.0270  -0.0297  -0.0198  -0.0393   0.0190  
             |   0.0070   0.0149   0.2413   0.1984   0.3912   0.0887   0.4103 
             | 
 naics325412 |   0.0815   0.0251   0.2257   0.2020   0.0234  -0.0057   0.1669  
             |   0.0004   0.2763   0.0000   0.0000   0.3098   0.8064   0.0000 
             | 
 naics325413 |  -0.0641  -0.0172  -0.1025  -0.0788  -0.0569   0.0228  -0.0420  
             |   0.0054   0.4570   0.0000   0.0006   0.0136   0.3227   0.0685 
             | 
 
             | divers~C lead1Y~C lead~29_ lead~46_   ydum01   ydum02   ydum03 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
diversific~C |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
lead1YRnet~C |   0.0123   1.0000  
             |   0.5954 
             | 
lead1YRe~29_ |   0.0704   0.7938   1.0000  
             |   0.0023   0.0000 
             | 
lead1YRr~46_ |   0.0235   0.8076   0.8500   1.0000  
             |   0.3089   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
      ydum01 |   0.0433   0.0001   0.0334  -0.0091   1.0000  
             |   0.0603   0.9968   0.1479   0.6939 
             | 
      ydum02 |   0.0493   0.0007   0.0283  -0.0092  -0.0086   1.0000  
             |   0.0326   0.9751   0.2203   0.6915   0.7104 
             | 
      ydum03 |   0.0471   0.0029   0.0254  -0.0087  -0.0088  -0.0094   1.0000  
             |   0.0411   0.9010   0.2710   0.7066   0.7023   0.6839 
             | 
      ydum04 |   0.0505   0.0048   0.0423  -0.0069  -0.0102  -0.0109  -0.0112  
             |   0.0286   0.8365   0.0666   0.7636   0.6585   0.6378   0.6280 
             | 
      ydum05 |   0.0500   0.0202   0.0620   0.0058  -0.0108  -0.0115  -0.0119  
             |   0.0302   0.3808   0.0072   0.8031   0.6389   0.6172   0.6070 
             | 
      ydum06 |   0.0313   0.0147   0.0441  -0.0009  -0.0127  -0.0135  -0.0139  
             |   0.1757   0.5240   0.0560   0.9695   0.5818   0.5574   0.5460 
             | 
      ydum07 |   0.0217   0.0036   0.0319  -0.0037  -0.0151  -0.0161  -0.0166  
             |   0.3461   0.8747   0.1670   0.8715   0.5121   0.4850   0.4723 
             | 
      ydum08 |   0.0146   0.0002   0.0225  -0.0069  -0.0163  -0.0174  -0.0179  
             |   0.5278   0.9947   0.3289   0.7664   0.4803   0.4522   0.4390 
             | 
      ydum09 |   0.0210  -0.0004   0.0145  -0.0110  -0.0180  -0.0192  -0.0198  
             |   0.3621   0.9854   0.5299   0.6330   0.4346   0.4053   0.3917 
             | 
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      ydum10 |   0.0085  -0.0171  -0.0168  -0.0317  -0.0219  -0.0234  -0.0240  
             |   0.7125   0.4587   0.4655   0.1695   0.3420   0.3114   0.2975 
             | 
      ydum12 |   0.0033  -0.0052  -0.0102  -0.0239  -0.0251  -0.0267  -0.0275  
             |   0.8852   0.8222   0.6574   0.3013   0.2776   0.2475   0.2339 
             | 
      ydum13 |   0.0128  -0.0246  -0.0209  -0.0225  -0.0258  -0.0275  -0.0283  
             |   0.5802   0.2869   0.3663   0.3292   0.2628   0.2330   0.2196 
             | 
      ydum14 |  -0.0019  -0.0165  -0.0323  -0.0275  -0.0284  -0.0302  -0.0311  
             |   0.9330   0.4759   0.1614   0.2328   0.2188   0.1902   0.1776 
             | 
      ydum15 |  -0.0110  -0.0295  -0.0300  -0.0248  -0.0292  -0.0311  -0.0320  
             |   0.6325   0.2011   0.1931   0.2818   0.2058   0.1778   0.1654 
             | 
      ydum16 |  -0.0292  -0.0078  -0.0201   0.0011  -0.0316  -0.0336  -0.0346  
             |   0.2063   0.7344   0.3843   0.9622   0.1714   0.1452   0.1338 
             | 
      ydum17 |  -0.0328   0.0108  -0.0101   0.0169  -0.0316  -0.0337  -0.0347  
             |   0.1547   0.6387   0.6616   0.4648   0.1703   0.1441   0.1327 
             | 
      ydum18 |  -0.0300   0.0253   0.0017   0.0474  -0.0314  -0.0334  -0.0344  
             |   0.1931   0.2726   0.9397   0.0400   0.1738   0.1474   0.1359 
             | 
 naics325411 |   0.1105  -0.0231  -0.0327  -0.0285   0.0406   0.0368   0.0351  
             |   0.0000   0.3163   0.1568   0.2169   0.0787   0.1108   0.1280 
             | 
 naics325412 |   0.0490  -0.0501   0.0135  -0.0373   0.0210   0.0201   0.0142  
             |   0.0336   0.0300   0.5600   0.1059   0.3638   0.3844   0.5375 
             | 
 naics325413 |  -0.0213   0.0272   0.0003   0.0366  -0.0096   0.0006  -0.0019  
             |   0.3570   0.2385   0.9880   0.1124   0.6766   0.9787   0.9341 
 
             |   ydum04   ydum05   ydum06   ydum07   ydum08   ydum09   ydum10 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ydum04 |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
      ydum05 |  -0.0137   1.0000  
             |   0.5519 
             | 
      ydum06 |  -0.0161  -0.0171   1.0000  
             |   0.4849   0.4585 
             | 
      ydum07 |  -0.0192  -0.0204  -0.0239   1.0000  
             |   0.4058   0.3775   0.3002 
             | 
      ydum08 |  -0.0207  -0.0219  -0.0257  -0.0306   1.0000  
             |   0.3708   0.3421   0.2648   0.1843 
             | 
      ydum09 |  -0.0229  -0.0243  -0.0285  -0.0339  -0.0365   1.0000  
             |   0.3218   0.2929   0.2170   0.1416   0.1136 
             | 
      ydum10 |  -0.0278  -0.0295  -0.0347  -0.0413  -0.0444  -0.0492   1.0000  
             |   0.2282   0.2008   0.1332   0.0738   0.0543   0.0331 
             | 
      ydum12 |  -0.0318  -0.0337  -0.0396  -0.0471  -0.0507  -0.0562  -0.0683  
             |   0.1686   0.1439   0.0862   0.0411   0.0279   0.0149   0.0031 
             | 
      ydum13 |  -0.0328  -0.0348  -0.0408  -0.0486  -0.0523  -0.0579  -0.0704  
             |   0.1556   0.1317   0.0768   0.0351   0.0233   0.0120   0.0022 
             | 
      ydum14 |  -0.0360  -0.0382  -0.0448  -0.0534  -0.0575  -0.0636  -0.0774  
             |   0.1189   0.0978   0.0519   0.0207   0.0127   0.0058   0.0008 
             | 
      ydum15 |  -0.0370  -0.0393  -0.0461  -0.0549  -0.0591  -0.0654  -0.0796  
             |   0.1086   0.0885   0.0456   0.0173   0.0104   0.0045   0.0006 
             | 
      ydum16 |  -0.0400  -0.0425  -0.0499  -0.0594  -0.0639  -0.0707  -0.0860  
             |   0.0828   0.0656   0.0307   0.0101   0.0056   0.0022   0.0002 
             | 
      ydum17 |  -0.0401  -0.0426  -0.0500  -0.0595  -0.0641  -0.0709  -0.0863  
             |   0.0820   0.0649   0.0302   0.0099   0.0055   0.0021   0.0002 
             | 
      ydum18 |  -0.0398  -0.0423  -0.0496  -0.0590  -0.0636  -0.0704  -0.0856  
             |   0.0845   0.0671   0.0316   0.0105   0.0059   0.0023   0.0002 
             | 
 naics325411 |   0.0271   0.0240   0.0488   0.0356   0.0303   0.0233   0.0105  
             |   0.2404   0.2988   0.0344   0.1233   0.1891   0.3120   0.6483 
             | 
 naics325412 |   0.0418   0.0264   0.0009  -0.0008   0.0061   0.0150  -0.0195  
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             |   0.0704   0.2523   0.9681   0.9712   0.7918   0.5155   0.3984 
             | 
 naics325413 |  -0.0147  -0.0082   0.0057   0.0167   0.0045  -0.0124   0.0338  
             |   0.5240   0.7211   0.8061   0.4696   0.8469   0.5918   0.1432 
             | 
 
             |   ydum12   ydum13   ydum14   ydum15   ydum16   ydum17   ydum18 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ydum12 |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
      ydum13 |  -0.0805   1.0000  
             |   0.0005 
             | 
      ydum14 |  -0.0884  -0.0912   1.0000  
             |   0.0001   0.0001 
 
             | 
      ydum15 |  -0.0909  -0.0938  -0.1030   1.0000  
             |   0.0001   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
      ydum16 |  -0.0983  -0.1014  -0.1113  -0.1145   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
      ydum17 |  -0.0986  -0.1016  -0.1116  -0.1148  -0.1241   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
      ydum18 |  -0.0978  -0.1008  -0.1107  -0.1139  -0.1231  -0.1235   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
 naics325411 |   0.0021   0.0001  -0.0216  -0.0231  -0.0271  -0.0273  -0.0268  
             |   0.9283   0.9956   0.3485   0.3174   0.2399   0.2374   0.2449 
             | 
 naics325412 |  -0.0276  -0.0224  -0.0023   0.0073   0.0033   0.0017  -0.0002  
             |   0.2314   0.3326   0.9191   0.7518   0.8863   0.9429   0.9925 
             | 
 naics325413 |   0.0451   0.0313   0.0012  -0.0063  -0.0136  -0.0188  -0.0211  
             |   0.0504   0.1744   0.9593   0.7842   0.5570   0.4158   0.3617 
             | 
             | n~325411 n~325412 n~325413 
-------------+--------------------------- 
 naics325411 |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
 naics325412 |  -0.1145   1.0000  
             |   0.0000 
             | 
 naics325413 |  -0.0544  -0.4439   1.0000  
             |   0.0184   0.0000 
             | 
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Table 6.6a Model #7 Signficant Interaction Effects (Final Model) 
 
xtnbreg pat_app_yr_D1 DNvertical_n tot_prtpat prtcomm partnerstatus   lead1YRavgyrcol   
brok_fixmis dens_fixmis InterDirect_Ind_t7 direct_t_7 ind_t_7 _10yrapp _10yrpatapp 
EquityEventslead1YRstkprice_24_ yrcompst_C diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ 
lead 1YRr_d_46 ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 ydum04 ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 
ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18 naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata 1992, 
nolog  
 
Random-effects negative binomial regression     Number of obs      =      1689 
Group variable (i): focalcode                   Number of groups   =       260 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Beta                       Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       6.5 
                                                               max =        11 
 
                                                Wald chi2(32)      =    477.33 
Log likelihood  = -3082.5184                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pat_app_yr~1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
DNvertical_n |  -8.40e-06   3.23e-06    -2.60   0.009    -.0000147   -2.07e-06 
  tot_prtpat |  -1.91e-06   .0000487    -0.04   0.969    -.0000974    .0000936 
     prtcomm |  -.0067274   .0030131    -2.23   0.026     -.012633   -.0008219 
partnersta~s |   .0000274   .0000493     0.56   0.578    -.0000692    .0001241 
lead1YRavg~l |   -.066007   .0241826    -2.73   0.006     -.113404     -.01861 
 brok_fixmis |  -.0005101    .000146    -3.49   0.000    -.0007961    -.000224 
 dens_fixmis |   .0079127   .0036923     2.14   0.032     .0006759    .0151495 
InterDirec~7 |  -.0006045   .0002343    -2.58   0.010    -.0010637   -.0001453 
  direct_t_7 |   .0206266   .0054926     3.76   0.000     .0098612     .031392 
     ind_t_7 |   .0019629   .0071485     0.27   0.784    -.0120478    .0159736 
    _10yrapp |    .008684   .0041738     2.08   0.037     .0005035    .0168644 
 _10yrpatapp |    .001044   .0001836     5.69   0.000     .0006841     .001404 
 EquityEvents|   .0805304   .0322666     2.50   0.013      .017289    .1437718 
lead1YRs~24_ |   .0013423   .0012967     1.04   0.301    -.0011992    .0038838 
  yrcompst_C |  -.0352049   .0124981    -2.82   0.005    -.0597007   -.0107091 
diversific~C |   .0420796   .0107697     3.91   0.000     .0209713    .0631879 
lead1YRnet~C |  -.0000393   .0000666    -0.59   0.555    -.0001698    .0000912 
lead1YRe~29_ |   .0062099   .0058363     1.06   0.287    -.0052291    .0176489 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .0001218   .0001079     1.13   0.259    -.0000897    .0003333 
      ydum08 |   .6186075   .2502034     2.47   0.013     .1282179    1.108997 
      ydum09 |   .8174238   .2404626     3.40   0.001     .3461258    1.288722 
      ydum10 |   1.161902   .2195317     5.29   0.000     .7316282    1.592177 
      ydum12 |   .6061259   .2106015     2.88   0.004     .1933545    1.018897 
      ydum13 |   1.030058   .1938579     5.31   0.000     .6501033    1.410012 
      ydum14 |   1.067128   .1763683     6.05   0.000     .7214521    1.412803 
      ydum15 |   1.187537    .156862     7.57   0.000     .8800934    1.494981 
      ydum16 |   1.180704   .1442931     8.18   0.000     .8978949    1.463514 
      ydum17 |   1.249145   .1334905     9.36   0.000      .987508    1.510781 
      ydum18 |   .8167482   .1324618     6.17   0.000     .5571278    1.076369 
 naics325411 |  -1.096861   .9379762    -1.17   0.242     -2.93526     .741539 
 naics325412 |   .3271239   .1787794     1.83   0.067    -.0232772     .677525 
 naics325413 |   .4112417   .2321296     1.77   0.076     -.043724    .8662073 
       _cons |  -.2103831   .2967193    -0.71   0.478    -.7919423    .3711761 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /ln_r |   .2102015   .1057847                      .0028673    .4175356 
       /ln_s |  -.4721007   .1125504                     -.6926954   -.2515059 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   1.233927   .1305305                      1.002871    1.518216 
           s |   .6236907   .0701966                      .5002259    .7776288 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled: chibar2(01) =  1117.74 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
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Table 6.6a Model #6 The Panel Negative Binomial Regression on Patenting Rates 
 
xtnbreg pat_app_yr_D1 Uphorizontie_n2 DNhorizontie_n UPvertical_n2 DNvertical_n tot_prtpat 
prtcomm partnerstatus   lead1YRavgyrcol   brok_fixmis  dens_fixmis  InterDirect_Ind_t7  
direct_t_7  ind_t_7  _10yrapp _10yrpatapp EquityEvents lead1YRstkprice_24_ yrcompst_C 
diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 ydum04 
ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18  
naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 1992, nolog  
 
Random-effects negative binomial regression     Number of obs      =      1689 
Group variable (i): focalcode                   Number of groups   =       260 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Beta                       Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       6.5 
                                                               max =        11 
 
                                                Wald chi2(35)      =    483.12 
Log likelihood  = -3082.0396                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pat_app_yr~1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Uphorizont~2 |   1.05e-08   9.43e-08     0.11   0.911    -1.74e-07    1.95e-07 
DNhorizont~n |  -.0002144   .0002278    -0.94   0.347    -.0006609    .0002321 
UPvertical~2 |   3.39e-06    .000017     0.20   0.842    -.0000299    .0000367 
DNvertical_n |  -7.38e-06   3.27e-06    -2.26   0.024    -.0000138   -9.77e-07 
  tot_prtpat |  -.0000176   .0000707    -0.25   0.803    -.0001561    .0001209 
     prtcomm |  -.0054468   .0034691    -1.57   0.116    -.0122461    .0013526 
partnersta~s |   .0000298   .0000504     0.59   0.554    -.0000689    .0001285 
lead1YRavg~l |  -.0655639   .0242107    -2.71   0.007     -.113016   -.0181117 
 brok_fixmis |   -.000505   .0001459    -3.46   0.001    -.0007909   -.0002191 
 dens_fixmis |   .0078295   .0036926     2.12   0.034      .000592    .0150669 
InterDirec~7 |  -.0006357    .000238    -2.67   0.008    -.0011022   -.0001691 
  direct_t_7 |   .0211042   .0055087     3.83   0.000     .0103074     .031901 
     ind_t_7 |   .0022938   .0071653     0.32   0.749      -.01175    .0163376 
    _10yrapp |   .0095468   .0043897     2.17   0.030     .0009431    .0181504 
 _10yrpatapp |   .0010348   .0001838     5.63   0.000     .0006746    .0013949 
 EquityEvents|   .0821158   .0323787     2.54   0.011     .0186548    .1455768 
lead1YRs~24_ |   .0014317   .0013005     1.10   0.271    -.0011172    .0039805 
  yrcompst_C |  -.0366163   .0126705    -2.89   0.004    -.0614501   -.0117825 
diversific~C |   .0429679    .010796     3.98   0.000     .0218081    .0641278 
lead1YRnet~C |  -.0000362    .000067    -0.54   0.589    -.0001676    .0000952 
lead1YRe~29_ |    .006132    .005839     1.05   0.294    -.0053122    .0175763 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .0001153   .0001086     1.06   0.288    -.0000976    .0003283 
      ydum08 |   .6098399   .2499935     2.44   0.015     .1198615    1.099818 
      ydum09 |   .8071017    .240742     3.35   0.001     .3352559    1.278947 
      ydum10 |    1.14573   .2210922     5.18   0.000     .7123971    1.579062 
      ydum12 |   .5957596   .2110371     2.82   0.005     .1821344    1.009385 
      ydum13 |   1.032252   .1932293     5.34   0.000     .6535295    1.410974 
      ydum14 |   1.054978   .1767479     5.97   0.000     .7085588    1.401398 
      ydum15 |   1.179675   .1569388     7.52   0.000     .8720809     1.48727 
      ydum16 |    1.17445   .1441725     8.15   0.000     .8918772    1.457023 
      ydum17 |   1.244996   .1331698     9.35   0.000     .9839876    1.506004 
      ydum18 |   .8163859   .1319209     6.19   0.000     .5578257    1.074946 
 naics325411 |  -1.085821   .9382408    -1.16   0.247    -2.924739    .7530975 
 naics325412 |   .3352316   .1791729     1.87   0.061    -.0159408    .6864039 
 naics325413 |   .4187353   .2332414     1.80   0.073    -.0384096    .8758801 
       _cons |  -.2096394    .297107    -0.71   0.480    -.7919584    .3726797 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /ln_r |   .2128228   .1059076                      .0052478    .4203979 
       /ln_s |  -.4713505    .112543                     -.6919308   -.2507702 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   1.237165   .1310252                      1.005262    1.522567 
           s |   .6241588   .0702447                      .5006086    .7782012 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled: chibar2(01) =  1104.92 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
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Table 6.6a Model #5 Adding Exploration and Exploitation Networks 
  
xtnbreg pat_app_yr_D1 tot_prtpat prtcomm partnerstatus   lead1YRavgyrcol   brok_fixmis 
dens_fixmis InterDirect_Ind_t7 direct_t_7 ind_t_7 _10yrapp _10yrpatapp 
EquityEventslead1YRstkprice_24_ yrcompst_C diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ 
lead1YRr_d_46_ ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 ydum04 ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 
ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18 naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 1992, 
nolog 
 
Random-effects negative binomial regression     Number of obs      =      1689 
Group variable (i): focalcode                   Number of groups   =       260 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Beta                       Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       6.5 
                                                               max =        11 
 
                                                Wald chi2(31)      =    452.59 
Log likelihood  = -3087.3706                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pat_app_yr~1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  tot_prtpat |  -.0000961   .0000434    -2.22   0.027    -.0001811   -.0000111 
     prtcomm |  -.0058366   .0029741    -1.96   0.050    -.0116657   -7.57e-06 
partnersta~s |   .0000331    .000051     0.65   0.517    -.0000669     .000133 
lead1YRavg~l |  -.0686619    .024399    -2.81   0.005    -.1164831   -.0208408 
 brok_fixmis |  -.0005005   .0001529    -3.27   0.001    -.0008002   -.0002008 
 dens_fixmis |   .0078936   .0036925     2.14   0.033     .0006565    .0151307 
InterDirec~7 |  -.0005133   .0002409    -2.13   0.033    -.0009854   -.0000411 
  direct_t_7 |   .0203377   .0057778     3.52   0.000     .0090135    .0316619 
     ind_t_7 |   .0003395   .0071829     0.05   0.962    -.0137388    .0144177 
    _10yrapp |   .0068283   .0040477     1.69   0.092     -.001105    .0147615 
 _10yrpatapp |    .001085   .0001906     5.69   0.000     .0007114    .0014586 
 EquityEvents|   .0862571   .0328399     2.63   0.009     .0218921    .1506221 
lead1YRs~24_ |    .001652   .0013122     1.26   0.208    -.0009198    .0042238 
  yrcompst_C |  -.0309773    .012385    -2.50   0.012    -.0552515   -.0067031 
diversific~C |   .0333773   .0103277     3.23   0.001     .0131353    .0536193 
lead1YRnet~C |  -.0000399    .000065    -0.61   0.539    -.0001673    .0000874 
lead1YRe~29_ |   .0071277    .005797     1.23   0.219    -.0042343    .0184897 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .0001117   .0001088     1.03   0.304    -.0001015     .000325 
      ydum08 |   .6556665   .2528661     2.59   0.010     .1600581    1.151275 
      ydum09 |   .8493141   .2419535     3.51   0.000     .3750939    1.323534 
      ydum10 |    1.19697   .2215134     5.40   0.000      .762812    1.631128 
      ydum12 |   .6189643   .2123217     2.92   0.004     .2028215    1.035107 
      ydum13 |   1.045966   .1964314     5.32   0.000     .6609675    1.430964 
      ydum14 |   1.084702    .178213     6.09   0.000     .7354115    1.433993 
      ydum15 |   1.197312   .1588214     7.54   0.000     .8860278    1.508596 
      ydum16 |   1.193954   .1461351     8.17   0.000      .907534    1.480373 
      ydum17 |   1.256658   .1355085     9.27   0.000     .9910661    1.522249 
      ydum18 |   .8197716    .135001     6.07   0.000     .5551745    1.084369 
 naics325411 |  -1.091672   .9384915    -1.16   0.245    -2.931082    .7477372 
 naics325412 |   .2984906   .1789038     1.67   0.095    -.0521544    .6491355 
 naics325413 |    .434981   .2329935     1.87   0.062    -.0216779    .8916398 
       _cons |  -.1710878   .2982181    -0.57   0.566    -.7555846    .4134089 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /ln_r |   .1936852   .1052555                     -.0126118    .3999822 
       /ln_s |  -.4854819   .1124179                     -.7058169   -.2651469 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   1.213714   .1277501                      .9874674    1.491798 
           s |   .6154006    .069182                      .4937051    .7670933 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled: chibar2(01) =  1114.66 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000  
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Table 6.6a Model #4 Adding Partners' Prominence and Tie Strength 
 
xtnbreg pat_app_yr_D1 partnerstatus   lead1YRavgyrcol   brok_fixmis dens_fixmis 
InterDirect_Ind_t7 direct_t_7 ind_t_7 _10yrapp _10yrpat app EquityEventslead1YRstkprice_24_ 
yrcompst_C diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ lead1YRr_d_46_ ydum01 ydum02 
ydum03 ydum04 ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 
ydum18 naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 1992, nolog  
 
Random-effects negative binomial regression     Number of obs      =      1689 
Group variable (i): focalcode                   Number of groups   =       260 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Beta                       Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       6.5 
                                                               max =        11 
 
                                                Wald chi2(29)      =    421.16 
Log likelihood  = -3092.4975                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pat_app_yr~1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
partnersta~s |  -.0000517    .000045    -1.15   0.250    -.0001398    .0000365 
lead1YRavg~l |  -.0692304   .0245644    -2.82   0.005    -.1173757    -.021085 
 brok_fixmis |   -.000495   .0001618    -3.06   0.002    -.0008121   -.0001778 
 dens_fixmis |   .0073688   .0036848     2.00   0.046     .0001468    .0145909 
InterDirec~7 |  -.0006326   .0002448    -2.58   0.010    -.0011124   -.0001528 
  direct_t_7 |   .0235665   .0059314     3.97   0.000     .0119411    .0351919 
     ind_t_7 |   .0009166   .0071895     0.13   0.899    -.0131745    .0150077 
    _10yrapp |   .0057251   .0039724     1.44   0.150    -.0020606    .0135109 
 _10yrpatapp |   .0010808   .0001955     5.53   0.000     .0006976     .001464 
 EquityEvents|   .0701441   .0321727     2.18   0.029     .0070867    .1332016 
lead1YRs~24_ |   .0019539   .0013244     1.48   0.140    -.0006419    .0045497 
  yrcompst_C |  -.0222399   .0116625    -1.91   0.057    -.0450979    .0006181 
diversific~C |   .0251784   .0093286     2.70   0.007     .0068946    .0434621 
lead1YRnet~C |   -.000028   .0000662    -0.42   0.673    -.0001578    .0001018 
lead1YRe~29_ |   .0056647   .0058645     0.97   0.334    -.0058295     .017159 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .0001078   .0001118     0.96   0.335    -.0001113    .0003269 
      ydum08 |   .7218219   .2521099     2.86   0.004     .2276956    1.215948 
      ydum09 |   .9277934   .2405815     3.86   0.000     .4562624    1.399324 
      ydum10 |   1.252388   .2200856     5.69   0.000     .8210282    1.683748 
      ydum12 |    .661679   .2126956     3.11   0.002     .2448032    1.078555 
      ydum13 |   1.110338   .1956981     5.67   0.000     .7267772      1.4939 
      ydum14 |   1.139388   .1781398     6.40   0.000     .7902403    1.488536 
      ydum15 |   1.208708   .1600039     7.55   0.000     .8951056    1.522309 
      ydum16 |   1.211045   .1473729     8.22   0.000     .9221992     1.49989 
      ydum17 |   1.274829   .1368599     9.31   0.000     1.006589     1.54307 
      ydum18 |   .8291072   .1368524     6.06   0.000     .5608814    1.097333 
 naics325411 |  -1.090523   .9371208    -1.16   0.245    -2.927246    .7461999 
 naics325412 |   .2754942   .1779112     1.55   0.122    -.0732053    .6241938 
 naics325413 |   .4228799   .2334713     1.81   0.070    -.0347154    .8804752 
       _cons |  -.2190679   .2986215    -0.73   0.463    -.8043554    .3662195 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /ln_r |   .1819824   .1048302                     -.0234811    .3874459 
       /ln_s |  -.4842147   .1125804                     -.7048683   -.2635612 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   1.199593   .1257536                      .9767924    1.473213 
           s |   .6161809   .0693699                      .4941737    .7683106 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled: chibar2(01) =  1107.51 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
 215
Table 6.6a Model #3 Adding Brokerage and Density (Structural Holes) 
  
xtnbreg pat_app_yr_D1 brok_fixmis  dens_fixmis InterDirect_Ind_t7  direct_t_7  ind_t_7  _10yrapp 
_10yrpatapp EquityEvents lead1YRstkprice_ 24_ yrcompst_C diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C 
lead1YRemploy_29_ lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 ydum04 ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 
ydum10 ydum12 ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18  naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if 
yeardata > 1992, nolog  
 
Random-effects negative binomial regression     Number of obs      =      1689 
Group variable (i): focalcode                   Number of groups   =       260 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Beta                       Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       6.5 
                                                               max =        11 
 
                                                Wald chi2(27)      =    403.69 
Log likelihood  = -3097.0427                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pat_app_yr~1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 brok_fixmis |  -.0005627   .0001663    -3.38   0.001    -.0008886   -.0002369 
 dens_fixmis |   .0072663   .0036716     1.98   0.048     .0000702    .0144624 
InterDirec~7 |  -.0005648   .0002376    -2.38   0.017    -.0010305   -.0000991 
  direct_t_7 |   .0268057   .0059843     4.48   0.000     .0150768    .0385346 
     ind_t_7 |  -.0010204   .0070092    -0.15   0.884    -.0147582    .0127174 
    _10yrapp |    .004714    .003768     1.25   0.211    -.0026713    .0120992 
 _10yrpatapp |   .0010451   .0001952     5.35   0.000     .0006624    .0014277 
 EquityEvents|   .0633755   .0324973     1.95   0.051     -.000318     .127069 
lead1YRs~24_ |   .0019542   .0013625     1.43   0.152    -.0007163    .0046248 
  yrcompst_C |  -.0180652   .0114159    -1.58   0.114      -.04044    .0043096 
diversific~C |   .0202953   .0088922     2.28   0.022     .0028669    .0377236 
lead1YRnet~C |  -.0000301   .0000662    -0.46   0.649    -.0001599    .0000996 
lead1YRe~29_ |   .0042171   .0058775     0.72   0.473    -.0073026    .0157368 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .0001419   .0001099     1.29   0.196    -.0000734    .0003573 
      ydum08 |   1.141533   .2024722     5.64   0.000     .7446947    1.538371 
      ydum09 |    1.35458    .185113     7.32   0.000     .9917654    1.717395 
      ydum10 |   1.620489   .1684986     9.62   0.000     1.290238     1.95074 
      ydum12 |   1.009976   .1666256     6.06   0.000     .6833958    1.336556 
      ydum13 |   1.403053   .1522489     9.22   0.000      1.10465    1.701455 
      ydum14 |   1.409533    .144049     9.79   0.000     1.127203    1.691864 
      ydum15 |   1.434013    .140395    10.21   0.000     1.158844    1.709182 
      ydum16 |   1.382042   .1363642    10.13   0.000     1.114773    1.649311 
      ydum17 |    1.38853   .1335989    10.39   0.000     1.126681    1.650379 
      ydum18 |     .89456   .1379432     6.48   0.000     .6241964    1.164924 
 naics325411 |  -1.196964   .9552547    -1.25   0.210    -3.069228    .6753012 
 naics325412 |    .289176    .173212     1.67   0.095    -.0503133    .6286653 
 naics325413 |   .3998454   .2309624     1.73   0.083    -.0528326    .8525234 
       _cons |   -.726916   .2166047    -3.36   0.001    -1.151453   -.3023785 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /ln_r |   .1643074   .1042573                     -.0400332    .3686481 
       /ln_s |  -.4675312   .1127358                     -.6884893   -.2465731 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   1.178577   .1228753                      .9607575    1.445779 
           s |   .6265472   .0706343                      .5023344    .7814742 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled: chibar2(01) =  1106.51 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
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Table 6.6a Model #2 Adding Direct, Indirect, and Interaction Effects 
 
xtnbreg pat_app_yr_D1 InterDirect_Ind_t7  direct_t_7  ind_t_7  _10yrapp _10yrpatapp EquityEvents 
lead1YRstkprice_24_ yrcompst_C diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ 
lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 ydum04 ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 
ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18  naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 
1992, nolog  
 
Random-effects negative binomial regression     Number of obs      =      1689 
Group variable (i): focalcode                   Number of groups   =       260 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Beta                       Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       6.5 
                                                               max =        11 
 
                                                Wald chi2(25)      =    366.24 
Log likelihood  = -3104.5273                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pat_app_yr~1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
InterDirec~7 |  -.0005418   .0002449    -2.21   0.027    -.0010218   -.0000618 
  direct_t_7 |   .0130191   .0048577     2.68   0.007     .0034982      .02254 
     ind_t_7 |    .002554    .006976     0.37   0.714    -.0111187    .0162268 
    _10yrapp |    .004064   .0038096     1.07   0.286    -.0034026    .0115305 
 _10yrpatapp |   .0005665   .0001308     4.33   0.000     .0003102    .0008228 
 EquityEvents|   .0560026   .0326259     1.72   0.086    -.0079429    .1199482 
lead1YRs~24_ |   .0022377    .001378     1.62   0.104    -.0004631    .0049385 
  yrcompst_C |  -.0187445   .0117519    -1.60   0.111    -.0417777    .0042887 
diversific~C |   .0243238   .0091534     2.66   0.008     .0063835    .0422642 
lead1YRnet~C |  -.0000152   .0000693    -0.22   0.826     -.000151    .0001206 
lead1YRe~29_ |   .0063436   .0061844     1.03   0.305    -.0057777    .0184648 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .0000831   .0001182     0.70   0.482    -.0001486    .0003148 
      ydum08 |   1.081761   .2120692     5.10   0.000     .6661132    1.497409 
      ydum09 |   1.358356   .1893134     7.18   0.000     .9873082    1.729403 
      ydum10 |   1.628204   .1708227     9.53   0.000     1.293397     1.96301 
      ydum12 |   .9945969     .16921     5.88   0.000     .6629513    1.326242 
      ydum13 |   1.366667   .1526627     8.95   0.000     1.067454     1.66588 
      ydum14 |   1.385724   .1434492     9.66   0.000     1.104568    1.666879 
      ydum15 |   1.436946   .1400293    10.26   0.000     1.162494    1.711399 
      ydum16 |   1.390646   .1356597    10.25   0.000     1.124758    1.656535 
      ydum17 |   1.395552   .1327963    10.51   0.000     1.135276    1.655828 
      ydum18 |   .9022058    .137612     6.56   0.000     .6324912     1.17192 
 naics325411 |  -1.257124   .9636443    -1.30   0.192    -3.145832    .6315843 
 naics325412 |   .3082508   .1756227     1.76   0.079    -.0359634    .6524649 
 naics325413 |   .3822653   .2319615     1.65   0.099     -.072371    .8369015 
       _cons |  -.6841934   .2190041    -3.12   0.002    -1.113434   -.2549532 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /ln_r |   .1416497   .1039623                     -.0621126    .3454121 
       /ln_s |  -.5004989   .1112929                     -.7186291   -.2823687 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   1.152173   .1197825                       .939777    1.412572 
           s |   .6062281   .0674689                        .48742    .7539956 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled: chibar2(01) =  1162.06 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
 217
Table 6.6a Model #1 Based Model with Control Variables 
 
xtnbreg pat_app_yr_D1 _10yrapp _10yrpatapp EquityEvents lead1YRstkprice_24_ yrcompst_C 
diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C   lead1YRemploy_29_ lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 
ydum04 ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18  
naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 1992, nolog  
 
Random-effects negative binomial regression     Number of obs      =      1689 
Group variable (i): focalcode                   Number of groups   =       260 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Beta                       Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       6.5 
                                                               max =        11 
 
                                                Wald chi2(22)      =    344.15 
Log likelihood  = -3108.3407                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pat_app_yr~1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    _10yrapp |   .0045798   .0038215     1.20   0.231    -.0029102    .0120699 
 _10yrpatapp |   .0005215   .0001208     4.32   0.000     .0002846    .0007583 
 EquityEvents|   .0584627   .0328959     1.78   0.076    -.0060121    .1229375 
lead1YRs~24_ |   .0019417   .0014117     1.38   0.169    -.0008251    .0047085 
  yrcompst_C |  -.0206836    .011741    -1.76   0.078    -.0436955    .0023282 
diversific~C |   .0285729   .0086929     3.29   0.001     .0115352    .0456106 
lead1YRnet~C |  -.0000375   .0000679    -0.55   0.580    -.0001706    .0000955 
lead1YRe~29_ |   .0082602   .0061795     1.34   0.181    -.0038513    .0203718 
lead1YRr~46_ |    .000108   .0001152     0.94   0.349    -.0001179    .0003339 
      ydum08 |   .9872497   .2101868     4.70   0.000     .5752912    1.399208 
      ydum09 |   1.257656   .1869221     6.73   0.000     .8912952    1.624016 
      ydum10 |   1.548486   .1694496     9.14   0.000     1.216371    1.880602 
      ydum12 |   .9426369   .1698693     5.55   0.000     .6096992    1.275575 
      ydum13 |   1.343738   .1538454     8.73   0.000     1.042207     1.64527 
      ydum14 |   1.393633   .1451569     9.60   0.000      1.10913    1.678135 
      ydum15 |   1.427702    .140236    10.18   0.000     1.152844     1.70256 
      ydum16 |   1.389809   .1358721    10.23   0.000     1.123505    1.656114 
      ydum17 |   1.394758   .1334021    10.46   0.000     1.133295    1.656222 
      ydum18 |   .9056538   .1383363     6.55   0.000     .6345195    1.176788 
 naics325411 |  -1.265631   .9668294    -1.31   0.191    -3.160581    .6293201 
 naics325412 |   .3332541   .1751775     1.90   0.057    -.0100875    .6765958 
 naics325413 |   .3949888   .2301752     1.72   0.086    -.0561463    .8461239 
       _cons |  -.6488004   .2167581    -2.99   0.003    -1.073639   -.2239622 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /ln_r |   .1297473   .1037347                     -.0735689    .3330635 
       /ln_s |  -.5132706   .1104122                     -.7296746   -.2968666 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           r |   1.138541   .1181061                      .9290721    1.395236 
           s |   .5985348   .0660856                      .4820658    .7431431 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled: chibar2(01) =  1215.57 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
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Table 6.6b Model #7 Signficant Interaction Effects (Final Model) 
 
zinb succmktapp_n UPvertical_n2 DNvertical_n tot_prtpat prtcomm partnerstatus   lead1YRavgyrcol 
brok_fixmis  dens_fixmis direct_t_7 ind_t_7 _10yrapp _10yrpatapp EquityEvents lead1YRstkprice_24_ 
yrcompst_C diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 
ydum03 ydum04 ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 
ydum18  naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 1992,inf(_10yrapp _10yrpatapp) 
cluster(focalcode) nolog  
 
Zero-inflated negative binomial regression        Number of obs   =       1689 
                                                  Nonzero obs     =        384 
                                                  Zero obs        =       1305 
 
Inflation model       = logit                     Wald chi2(32)   =    3150.26 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -1362.158                 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
                        (standard errors adjusted for clustering on focalcode) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
succmktapp_n |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
succmktapp_n | 
UPvertical~2 |  -.0000216    .000018    -1.20   0.232    -.0000569    .0000138 
DNvertical_n |   7.14e-06   3.29e-06     2.17   0.030     6.85e-07    .0000136 
  tot_prtpat |  -.0002678   .0001118    -2.40   0.017    -.0004869   -.0000488 
     prtcomm |  -.0024936   .0045317    -0.55   0.582    -.0113755    .0063883 
partnersta~s |   .0003109    .000125     2.49   0.013      .000066    .0005558 
lead1YRavg~l |  -.0319799    .047566    -0.67   0.501    -.1252074    .0612477 
 brok_fixmis |   .0004039   .0002743     1.47   0.141    -.0001337    .0009415 
 dens_fixmis |  -.0123837   .0037433    -3.31   0.001    -.0197204   -.0050469 
  direct_t_7 |  -.0234583   .0106634    -2.20   0.028    -.0443581   -.0025584 
     ind_t_7 |   .0318586   .0120082     2.65   0.008     .0083229    .0553943 
    _10yrapp |   .0373408   .0073128     5.11   0.000      .023008    .0516735 
 _10yrpatapp |   3.07e-06   .0001722     0.02   0.986    -.0003344    .0003405 
EquityEvents |  -.1132646   .0777855    -1.46   0.145    -.2657214    .0391923 
lead1YRs~24_ |  -.0033032   .0025336    -1.30   0.192    -.0082689    .0016625 
  yrcompst_C |   .0092313   .0183794     0.50   0.615    -.0267917    .0452543 
diversific~C |   .0565555   .0112366     5.03   0.000     .0345321    .0785789 
lead1YRnet~C |   .0001069   .0000959     1.11   0.265    -.0000811    .0002948 
lead1YRe~29_ |  -.0137086   .0160116    -0.86   0.392    -.0450907    .0176736 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .0004757   .0002933     1.62   0.105    -.0000991    .0010506 
      ydum08 |  -.0465262   .3058394    -0.15   0.879    -.6459603    .5529079 
      ydum09 |  -.1366327   .2947962    -0.46   0.643    -.7144227    .4411574 
      ydum10 |  -.0975768   .3113604    -0.31   0.754    -.7078319    .5126783 
      ydum12 |  -.2680911   .2821633    -0.95   0.342     -.821121    .2849387 
      ydum13 |  -.3881654   .2518519    -1.54   0.123    -.8817861    .1054553 
      ydum14 |  -.3117403   .2280646    -1.37   0.172    -.7587387    .1352581 
      ydum15 |  -.1372946   .1914473    -0.72   0.473    -.5125244    .2379351 
      ydum16 |   .0676464   .1452185     0.47   0.641    -.2169767    .3522695 
      ydum17 |  -.0078119   .0898699    -0.09   0.931    -.1839538    .1683299 
      ydum18 |   .0626574   .0760977     0.82   0.410    -.0864913    .2118062 
 naics325411 |  -26.95281   .7482747   -36.02   0.000     -28.4194   -25.48622 
 naics325412 |   1.445301   .2466934     5.86   0.000     .9617906    1.928811 
 naics325413 |  -1.268514   .4945926    -2.56   0.010    -2.237898   -.2991308 
       _cons |  -.3693585   .3786695    -0.98   0.329    -1.111537    .3728201 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate      | 
    _10yrapp |  -29.02719   .7306563   -39.73   0.000    -30.45925   -27.59513 
 _10yrpatapp |   .0002622   .0035903     0.07   0.942    -.0067746     .007299 
       _cons |   2.656669   .3536687     7.51   0.000     1.963491    3.349847 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |  -.9959479   .4754559    -2.09   0.036    -1.927824   -.0640716 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   .3693731   .1756206                      .1454643    .9379378 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 219
Table 6.6b Model #6 Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Regression on Marketed Drug Apps 
 
zinb succmktapp_n Uphorizontie_n2 DNhorizontie_n UPvertical_n2 DNvertical_n tot_prtpat prtcomm 
partnerstatus   lead1YRavgyrcol brok_fixmis dens_fixmis InterDirect_Ind_t7  direct_t_7  ind_t_7  
_10yrapp _10yrpatapp EquityEvents lead1YRstkprice_24_ yrcompst_C diversification_C 
lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 ydum04 ydum05 ydum06 
ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18  naics325411 
naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 1992,inf(_10yrapp _10yrpatapp) cluster(focalcode) nolog  
 
Zero-inflated negative binomial regression        Number of obs   =       1689 
                                                  Nonzero obs     =        384 
                                                  Zero obs        =       1305 
 
Inflation model       = logit                     Wald chi2(35)   =    6034.79 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -1358.656                 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
                        (standard errors adjusted for clustering on focalcode) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
succmktapp_n |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Uphorizont~2 |   2.08e-07   2.02e-07     1.03   0.303    -1.88e-07    6.03e-07 
DNhorizont~n |   .0004568   .0003079     1.48   0.138    -.0001467    .0010604 
UPvertical~2 |  -.0000347   .0000177    -1.96   0.050    -.0000695   -2.62e-08 
DNvertical_n |   7.63e-06   4.19e-06     1.82   0.068    -5.75e-07    .0000158 
  tot_prtpat |   -.000308   .0001649    -1.87   0.062    -.0006311    .0000151 
     prtcomm |   -.005874   .0035132    -1.67   0.095    -.0127598    .0010117 
partnersta~s |   .0003108   .0001299     2.39   0.017     .0000562    .0005654 
lead1YRavg~l |  -.0360327   .0482323    -0.75   0.455    -.1305662    .0585009 
 brok_fixmis |   .0003685   .0002647     1.39   0.164    -.0001503    .0008873 
 dens_fixmis |  -.0115662   .0034614    -3.34   0.001    -.0183504    -.004782 
InterDirec~7 |   .0007753    .000869     0.89   0.372    -.0009279    .0024784 
  direct_t_7 |  -.0309792   .0144491    -2.14   0.032    -.0592989   -.0026594 
     ind_t_7 |   .0172391   .0153725     1.12   0.262    -.0128906    .0473687 
    _10yrapp |   .0366667    .006877     5.33   0.000      .023188    .0501453 
 _10yrpatapp |  -.0000209   .0001744    -0.12   0.905    -.0003628     .000321 
EquityEvents |  -.1031862   .0720148    -1.43   0.152    -.2443327    .0379603 
lead1YRs~24_ |  -.0032704   .0023899    -1.37   0.171    -.0079546    .0014138 
  yrcompst_C |    .008724   .0204745     0.43   0.670    -.0314053    .0488532 
diversific~C |     .05869   .0126975     4.62   0.000     .0338034    .0835766 
lead1YRnet~C |   .0000617   .0001174     0.53   0.599    -.0001683    .0002917 
lead1YRe~29_ |  -.0144736   .0159785    -0.91   0.365    -.0457909    .0168438 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .0005591   .0003101     1.80   0.071    -.0000486    .0011669 
      ydum08 |  -.1099063   .2878564    -0.38   0.703    -.6740944    .4542818 
      ydum09 |  -.2016159   .2888061    -0.70   0.485    -.7676654    .3644336 
      ydum10 |  -.1562746   .3177684    -0.49   0.623    -.7790892      .46654 
      ydum12 |  -.3354701   .2847278    -1.18   0.239    -.8935264    .2225862 
      ydum13 |  -.4373333   .2497697    -1.75   0.080    -.9268729    .0522062 
      ydum14 |  -.3464489   .2312983    -1.50   0.134    -.7997851    .1068874 
      ydum15 |  -.1564355     .18797    -0.83   0.405    -.5248498    .2119789 
      ydum16 |   .0506718   .1379643     0.37   0.713    -.2197332    .3210769 
      ydum17 |  -.0122161   .0898315    -0.14   0.892    -.1882827    .1638504 
      ydum18 |    .057659   .0756243     0.76   0.446    -.0905619    .2058799 
 naics325411 |   -25.0518   .7524307   -33.29   0.000    -26.52654   -23.57706 
 naics325412 |   1.390892   .2434238     5.71   0.000     .9137899    1.867994 
 naics325413 |   -1.21583   .4876133    -2.49   0.013    -2.171534   -.2601251 
       _cons |  -.2252313   .3920044    -0.57   0.566    -.9935457    .5430832 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate      | 
    _10yrapp |  -27.87202   .7346722   -37.94   0.000    -29.31195   -26.43209 
 _10yrpatapp |   .0001425   .0035701     0.04   0.968    -.0068548    .0071399 
       _cons |   2.681367   .3574352     7.50   0.000     1.980807    3.381927 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |  -1.018142   .4606822    -2.21   0.027    -1.921063   -.1152218 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   .3612654   .1664285                      .1464512    .8911684 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 6.6b Model #5 Adding Exploration and Exploitation Networks 
 
zinb  succmktapp_n tot_prtpat prtcomm partnerstatus   lead1YRavgyrcol   brok_fixmis  dens_fixmis 
InterDirect_Ind_t7  direct_t_7  ind_t_7  _10yrapp _10yrpatapp EquityEvents lead1YRstkprice_24_ 
yrcompst_C diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 
ydum03 ydum04 ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 
ydum18  naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 1992,inf(_10yrapp _10yrpatapp)  
cluster(focalcode) nolog  
 
Zero-inflated negative binomial regression        Number of obs   =       1689 
                                                  Nonzero obs     =        384 
                                                  Zero obs        =       1305 
 
Inflation model       = logit                     Wald chi2(31)   =    2560.79 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -1363.988                 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
                        (standard errors adjusted for clustering on focalcode) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
succmktapp_n |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
succmktapp_n | 
  tot_prtpat |  -.0000243   .0000853    -0.29   0.775    -.0001914    .0001428 
     prtcomm |  -.0065459   .0051198    -1.28   0.201    -.0165805    .0034886 
partnersta~s |   .0003412   .0001164     2.93   0.003     .0001131    .0005693 
lead1YRavg~l |  -.0334595   .0476899    -0.70   0.483      -.12693    .0600111 
 brok_fixmis |   .0003709   .0002746     1.35   0.177    -.0001672    .0009091 
 dens_fixmis |  -.0114477   .0035639    -3.21   0.001    -.0184329   -.0044626 
InterDirec~7 |   .0006324   .0008318     0.76   0.447    -.0009978    .0022627 
  direct_t_7 |    -.02948   .0143444    -2.06   0.040    -.0575944   -.0013655 
     ind_t_7 |   .0191656   .0150883     1.27   0.204     -.010407    .0487382 
    _10yrapp |   .0379626   .0081708     4.65   0.000     .0219482    .0539771 
 _10yrpatapp |  -.0000242   .0001749    -0.14   0.890     -.000367    .0003186 
EquityEvents |  -.1178366    .067509    -1.75   0.081    -.2501517    .0144786 
lead1YRs~24_ |  -.0036508   .0024294    -1.50   0.133    -.0084124    .0011108 
  yrcompst_C |   .0103023   .0186081     0.55   0.580    -.0261689    .0467736 
diversific~C |   .0572489   .0120414     4.75   0.000     .0336482    .0808496 
lead1YRnet~C |   .0000812   .0001136     0.72   0.474    -.0001414    .0003038 
lead1YRe~29_ |  -.0162521   .0156834    -1.04   0.300     -.046991    .0144869 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .0005785   .0003134     1.85   0.065    -.0000358    .0011928 
      ydum08 |  -.0823539   .2921088    -0.28   0.778    -.6548766    .4901689 
      ydum09 |  -.2019319   .2921654    -0.69   0.489    -.7745655    .3707016 
      ydum10 |  -.1678926    .305282    -0.55   0.582    -.7662344    .4304492 
      ydum12 |  -.2368333   .2805537    -0.84   0.399    -.7867085    .3130419 
      ydum13 |  -.4203142   .2468355    -1.70   0.089    -.9041029    .0634746 
      ydum14 |  -.3496575   .2245295    -1.56   0.119    -.7897273    .0904124 
      ydum15 |  -.1610792   .1886768    -0.85   0.393    -.5308789    .2087205 
      ydum16 |   .0320502   .1383498     0.23   0.817    -.2391105    .3032108 
      ydum17 |  -.0114921   .0893398    -0.13   0.898     -.186595    .1636107 
      ydum18 |   .0594575   .0757647     0.78   0.433    -.0890385    .2079536 
 naics325411 |  -25.70703   .7507209   -34.24   0.000    -27.17841   -24.23564 
 naics325412 |   1.418051   .2494936     5.68   0.000     .9290529     1.90705 
 naics325413 |  -1.327559    .453082    -2.93   0.003    -2.215583   -.4395345 
       _cons |  -.2918483   .3865891    -0.75   0.450    -1.049549    .4658525 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate      | 
    _10yrapp |  -27.80858   .6919654   -40.19   0.000    -29.16481   -26.45236 
 _10yrpatapp |   .0001058   .0035923     0.03   0.977     -.006935    .0071465 
       _cons |   2.665789   .3550057     7.51   0.000      1.96999    3.361587 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |  -.9709221   .4388747    -2.21   0.027    -1.831101   -.1107434 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   .3787337   .1662166                      .1602371    .8951684 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 6.6b Model #4 Adding Equity Partners and Tie Strength 
  
zinb succmktapp_n partnerstatus   lead1YRavgyrcol brok_fixmis  dens_fixmis InterDirect_Ind_t7  
direct_t_7  ind_t_7  _10yrapp _10yrpatapp EquityEvents lead1YRstkprice_24_ yrcompst_C 
diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 ydum0 
> 4 ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18 
naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 1992,inf(_10yrapp _10yrpatapp)  
cluster(focalcode) nolog  
 
Zero-inflated negative binomial regression        Number of obs   =       1689 
                                                  Nonzero obs     =        384 
                                                  Zero obs        =       1305 
 
Inflation model       = logit                     Wald chi2(29)   =    2359.67 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -1365.425                 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
                        (standard errors adjusted for clustering on focalcode) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
succmktapp_n |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
succmktapp_n | 
partnersta~s |   .0002775   .0000915     3.03   0.002     .0000982    .0004569 
lead1YRavg~l |  -.0333326   .0475976    -0.70   0.484    -.1266222    .0599569 
 brok_fixmis |   .0003757   .0002742     1.37   0.171    -.0001619    .0009132 
 dens_fixmis |  -.0121401   .0033092    -3.67   0.000    -.0186261   -.0056542 
InterDirec~7 |    .000611   .0008225     0.74   0.458     -.001001     .002223 
  direct_t_7 |  -.0294114   .0140911    -2.09   0.037    -.0570294   -.0017934 
     ind_t_7 |   .0202953   .0148828     1.36   0.173    -.0088744     .049465 
    _10yrapp |   .0379894   .0082584     4.60   0.000     .0218033    .0541754 
 _10yrpatapp |  -.0000101   .0001768    -0.06   0.955    -.0003565    .0003364 
EquityEvents |  -.1256594   .0683352    -1.84   0.066     -.259594    .0082752 
lead1YRs~24_ |  -.0036892   .0024856    -1.48   0.138    -.0085609    .0011824 
  yrcompst_C |   .0106127   .0187331     0.57   0.571    -.0261035    .0473288 
diversific~C |   .0564361   .0120764     4.67   0.000     .0327668    .0801054 
lead1YRnet~C |   .0000732   .0001178     0.62   0.534    -.0001577    .0003041 
lead1YRe~29_ |   -.016219   .0161053    -1.01   0.314    -.0477848    .0153468 
lead1YRr~46_ |    .000585   .0003191     1.83   0.067    -.0000404    .0012104 
      ydum08 |  -.0777762     .29224    -0.27   0.790    -.6505562    .4950038 
      ydum09 |  -.2035886   .2947641    -0.69   0.490    -.7813155    .3741384 
      ydum10 |  -.1573833   .3116836    -0.50   0.614     -.768272    .4535054 
      ydum12 |  -.2522137   .2920617    -0.86   0.388     -.824644    .3202167 
      ydum13 |  -.4053906   .2398524    -1.69   0.091    -.8754927    .0647115 
      ydum14 |    -.32523   .2234734    -1.46   0.146    -.7632298    .1127698 
      ydum15 |  -.1690341   .1878276    -0.90   0.368    -.5371694    .1991011 
      ydum16 |    .015047   .1379823     0.11   0.913    -.2553934    .2854873 
      ydum17 |  -.0111749   .0883695    -0.13   0.899     -.184376    .1620261 
      ydum18 |   .0574786   .0760794     0.76   0.450    -.0916343    .2065916 
 naics325411 |  -25.86051   .7508745   -34.44   0.000    -27.33219   -24.38882 
 naics325412 |    1.41644   .2592875     5.46   0.000     .9082459    1.924634 
 naics325413 |  -1.338307   .4619078    -2.90   0.004    -2.243629   -.4329839 
       _cons |  -.2882424   .3964389    -0.73   0.467    -1.065248    .4887635 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate      | 
    _10yrapp |  -27.78007   .6846587   -40.58   0.000    -29.12198   -26.43817 
 _10yrpatapp |   .0000996   .0035878     0.03   0.978    -.0069324    .0071315 
       _cons |   2.665978   .3551954     7.51   0.000     1.969808    3.362148 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |  -.9663697   .4447043    -2.17   0.030    -1.837974   -.0947653 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   .3804617    .169193                      .1591395    .9095864 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
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Table 6.6b Model #3 Adding Brokerage and Density (Structural Holes) 
 
zinb  succmktapp_n brok_fixmis  dens_fixmis InterDirect_Ind_t7  direct_t_7  ind_t_7  _10yrapp 
_10yrpatapp EquityEvents lead1YRstkprice_24_  yrcompst_C diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C 
lead1YRemploy_29_ lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 ydum04 ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 
ydum10 ydum12 ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18  naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if 
yeardata > 1992,inf(_10yrapp _10yrpatapp) cluster(focalcode) nolog  
 
Zero-inflated negative binomial regression        Number of obs   =       1689 
                                                  Nonzero obs     =        384 
                                                  Zero obs        =       1305 
 
Inflation model       = logit                     Wald chi2(27)   =    2006.76 
Log pseudo-likelihood =  -1374.58                 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
                        (standard errors adjusted for clustering on focalcode) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
succmktapp_n |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
succmktapp_n | 
 brok_fixmis |   .0004132    .000284     1.45   0.146    -.0001434    .0009697 
 dens_fixmis |  -.0119907   .0035964    -3.33   0.001    -.0190396   -.0049419 
InterDirec~7 |   .0001296   .0008304     0.16   0.876     -.001498    .0017573 
  direct_t_7 |  -.0245703   .0140408    -1.75   0.080    -.0520897    .0029492 
     ind_t_7 |   .0299021   .0154569     1.93   0.053    -.0003929    .0601972 
    _10yrapp |   .0387895    .009898     3.92   0.000     .0193899    .0581892 
 _10yrpatapp |  -.0000538   .0001747    -0.31   0.758    -.0003963    .0002886 
EquityEvents |  -.1280968   .0697845    -1.84   0.066     -.264872    .0086784 
lead1YRs~24_ |   -.003281   .0026189    -1.25   0.210     -.008414    .0018521 
  yrcompst_C |   .0142781   .0184536     0.77   0.439    -.0218902    .0504464 
diversific~C |   .0569799   .0118386     4.81   0.000     .0337768    .0801831 
lead1YRnet~C |   .0001165   .0001101     1.06   0.290    -.0000993    .0003323 
lead1YRe~29_ |  -.0194794   .0157414    -1.24   0.216    -.0503321    .0113732 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .0005593   .0003158     1.77   0.077    -.0000597    .0011783 
      ydum08 |   .1652353   .3101609     0.53   0.594    -.4426689    .7731395 
      ydum09 |     .06395    .288427     0.22   0.825    -.5013565    .6292566 
      ydum10 |     .20778   .2971958     0.70   0.484     -.374713     .790273 
      ydum12 |   .1431266   .2796032     0.51   0.609    -.4048855    .6911388 
      ydum13 |   .0231705   .2067398     0.11   0.911    -.3820321     .428373 
      ydum14 |   .0346298   .1769112     0.20   0.845    -.3121098    .3813695 
      ydum15 |  -.0180265   .1583978    -0.11   0.909    -.3284806    .2924275 
      ydum16 |   .1588149   .1104041     1.44   0.150    -.0575732     .375203 
      ydum17 |   .0575411   .0772731     0.74   0.456    -.0939113    .2089935 
      ydum18 |   .1008764   .0764692     1.32   0.187    -.0490005    .2507533 
 naics325411 |  -25.16242   .7612197   -33.06   0.000    -26.65438   -23.67045 
 naics325412 |   1.379252   .2880169     4.79   0.000     .8147495    1.943755 
 naics325413 |  -1.375851   .5109555    -2.69   0.007    -2.377305   -.3743967 
       _cons |  -.5966246   .4564478    -1.31   0.191    -1.491246    .2979966 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate      | 
    _10yrapp |  -27.25602   .7973782   -34.18   0.000    -28.81885   -25.69319 
 _10yrpatapp |   .0001225   .0035977     0.03   0.973    -.0069289    .0071739 
       _cons |   2.663331   .3584669     7.43   0.000     1.960749    3.365913 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |   -.919298   .4434984    -2.07   0.038    -1.788539   -.0500571 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   .3987989   .1768667                      .1672043    .9511751 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 6.6b Model #2 Adding Direct, Indirect, and Interaction Effects 
 
zinb  succmktapp_n InterDirect_Ind_t7  direct_t_7  ind_t_7  _10yrapp _10yrpatapp EquityEvents 
lead1YRstkprice_24_ yrcompst_C diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ 
lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 ydum04 ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 
ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18  naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 
1992,inf(_10yrapp _10yrpatapp) cluster(focalcode) nolog  
 
Zero-inflated negative binomial regression        Number of obs   =       1689 
                                                  Nonzero obs     =        384 
                                                  Zero obs        =       1305 
 
Inflation model       = logit                     Wald chi2(25)   =    2964.23 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -1386.489                 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
                        (standard errors adjusted for clustering on focalcode) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
succmktapp_n |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
succmktapp_n | 
InterDirec~7 |   .0004237   .0007718     0.55   0.583    -.0010891    .0019365 
  direct_t_7 |  -.0102149   .0154562    -0.66   0.509    -.0405084    .0200787 
     ind_t_7 |   .0132386   .0154681     0.86   0.392    -.0170782    .0435554 
    _10yrapp |   .0413808   .0124452     3.33   0.001     .0169886    .0657729 
 _10yrpatapp |   .0000563   .0001707     0.33   0.742    -.0002783    .0003909 
EquityEvents |  -.1072124   .0669656    -1.60   0.109    -.2384625    .0240378 
lead1YRs~24_ |  -.0052621   .0028989    -1.82   0.069    -.0109439    .0004197 
  yrcompst_C |   .0151121   .0177855     0.85   0.395    -.0197469    .0499711 
diversific~C |   .0561901   .0121763     4.61   0.000      .032325    .0800551 
lead1YRnet~C |   .0001429   .0001139     1.25   0.210    -.0000803    .0003661 
lead1YRe~29_ |  -.0202348   .0150904    -1.34   0.180    -.0498115    .0093418 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .0005363    .000301     1.78   0.075    -.0000536    .0011263 
      ydum08 |   .0886147   .3081313     0.29   0.774    -.5153115    .6925409 
      ydum09 |  -.0237622   .2809792    -0.08   0.933    -.5744713     .526947 
      ydum10 |   .1225442   .2846492     0.43   0.667     -.435358    .6804465 
      ydum12 |   .0542705   .2579564     0.21   0.833    -.4513147    .5598557 
      ydum13 |   .0308722   .1982554     0.16   0.876    -.3577012    .4194455 
      ydum14 |   .0185696   .1679772     0.11   0.912    -.3106596    .3477989 
      ydum15 |  -.0722332   .1494836    -0.48   0.629    -.3652157    .2207493 
      ydum16 |    .109646   .1063997     1.03   0.303    -.0988936    .3181856 
      ydum17 |   .0280176   .0722997     0.39   0.698    -.1136872    .1697223 
      ydum18 |   .0614116   .0678463     0.91   0.365    -.0715646    .1943878 
 naics325411 |  -34.58631   .7591194   -45.56   0.000    -36.07416   -33.09846 
 naics325412 |   1.357068   .2957671     4.59   0.000      .777375    1.936761 
 naics325413 |   -1.32993   .4709584    -2.82   0.005    -2.252991   -.4068684 
       _cons |  -.5714094    .448765    -1.27   0.203    -1.450973    .3081539 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate      | 
    _10yrapp |  -28.13163   .7894787   -35.63   0.000    -29.67898   -26.58428 
 _10yrpatapp |   .0002665   .0036644     0.07   0.942    -.0069156    .0074486 
       _cons |   2.645191   .3595282     7.36   0.000     1.940529    3.349853 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |   -.812132   .3692998    -2.20   0.028    -1.535946   -.0883177 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   .4439106   .1639361                      .2152519    .9154699 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 6.6b Model #1 Based Model with Control Variables 
 
zinb  succmktapp_n _10yrapp _10yrpatapp EquityEvents lead1YRstkprice_24_ yrcompst_C 
diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 ydum04 
ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18  
naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 1992,inf(succmktapp_n  _10yrapp) 
cluster(focalcode) nolog  
 
Zero-inflated negative binomial regression        Number of obs   =       1689 
                                                  Nonzero obs     =        384 
                                                  Zero obs        =       1305 
 
Inflation model       = logit                     Wald chi2(22)   =    1729.25 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -1179.825                 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
                        (standard errors adjusted for clustering on focalcode) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
succmktapp_n |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
succmktapp_n | 
    _10yrapp |   .0402657   .0101124     3.98   0.000     .0204458    .0600855 
 _10yrpatapp |   .0000628   .0001509     0.42   0.677    -.0002329    .0003586 
EquityEvents |  -.1083547   .0781865    -1.39   0.166    -.2615974     .044888 
lead1YRs~24_ |   -.006407   .0031428    -2.04   0.041    -.0125668   -.0002472 
  yrcompst_C |   .0140547   .0163458     0.86   0.390    -.0179826     .046092 
diversific~C |   .0534817   .0104985     5.09   0.000     .0329049    .0740585 
lead1YRnet~C |   .0001624   .0000945     1.72   0.086    -.0000228    .0003477 
lead1YRe~29_ |  -.0175325   .0147012    -1.19   0.233    -.0463463    .0112813 
lead1YRr~46_ |    .000386   .0002844     1.36   0.175    -.0001715    .0009435 
      ydum08 |   .0024009   .2556773     0.01   0.993    -.4987175    .5035192 
      ydum09 |  -.1126675   .2243303    -0.50   0.615    -.5523469    .3270119 
      ydum10 |   .0423912   .2216299     0.19   0.848    -.3919954    .4767778 
      ydum12 |  -.0519635   .2049074    -0.25   0.800    -.4535746    .3496476 
      ydum13 |  -.0759873   .1641147    -0.46   0.643    -.3976461    .2456715 
      ydum14 |  -.0521969   .1612466    -0.32   0.746    -.3682344    .2638405 
      ydum15 |  -.0677934    .142017    -0.48   0.633    -.3461416    .2105547 
      ydum16 |    .095382    .104276     0.91   0.360    -.1089951    .2997591 
      ydum17 |   .0316987   .0755672     0.42   0.675    -.1164103    .1798077 
      ydum18 |   .0656417    .064509     1.02   0.309    -.0607937    .1920771 
 naics325411 |   -9.52357    .711873   -13.38   0.000    -10.91882   -8.128324 
 naics325412 |   1.286459   .2799125     4.60   0.000     .7378406    1.835077 
 naics325413 |  -.7749272   .2590484    -2.99   0.003    -1.282653   -.2672015 
       _cons |  -.3031928   .3990699    -0.76   0.447    -1.085356    .4789699 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate      | 
succmktapp_n |   -46.8954   .3088568  -151.84   0.000    -47.50074   -46.29005 
    _10yrapp |  -1.373314   .3231917    -4.25   0.000    -2.006758   -.7398696 
       _cons |   24.28152    .100284   242.13   0.000     24.08497    24.47807 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |  -.8600018    .381108    -2.26   0.024     -1.60696   -.1130439 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   .4231613   .1612702                      .2004963    .8931115 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 6.6c Model#7 Test for Fixed-Effects on GLS Regression on Sales 
 
xtreg sales_12_D2 Uphorizontie_n2 DNhorizontie_n UPvertical_n2 DNvertical_n tot_prtpat prtcomm 
partnerstatus   lead1YRavgyrcol   brok_fixmis  dens_fixmis InterDirect_Ind_t7  direct_t_7  
ind_t_7  _10yrapp _10yrpatapp EquityEvents lead1YRstkprice_24_ yrcompst_C diversification_C 
lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 ydum04 ydum05 ydum06 
ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18  naics325411 
naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 1992, fe   
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1689 
Group variable (i): focalcode                   Number of groups   =       260 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5005                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.5451                                        avg =       6.5 
       overall = 0.5747                                        max =        11 
 
                                                F(31,1398)         =     45.19 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8047                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 sales_12_D2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Uphorizont~2 |    -.00138     .00029    -4.76   0.000    -.0019489    -.000811 
DNhorizont~n |  -1.760333   .4941765    -3.56   0.000     -2.72974   -.7909253 
UPvertical~2 |   .1312696   .0467447     2.81   0.005     .0395722    .2229669 
DNvertical_n |   .0233909   .0048145     4.86   0.000     .0139464    .0328354 
  tot_prtpat |   .3437352   .0973231     3.53   0.000     .1528202    .5346503 
     prtcomm |   3.423298   3.844885     0.89   0.373    -4.119068    10.96566 
partnersta~s |  -.3111221   .0869278    -3.58   0.000     -.481645   -.1405992 
lead1YRavg~l |   57.90349   36.19582     1.60   0.110    -13.10047    128.9075 
 brok_fixmis |   4.337319    .363116    11.94   0.000     3.625008     5.04963 
 dens_fixmis |  -4.590208   5.269833    -0.87   0.384    -14.92784    5.747424 
InterDirec~7 |  -2.178392   .7027059    -3.10   0.002    -3.556863   -.7999198 
  direct_t_7 |  -62.80147   14.82938    -4.23   0.000     -91.8917   -33.71125 
     ind_t_7 |   13.44535   11.32488     1.19   0.235    -8.770232    35.66093 
    _10yrapp |   220.8077   25.04584     8.82   0.000     171.6763    269.9392 
 _10yrpatapp |   12.69719   .7163475    17.72   0.000     11.29196    14.10242 
 EquityEvents|   135.1334   53.48705     2.53   0.012     30.20986    240.0569 
lead1YRs~24_ |  -5.354024   2.721076    -1.97   0.049    -10.69186   -.0161922 
  yrcompst_C |   389.1471   995.1599     0.39   0.696    -1563.021    2341.315 
diversific~C |  (dropped) 
lead1YRnet~C |   -.192607   .1094867    -1.76   0.079    -.4073829     .022169 
lead1YRe~29_ |   20.08055   13.48398     1.49   0.137    -6.370453    46.53156 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .0953219   .1428758     0.67   0.505    -.1849521    .3755959 
      ydum08 |    4252.51   9933.812     0.43   0.669    -15234.27    23739.29 
      ydum09 |   3873.541   8940.039     0.43   0.665     -13663.8    21410.88 
      ydum10 |   3641.765   7954.585     0.46   0.647    -11962.45    19245.97 
      ydum12 |   3195.784   6963.903     0.46   0.646    -10465.04    16856.61 
      ydum13 |   2741.212    5971.13     0.46   0.646    -8972.129    14454.55 
      ydum14 |   2319.469   4976.782     0.47   0.641    -7443.297    12082.24 
      ydum15 |   1899.311   3984.701     0.48   0.634    -5917.326    9715.948 
      ydum16 |   1539.752   2989.371     0.52   0.607    -4324.385     7403.89 
      ydum17 |    1068.15   1994.911     0.54   0.592    -2845.191    4981.491 
      ydum18 |   529.4022   1002.544     0.53   0.598    -1437.251    2496.056 
 naics325411 |  (dropped) 
 naics325412 |  (dropped) 
 naics325413 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -6130.564   13316.57    -0.46   0.645    -32253.19    19992.06 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  4518.5232 
     sigma_e |  1141.8332 
         rho |  .93997546   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(259, 1398) =    25.16           Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Table 6.6c Model #6 GLS Regression on Sales (Final Model) 
 
xtreg sales_12_D2 Uphorizontie_n2 DNhorizontie_n UPvertical_n2 DNvertical_n tot_prtpat prtcomm 
partnerstatus   lead1YRavgyrcol   brok_fixmis  dens_fixmis InterDirect_Ind_t7  direct_t_7  
ind_t_7  _10yrapp _10yrpatapp EquityEvents lead1YRstkprice_24_ yrcompst_C diversification_C 
lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 ydum04 ydum05 ydum06 
ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18  naics325411 
naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 1992 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1689 
Group variable (i): focalcode                   Number of groups   =       260 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4883                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.6453                                        avg =       6.5 
       overall = 0.6667                                        max =        11 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(35)      =   1799.73 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 sales_12_D2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Uphorizont~2 |   -.001392   .0002963    -4.70   0.000    -.0019728   -.0008113 
DNhorizont~n |  -1.707584   .5035213    -3.39   0.001    -2.694468   -.7207007 
UPvertical~2 |   .1352774     .04743     2.85   0.004     .0423162    .2282385 
DNvertical_n |   .0243462   .0047205     5.16   0.000     .0150941    .0335982 
  tot_prtpat |   .3370022    .099349     3.39   0.001     .1422817    .5317227 
     prtcomm |   4.045518    3.92254     1.03   0.302    -3.642519    11.73355 
partnersta~s |  -.3571168   .0882778    -4.05   0.000     -.530138   -.1840955 
lead1YRavg~l |   68.60646   31.86056     2.15   0.031     6.160901     131.052 
 brok_fixmis |   5.314911   .3408769    15.59   0.000     4.646805    5.983017 
 dens_fixmis |  -3.259564    5.24709    -0.62   0.534    -13.54367    7.024543 
InterDirec~7 |  -2.260517   .6822488    -3.31   0.001      -3.5977    -.923334 
  direct_t_7 |  -77.65044    14.2201    -5.46   0.000    -105.5213   -49.77956 
     ind_t_7 |   17.62112   11.06872     1.59   0.111    -4.073176    39.31543 
    _10yrapp |   103.9359   12.85762     8.08   0.000     78.73541    129.1363 
 _10yrpatapp |   9.910993   .5341365    18.56   0.000     8.864104    10.95788 
 EquityEvents|   116.3305    54.4288     2.14   0.033     9.652055     223.009 
lead1YRs~24_ |  -6.917915   2.672342    -2.59   0.010    -12.15561   -1.680221 
  yrcompst_C |  -18.26727   25.44801    -0.72   0.473    -68.14445    31.60991 
diversific~C |   51.70613    23.8489     2.17   0.030     4.963138    98.44913 
lead1YRnet~C |  -.1920691   .1059902    -1.81   0.070    -.3998061    .0156678 
lead1YRe~29_ |   14.39227   11.28493     1.28   0.202    -7.725786    36.51032 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .1278347   .1364687     0.94   0.349     -.139639    .3953084 
      ydum08 |   12.87563   364.0772     0.04   0.972    -700.7025    726.4538 
      ydum09 |    82.1373   337.1198     0.24   0.808    -578.6054      742.88 
      ydum10 |   309.7905   305.5929     1.01   0.311    -289.1606    908.7416 
      ydum12 |   278.2225   276.1658     1.01   0.314    -263.0526    819.4976 
      ydum13 |    258.702   255.1258     1.01   0.311    -241.3354    758.7395 
      ydum14 |   232.5283   223.8811     1.04   0.299    -206.2705    671.3271 
      ydum15 |   260.3448   193.9865     1.34   0.180    -119.8618    640.5513 
      ydum16 |   335.8041   164.8963     2.04   0.042     12.61336    658.9949 
      ydum17 |   283.2339     140.81     2.01   0.044     7.251285    559.2164 
      ydum18 |    138.014   124.9494     1.10   0.269    -106.8823    382.9104 
 naics325411 |  -203.3507   1475.747    -0.14   0.890    -3095.762     2689.06 
 naics325412 |   145.2666   344.4495     0.42   0.673    -529.8421    820.3753 
 naics325413 |  -96.26103   460.2053    -0.21   0.834    -998.2468    805.7248 
       _cons |  -577.0613   437.8939    -1.32   0.188    -1435.318     281.195 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2313.5242 
     sigma_e |  1141.8332 
         rho |  .80412434   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 6.6c Model #5 Adding Exploration and Exploitation Networks 
 
xtreg sales_12_D2 tot_prtpat prtcomm partnerstatus   lead1YRavgyrcol   brok_fixmis  dens_fixmis 
InterDirect_Ind_t7  direct_t_7  ind_t_7  _10yrapp _10yrpatapp EquityEvents lead1YRstkprice_24_ 
yrcompst_C diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 
ydum03 ydum04 ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 
ydum18  naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 1992  
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1689 
Group variable (i): focalcode                   Number of groups   =       260 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4688                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.6377                                        avg =       6.5 
       overall = 0.6573                                        max =        11 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(31)      =   1678.37 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 sales_12_D2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  tot_prtpat |   .4248523   .0848456     5.01   0.000     .2585579    .5911466 
     prtcomm |   3.299094   3.710229     0.89   0.374    -3.972821    10.57101 
partnersta~s |  -.3673773   .0879936    -4.18   0.000    -.5398415    -.194913 
lead1YRavg~l |   68.89252   32.42258     2.12   0.034     5.345429    132.4396 
 brok_fixmis |   4.743796   .3338277    14.21   0.000     4.089506    5.398086 
 dens_fixmis |  -3.961754   5.321165    -0.74   0.457    -14.39105    6.467539 
InterDirec~7 |  -2.385598   .6595395    -3.62   0.000    -3.678272   -1.092924 
  direct_t_7 |  -70.14895   14.28533    -4.91   0.000    -98.14769   -42.15022 
     ind_t_7 |   19.84345   11.07224     1.79   0.073    -1.857746    41.54464 
    _10yrapp |   104.4588   13.16687     7.93   0.000     78.65217    130.2654 
 _10yrpatapp |   10.28268   .5405355    19.02   0.000     9.223247    11.34211 
 EquityEvents|   98.28409   55.05274     1.79   0.074    -9.617306    206.1855 
lead1YRs~24_ |  -8.556451   2.699052    -3.17   0.002     -13.8465   -3.266406 
  yrcompst_C |  -18.90357   26.21835    -0.72   0.471    -70.29058    32.48345 
diversific~C |   54.59246   24.54008     2.22   0.026     6.494782    102.6901 
lead1YRnet~C |  -.1994282   .1075157    -1.85   0.064    -.4101551    .0112988 
lead1YRe~29_ |   12.87515   11.48274     1.12   0.262    -9.630613    35.38091 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .1513368   .1383975     1.09   0.274    -.1199172    .4225908 
      ydum08 |   16.84491    372.392     0.05   0.964      -713.03    746.7199 
      ydum09 |   64.94555   344.6882     0.19   0.851     -610.631    740.5221 
      ydum10 |   267.2338   312.0705     0.86   0.392     -344.413    878.8807 
      ydum12 |   320.2409   281.9304     1.14   0.256    -232.3326    872.8144 
      ydum13 |   251.1305   260.3975     0.96   0.335    -259.2392    761.5002 
      ydum14 |   232.6085   228.4454     1.02   0.309    -215.1363    680.3533 
      ydum15 |   269.8842   197.7775     1.36   0.172    -117.7525     657.521 
      ydum16 |   333.9562   167.8907     1.99   0.047     4.896415     663.016 
      ydum17 |   279.8893   143.1047     1.96   0.050    -.5908414    560.3694 
      ydum18 |   131.0359   126.6865     1.03   0.301     -117.265    379.3369 
 naics325411 |  -212.9803   1520.707    -0.14   0.889    -3193.511     2767.55 
 naics325412 |   160.7174   355.0358     0.45   0.651    -535.1399    856.5748 
 naics325413 |  -105.2315   474.5555    -0.22   0.825    -1035.343    824.8803 
       _cons |  -588.0686   449.0971    -1.31   0.190    -1468.283    292.1455 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2400.6119 
     sigma_e |  1163.4312 




Table 6.6c Model #4 Adding Prominence of Partners and Tie Strength 
  
xtreg sales_12_D2 partnerstatus   lead1YRavgyrcol   brok_fixmis  dens_fixmis InterDirect_Ind_t7  
direct_t_7  ind_t_7  _10yrapp _10yrpatapp EquityEvents lead1YRstkprice_24_ yrcompst_C 
diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 ydum04 
ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18  
naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 1992 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1689 
Group variable (i): focalcode                   Number of groups   =       260 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4594                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.6348                                        avg =       6.5 
       overall = 0.6539                                        max =        11 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(29)      =   1629.94 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 sales_12_D2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
partnersta~s |   -.108801   .0709565    -1.53   0.125    -.2478732    .0302711 
lead1YRavg~l |     68.024   32.63144     2.08   0.037     4.067559    131.9804 
 brok_fixmis |   4.535541   .3338275    13.59   0.000     3.881251    5.189831 
 dens_fixmis |  -4.216691   5.345892    -0.79   0.430    -14.69445    6.261065 
InterDirec~7 |  -2.395103   .6618595    -3.62   0.000    -3.692324   -1.097882 
  direct_t_7 |  -67.52081   14.33967    -4.71   0.000    -95.62605   -39.41557 
     ind_t_7 |   18.54987   11.11441     1.67   0.095    -3.233976    40.33373 
    _10yrapp |   102.9821   13.20725     7.80   0.000     77.09638    128.8679 
 _10yrpatapp |   10.39945   .5427897    19.16   0.000       9.3356     11.4633 
 EquityEvents|   92.50702   55.39283     1.67   0.095    -16.06093     201.075 
lead1YRs~24_ |  -8.465844   2.720937    -3.11   0.002    -13.79878   -3.132906 
  yrcompst_C |  -19.12055   26.26817    -0.73   0.467    -70.60521    32.36412 
diversific~C |   56.16242   24.58734     2.28   0.022     7.972117    104.3527 
lead1YRnet~C |  -.2090845   .1083741    -1.93   0.054    -.4214939    .0033249 
lead1YRe~29_ |   14.03145   11.55251     1.21   0.225    -8.611047    36.67395 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .1557312   .1395148     1.12   0.264    -.1177128    .4291752 
      ydum08 |   28.76239   373.8538     0.08   0.939    -703.9775    761.5023 
      ydum09 |   75.96487   346.1495     0.22   0.826    -602.4757    754.4055 
      ydum10 |   232.4236    313.403     0.74   0.458     -381.835    846.6823 
      ydum12 |   329.4986   283.3215     1.16   0.245    -225.8013    884.7984 
      ydum13 |   218.3699   261.7171     0.83   0.404    -294.5863     731.326 
      ydum14 |   198.0712   229.6138     0.86   0.388    -251.9636     648.106 
      ydum15 |   263.9178   198.9091     1.33   0.185    -125.9368    653.7724 
      ydum16 |   338.6596   168.9893     2.00   0.045      7.44676    669.8725 
      ydum17 |   272.8918   144.1348     1.89   0.058    -9.607259    555.3908 
      ydum18 |   122.2852    127.708     0.96   0.338    -128.0178    372.5883 
 naics325411 |  -232.2859   1523.585    -0.15   0.879    -3218.458    2753.886 
 naics325412 |   173.1746   355.6234     0.49   0.626    -523.8344    870.1836 
 naics325413 |  -116.3141   475.3171    -0.24   0.807    -1047.918    815.2902 
       _cons |  -590.8986   450.4557    -1.31   0.190    -1473.776    291.9784 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2403.5701 
     sigma_e |  1173.3739 
         rho |  .80754615   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 6.6c Model #3 Adding Brokerage and Density (Structural Holes) 
 
xtreg sales_12_D2 brok_fixmis  dens_fixmis InterDirect_Ind_t7  direct_t_7  ind_t_7  _10yrapp 
_10yrpatapp EquityEvents lead1YRstkprice_24_ yrcompst_C diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C 
lead1YRemploy_29_ lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 ydum04 ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 
ydum10 ydum12 ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18  naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if 
yeardata > 1992 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1689 
Group variable (i): focalcode                   Number of groups   =       260 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4578                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.6328                                        avg =       6.5 
       overall = 0.6527                                        max =        11 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(27)      =   1618.57 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 sales_12_D2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 brok_fixmis |   4.483722   .3319732    13.51   0.000     3.833066    5.134377 
 dens_fixmis |  -4.293583   5.348312    -0.80   0.422    -14.77608    6.188916 
InterDirec~7 |  -2.204573   .6559913    -3.36   0.001    -3.490292   -.9188534 
  direct_t_7 |  -65.97067   14.32134    -4.61   0.000    -94.03997   -37.90137 
     ind_t_7 |   17.61214   11.12159     1.58   0.113    -4.185782    39.41006 
    _10yrapp |   103.3026   13.23318     7.81   0.000       77.366    129.2391 
 _10yrpatapp |   10.51712   .5417947    19.41   0.000     9.455219    11.57902 
 EquityEvents|   91.72782   55.34879     1.66   0.097     -16.7538    200.2095 
lead1YRs~24_ |  -8.465141   2.722154    -3.11   0.002    -13.80046   -3.129818 
  yrcompst_C |  -22.90999   26.28789    -0.87   0.383     -74.4333    28.61332 
diversific~C |   54.91073   24.59394     2.23   0.026     6.707484     103.114 
lead1YRnet~C |  -.2166733   .1084079    -2.00   0.046    -.4291489   -.0041977 
lead1YRe~29_ |   16.15137   11.52641     1.40   0.161    -6.439976    38.74272 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .1341321    .139354     0.96   0.336    -.1389968     .407261 
      ydum08 |  -374.8914   319.1205    -1.17   0.240    -1000.356    250.5734 
      ydum09 |  -317.0595   291.1758    -1.09   0.276    -887.7535    253.6345 
      ydum10 |  -150.4706   258.4378    -0.58   0.560    -656.9995    356.0582 
      ydum12 |  -42.28621   230.2358    -0.18   0.854      -493.54    408.9676 
      ydum13 |  -161.8171    207.315    -0.78   0.435     -568.147    244.5128 
      ydum14 |  -119.7604   184.0991    -0.65   0.515     -480.588    241.0673 
      ydum15 |    25.6283   166.2379     0.15   0.877     -300.192    351.4486 
      ydum16 |   154.1279   146.6094     1.05   0.293    -133.2212     441.477 
      ydum17 |   151.5726    132.874     1.14   0.254    -108.8557    412.0009 
      ydum18 |   63.70452   124.6685     0.51   0.609    -180.6412    308.0503 
 naics325411 |  -152.4179   1526.972    -0.10   0.920    -3145.228    2840.392 
 naics325412 |   158.9315   356.4694     0.45   0.656    -539.7357    857.5987 
 naics325413 |  -84.68573   476.3387    -0.18   0.859    -1018.292     848.921 
       _cons |  -128.2834   395.8478    -0.32   0.746    -904.1307     647.564 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2408.0712 
     sigma_e |   1173.818 
         rho |  .80800966   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 6.6c Model #2 Adding Direct, Indirect, and Interaction Effects 
 
xtreg sales_12_D2 InterDirect_Ind_t7  direct_t_7  ind_t_7  _10yrapp _10yrpatapp EquityEvents 
lead1YRstkprice_24_ yrcompst_C diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ 
lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 ydum04 ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 
ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18  naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 1992 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1689 
Group variable (i): focalcode                   Number of groups   =       260 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4210                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.5738                                        avg =       6.5 
       overall = 0.5952                                        max =        11 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(25)      =   1284.92 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 sales_12_D2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
InterDirec~7 |  -.1441807    .667138    -0.22   0.829    -1.451747    1.163386 
  direct_t_7 |   34.39097   12.85661     2.67   0.007     9.192475    59.58947 
     ind_t_7 |  -20.85847   11.20318    -1.86   0.063    -42.81631    1.099365 
    _10yrapp |    138.423   13.98308     9.90   0.000     111.0167    165.8294 
 _10yrpatapp |   13.39031   .5347872    25.04   0.000     12.34215    14.43847 
 EquityEvents|   121.0456   57.80947     2.09   0.036     7.741101    234.3501 
lead1YRs~24_ |  -9.405718    2.84942    -3.30   0.001    -14.99048   -3.820958 
  yrcompst_C |  -45.01601   28.49346    -1.58   0.114    -100.8622    10.83014 
diversific~C |   28.32991   26.61958     1.06   0.287    -23.84351    80.50334 
lead1YRnet~C |  -.2843486   .1135208    -2.50   0.012    -.5068454   -.0618519 
lead1YRe~29_ |   19.21932   12.18443     1.58   0.115    -4.661714    43.10036 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .1588877   .1460787     1.09   0.277    -.1274213    .4451968 
      ydum08 |  -560.1483   341.6311    -1.64   0.101    -1229.733    109.4364 
      ydum09 |  -523.4991   311.3455    -1.68   0.093    -1133.725    86.72686 
      ydum10 |  -355.8772   276.2594    -1.29   0.198    -897.3357    185.5813 
      ydum12 |  -228.4984   245.7884    -0.93   0.353    -710.2348    253.2379 
      ydum13 |  -264.9213   221.1014    -1.20   0.231    -698.2722    168.4295 
      ydum14 |  -248.5346   195.9756    -1.27   0.205    -632.6396    135.5705 
      ydum15 |  -200.5463   175.6483    -1.14   0.254    -544.8107     143.718 
      ydum16 |  -45.52497   154.3039    -0.30   0.768     -347.955    256.9051 
      ydum17 |  -5.750086   139.3104    -0.04   0.967    -278.7934    267.2932 
      ydum18 |  -43.76022   130.3602    -0.34   0.737    -299.2615     211.741 
 naics325411 |   442.6905   1657.279     0.27   0.789    -2805.517    3690.898 
 naics325412 |   108.4723   387.3931     0.28   0.779    -650.8042    867.7487 
 naics325413 |  -54.75043   517.9598    -0.11   0.916    -1069.933    960.4321 
       _cons |   78.79576   428.5584     0.18   0.854    -761.1633    918.7548 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2591.8767 
     sigma_e |  1212.9576 
         rho |  .82033828   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 6.6c Model #1 Based Model with Control Variables 
 
xtreg sales_12_D2 _10yrapp _10yrpatapp EquityEvents lead1YRstkprice_24_ yrcompst_C 
diversification_C lead1YRnet_inc_C lead1YRemploy_29_ lead1YRr_d_46_  ydum01 ydum02 ydum03 ydum04 
ydum05 ydum06 ydum07 ydum08 ydum09 ydum10 ydum12 ydum13 ydum14 ydum15 ydum16 ydum17 ydum18 
naics325411 naics325412 naics325413 if yeardata > 1992  
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1689 
Group variable (i): focalcode                   Number of groups   =       260 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4206                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.5698                                        avg =       6.5 
       overall = 0.5878                                        max =        11 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(22)      =   1256.88 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 sales_12_D2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    _10yrapp |   147.4105   14.09149    10.46   0.000     119.7917    175.0293 
 _10yrpatapp |   13.89577    .515741    26.94   0.000     12.88494     14.9066 
 EquityEvents|   112.9404   57.63146     1.96   0.050    -.0151582     225.896 
lead1YRs~24_ |   -9.42003   2.846084    -3.31   0.001    -14.99825   -3.841808 
  yrcompst_C |  -44.39761   29.14083    -1.52   0.128    -101.5126    12.71738 
diversific~C |   29.64311   27.19807     1.09   0.276    -23.66414    82.95035 
lead1YRnet~C |  -.2797467   .1135167    -2.46   0.014    -.5022354    -.057258 
lead1YRe~29_ |   19.08259   12.23247     1.56   0.119    -4.892611    43.05779 
lead1YRr~46_ |   .1623298   .1459582     1.11   0.266     -.123743    .4484025 
      ydum08 |  -567.7345   344.0461    -1.65   0.099    -1242.053    106.5835 
      ydum09 |  -531.6636   312.5407    -1.70   0.089    -1144.232    80.90494 
      ydum10 |  -361.3806   277.3745    -1.30   0.193    -905.0245    182.2634 
      ydum12 |  -217.3975   247.5779    -0.88   0.380    -702.6413    267.8463 
      ydum13 |  -228.6986   222.9251    -1.03   0.305    -665.6237    208.2265 
      ydum14 |  -202.9676   197.9272    -1.03   0.305    -590.8978    184.9627 
      ydum15 |  -152.7979   176.3383    -0.87   0.386    -498.4146    192.8187 
      ydum16 |  -2.857297   154.4009    -0.02   0.985    -305.4775    299.7629 
      ydum17 |   27.41674   139.0993     0.20   0.844    -245.2129    300.0463 
      ydum18 |  -27.44256   130.1356    -0.21   0.833    -282.5036    227.6185 
 naics325411 |   368.4936   1697.746     0.22   0.828    -2959.028    3696.016 
 naics325412 |   30.06931   396.9428     0.08   0.940    -747.9242    808.0628 
 naics325413 |  -79.32542   531.5456    -0.15   0.881    -1121.136    962.4849 
       _cons |   130.3243   437.9175     0.30   0.766    -727.9781    988.6267 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2670.4126 
     sigma_e |  1214.4722 








BIOSCAN FIELDS AND THEIR DESCRIPTIONS 
 
Company records: include only those fields for which information has been obtained.  Dates are 
included, when possible, to reflect the approximate occurrence of events. 
 
Company Name and Address: Displays main address, telephone, fax, web site, and e-mail 
address, if known. Second addresses are given for major research facilities or U.S. facilitates of 
non-U.S. companies. (Fax, e-mail, and second addresses are not searchable fields.) 
 
Key Personnel: Displays management involved in relevant marketing and R&D areas, including 
chairperson of the board, president, chief operating officer (COO), chief executive officer 
(CEO), executive or senior vice presents, director of R&D (research and development), and 
director of marketing.  Also includes names of senior scientists and researchers. 
 
Employees: Displays total number of employees, along with a breakdown of the number of 
PhDs/MDs/DVMs on staff, if known. 
 
History: Displays information on founders, founding date, name changes, major acquisitions, 
previous subsidiaries or investments, and organization memberships. 
 
Facilities: Includes type and location of facilities involved in biotechnology, including size (in 
square feet or square meters). 
 
Stock-Financial History: Contains information on public/private status; initial funding; stock 
exchange and ticker symbol; and public offerings, including date, price of stock at issuance, 
number of shares offered, and value.  For public companies, it also includes financial for the 
most recently competed fiscal year, compare with the corresponding figures for the previous 
year. 
 
Private Placements: Lists arrangements made through investment firms to fund clinical research 
for products in development.  Information may include date, dollar value, and designation of 
funds. 
 
Subsidiaries/Divisions: Lists subsidiaries of biotechnology companies and, for non-
biotechnology companies, only those subsidiaries involved in biotechnology.  The address, 
management, and research interests are listed, if readily available.  (A company usually is 
considered a subsidiary if 51% or more is owned by the parent company.)  Also included are 
divisions of large companies that focus on biotechnology. 
Subsidiary of: Lists the parent company. 
 
Investments: Lists investments by biotechnology companies.  For non-biotechnology 
companies, data generally are limited to investments in the biotechnology industry.  Joint 
ventures also are listed here. 
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Principal Investors: Lists the principal investors in the biotechnology company. 
 
Financial Information: Lists general information, which may include R&D budget, nonprofit 
offshoots, or investment arms of the company. 
 
Business Strategy: Lists general corporate goals and missing statement. 
 
Agreements: Lists a brief summary of the product(s) and content of the agreement, and the date 
the agreement commenced.  Also includes federal grants awarded, such as SBIR grants.  
Agreements are arranged alphabetically by company/ organization.  Parentheses after a company 
name may contain geographic qualifiers or the name of its parent company. 
 
Research and Development: Lists general research interests and technologies worked on by the 
company or its subsidiaries.  Research conducted through agreements with other companies also 
is included. 
 
Products on the Market: Lists 1) all products of biotechnology companies; and 2) 
biotechnology products of nonbiotechnology (e.g., chemical and pharmaceutical) companies. 
 
Product in developments: Lists generic, trade name, and uses of the product.  The status refers 
to standard stages for a U.S. drug or other product in development.  For Human Therapeutics, 
they are, in order:  
 
• Preclinicals; 
• IND (Investigational New Drug Application); 
• Phase I; 
• Phase II; 
• Phase III; 
• NDA (New Drug Application) –for biologicals, the PLA (Product License Approval is 




FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS OF DRUG@FDA DATABASE 
1. What is the purpose of Drugs@FDA, and what are its main uses?  
Drugs@FDA is a Web site where you can search for official information about FDA approved 
brand name and generic drugs.  
The main uses of Drugs@FDA are: 
• Finding labels for approved drug products.  
• Finding generic drug products for a brand name drug product.  
• Finding therapeutically equivalent drug products for a brand name or generic drug 
product.  
• Finding consumer information for drugs approved from 1998 on.  
• Finding all drugs with a specific active ingredient.  
• Viewing the approval history of a drug.  
2. What Drug Products are in Drugs@FDA?  
Drugs@FDA contains prescription and over-the-counter human drugs currently approved for 
sale in the United States.  Drugs@FDA also contains discontinued drugs.  
Drugs@FDA contains the following biological therapeutic products:  
• Monoclonal antibodies for in-vivo use  
• Cytokines, growth factors, enzymes, immunomodulators; and thrombolytics  
• Proteins intended for therapeutic use that are extracted from animals or microorganisms, 
including recombinant versions of these products (except clotting factors)  
• Other non-vaccine therapeutic immunotherapies  
Not all biologic therapeutic products are in Drugs@FDA. 
Drugs@FDA contains most of the drug products approved since 1939.  The majority of labels, 
approval letters, reviews, and other information are available for drug products approved from 
1998 to the present.  
3. What Drug Products are not in Drugs@FDA?  
Drugs@FDA does not include:  
• Dietary supplements.  
• Drugs for animals.  FDA's Center for Veterinary Medicine is responsible for the 
agency's oversight of these products.  
• Drugs withdrawn for reasons of safety or effectiveness. 
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• Over-the-counter products that are approved for marketing through a process other than 
submitting a New Drug Application.   
• Prescription drugs sold in countries other than the United States.   
• Prescription drugs sold (illegally) in the United States without FDA approval.  
• Drugs that are under review at FDA for which no action regarding approval has 
occurred.   
• Biological products including bacterial and viral vaccines; human blood products; 
certain blood products produced by biotechnology; and gene therapy. FDA's Center for 
Biologics Evaluation and Research is responsible for the agency's oversight of these 
products.   
4. Why doesn't Drugs@FDA include dietary supplements? 
• Dietary supplements do not require FDA approval to be sold in the United States.  FDA's 
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition is responsible for the agency's oversight of 
these products. 
5.  How can I find out if a generic drug is available for a brand name drug? 
• Find the "Drug Details" page for your drug by following Instructions to Finding Health 
Information.  
• If a generic drug is available, you will see the link "Therapeutic Equivalence" in the 
middle of the Drug Details page. Click on this link to see the generic and other 
therapeutically equivalent drug products for your drug.  
• Be sure to read the definitions for Generic Drug and Therapeutic Equivalents.  
6. What information is available for each drug product in Drugs@FDA? 
Search results for all drug products include: 
• drug name (brand name or generic name)  
• active ingredient  
• dosage form or route of administration  
• strength  
• marketing status (prescription, over-the-counter, or discontinued)  
• company that sponsored an application for approval  
• FDA action date  
• Supplement type (type of regulatory action)  
Many, but not all drug products have links to: 
• current FDA approved labels  
• older labels  
• approval letters  
• reviews (scientific analyses of new drug applications that provide the basis for approval)  
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7. How can I search Drugs@FDA? 
You can search by: 
• drug name   
• generic name  
• active ingredient  
• drug name and FDA Action Date range  
• application number (NDA, ANDA, BLA)  
• action dates of approvals and supplements in one, two, or three month blocks  
Detailed instructions for searching Drugs@FDA are available. 
8. How do searches work in Drugs@FDA? 
The drugs that are listed on the "Search Results" page are not always related in terms of their 
chemical makeup or the conditions they treat, and are not necessarily substitutable.  They appear 
together because their drug names or active ingredient names contain the words or parts of words 
you entered in the search box.  The text you searched for appears in bold letters in the search 
results. 
 
Even if drug products have the same active ingredient, dosage form, and strength, it might not be 
safe to use one in place of the other.  You should always consult a health care professional to 
determine if one drug can be safely substituted for another, that is, if they are therapeutically 
equivalent. 
How searches work: 
• When you enter a string of characters to search Drugs@FDA, you are searching for that 
string of characters in the exact order you typed them, anywhere in a drug name or an 
active ingredient name.  
o Example: 
If you enter "proz" you will retrieve drug products that have that four-letter string 
somewhere in their drug names or active ingredient names:  
 CEFPROZIL   [from the "Active Ingredient" column]  
 OXAPROZIN POTASSIUM   [from the "Active Ingredient" column]  
 PROZAC   [from the "Drug Name" column]  
 PROZAC WEEKLY   [from the "Drug Name" column] 
o Tip:  Enter as much of the name as you know to focus your results.  For example, 
if you know you want to retrieve the records for Prozac, enter the entire word. 
• If you enter two or more words separated by a space, Drugs@FDA will look for 
records containing both of the words, whether they occur together or apart, in either a 
drug name or an active ingredient name.  
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o Example: 
If you enter "claritin pseudoephedrine" you will retrieve drug products that have 
either one of those words in either their drug names or active ingredient names:  
 CLARITIN-D  (LORATADINE; PSEUDOEPHEDRINE SULFATE)  
 CLARITIN-D 24 HOUR  (LORATADINE; PSEUDOEPHEDRINE 
SULFATE)  
9. How often do you update Drugs@FDA? 
We add new drug approvals every day, sometimes several times throughout the day.  
10. Where does the information in Drugs@FDA come from?  
The information in Drugs@FDA comes from:  
• Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book)   
• Center-wide Oracle-based Management Information System (COMIS).  COMIS is used 
by FDA staff to track information about the receipt and review status of investigational 
new drug applications (INDs), new drug applications (NDAs), and abbreviated new drug 
applications (ANDAs).  
11. How can I get further assistance? 
• For general drug information:  
o Call 301-827-4573 or 888-INFO-FDA (1-888-463-6332)  
o E-mail your questions to druginfo@cder.fda.gov  
• For technical questions about this site, please use our Drugs@FDA Comments and 
Feedback form.  
 
FDA/Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
Division of Library and Information Services 
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